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In 1934, with the virtual collapse of its econcmy,
NewfoW1dland surrendered representative and responsible
government to a comnission appointed by the goverrunent of
the United Kingdom. At the same time technology such as
the airplane was increasing Newfoundland's strategic worth
and making its security an inportant factor in the defence
of North America. Yet, on the eve of World War II
NewfoW1dland had no local defence fOl-ces and depended for
protection on the distant and overextended resources of
Britain's Royal Navy.
When the internati ol"'.al situation deteriorated during
the late 1930s canada became concerned aOOut Newfoundland's
military weakness but was reluctant to become involved in
the colony':OJ defence. With the fall of France in 1940
Canada's relationship with Newfoundland underwent a
fundamental shift. Changing strategic considerations and
the country's 0\"11 defence requiretrents led directly to
canadian intervention. The despatch of military and air
force units to secure Newfoundland's vital airfields
represented the first stage of an extended comni.tment to
the island's defence.
A greater extension of Canadian control over
Newfoundland I s defence came with the establishment of W
Force. Comprised of elements of Canada' 5 expanded wartime
army, WForce was assigned responsibility for defending the
island against enemy incursions and providing t1ecurity for
existing and proposed defence facilities.
TI1e American decision to station tl"OOPS in
Newfoundland in 1940 posed '" threat to Canada I s pre-eminent
role in the island's defence. The canadian response was to
hedge Arrerican comnand responsibility, to increase the
Canadian comnitment and to integrate NewfolU1dland into the
Canadian defence orbit.
Newfoundland became less important to North American
defence as the war effort shifted towards Europe and the
Allied invasion of German-occupied Europe. This led to a
reduction of Canadian Active Service Force units in
Newfoundland and their replacement with personnel
conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization Act,
a situation that continued until the end of the war.
since the last decade of the nineteenth century canada
and Newfoundland had come closer together socially,
culturally and ccmnercially. World War II now brought them
together strategically and militarily. The interaction
between Canadians and Newfoundlanders was for the rrost part
amicable and ultimately beneficial for roth. For Canada it
had been a costly but necessary investment, given the tenor
of the times. Tens of millions had been poured into the
Newfoundland economy creating thousands of jobs and an
infrastructure that lasted beyond the war. canadian
ll.'1dertakings in Newfoundland were, however. based on sound
military practice and research for this paper fOillld
evidence that canada's activities were m:::>tivated by
anything other than wartime exigencies.
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'!he fact that the canadian Army took the main
responsibility for the physical defence of NewfoWldland during
world War II has never been given the full recognition it
deserves. Economic and political historians like David
Mackenzie, Insjde the Atlantic triangle· canada and the
Entrance of Newfoundland into confederation (Toronto: 1986)
and Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World
.l.22..9..=l.2. (Kingston: 1988), while helpful, deal alTlPst
exclusively with the financial and administrative arrangements
of canada's (and the United States') involvement in the
defence of Newfoundland in World War II. On the other hand
military historians like c. P. Stacey, ADDS Men and
Governments· The war Pglicies of canada 1939 - J945 (ottawa:
1970) and Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations between the
United States and canada 1939 - 1945 (Washington D.C.: 1957)
have. dealt with Canada's and the United States' role in
Newfoundland's defence only in general terms, content to
confine themselves to policy rather than offering an
explanation of how the undertaking was carried out. 'l'his
paper corrects this oversight by describing the crucial part
played by W Force and how it was organized, manned, equipped
and deployed to carry out its task.
Frcm the outset it was apparent that the topic could not
be adequately addressed without first describing
Newfoundland's and canada's pre-war positions in the North
Atlantic Triangle. This discussion is included here mainly in
the way of background and since it has been dealt with
exhaustively in IT'aI1y recent histories, such as those cited
abcNe, the author has relied alrrost exclusively on secondary
sources.
For the opening phase of the war as the canadian Anny
expanded and began the rronumental task of reorganizing itself
to defend canada and take on overseas conmitments the official
histories, such as C.P. Stacey, 11:l.e-..Qf..f.~he
canadian Anny jn the second World war VOllUDe I Sjx Years of
Hat: (Ottawa: 1957) and G.W.L. Nicholson, Tbe Gllnners of
canada· The Hjstory of the Royal Regiment Of Canadian
Artjllery yolJure II 1919 - 1967 (Toronto: 1972), still proved
to be th2. best sources.
Fran the arrival of the canadian Army in Newfoundland in
June 1940 until its departure in OCtober 1945 primary sources
were used alrrost exclusively. The main primary source was the
National Defence Department I s Records Group 24 contained in
the National Archives of canada, Ottawa. The War Diaries of
Headquarters W Force (seven volumes) as well as the War
Diaries of all the units that served in W Force (forty-seven
ii
volumes) were consulted. These War Diaries provided a
continuous record of events in Newfoundland throughout the
period. No significant gaps were found in these records and
little difficulty was encountered in reconstructing the events
from JLU1e 1940 to October 1945. In spite of wartime
censorship The Qaily News and 11Je Evenjng TelewAm were
beneficial in providing ;:1 local perspective of the canadian
Army while the Ottawa Cit.j zen provided a Canadian view. For
day-to-day activities and personal experiences and attitudes
the regimental histories of units stationed in Newfoundland
such as G.L. cassidy, Warpath, The St0t:y of the Algonqlljo
Regj.ment 1939 - 1945 (Toronto: 194B) and Geoffrey Hayes !he.
r,i ncs' A Hj stOry of the r,i ncol nand Welland Regj rIJent:....at.....Ha
(Alma: 19B6) , provided a detailed record and as well offered
sane interesting insights. Finally an indispensable source
for Canadian policy regarding NewfolU'ldland is the collection
of reproduced government documents edited by Paul Bridle,
LJocUments on Relatjons between canada and NewfQundland J935......=.
J949 VOll1me I Defence Civil Ayjation and Economic Affairs
(Ottawa: 1974)
The author is grateful to the many people who gave this
work critical reading and constructive advice. Deserving of
special thanks are: Dr. David Facey-Crowther, my original
supervisor, for his encouragement and guidance over a period
of several years, Dr. Malcolm MaCLeod, for his assistance and
iii
advice early on and a special debt is owed to Dr. Olaf Janzen,
my second supervisor, who helped me redefine and polish the
rTWluscript .
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Standing at the threshold of the New World Newfoundland
still cast a lingering glance at the old. Whenever an enemy
appeared to threaten any part of the Enpire it was ready to
take up anns and then, when the danger had passed, resume its
station as a rerrote and seemingly unimportant island in the
North Atlantic, secure behind the protecting shield of the
Royal Navy. This was the course followed in the Great War.
By the 19305, however, Newfoundland's rerroteness was being
lessened by fast developing technology such as the airplane
which, at the same time, greatly enhanced its strategic worth.
This only helped to underscore its vulnerability since Great
Britain, on whan it depet'-ded for its defence, had neither
military establishments nor naval facilities on the island.
Europeans first arrived in Newfoundland a millennitull ago
when Norse explorers visited and for a time settled on the tip
of the Great Northern Peninsula. Sustained European interest
in Newfoundland began only after John ca1:x:lt rediscovered the
island in 1497. Although the English laid claim to the island
by right of Cabot's discovery, it was the Portuguese, Spanish,
Basques and French who first established the island as a base
for a seasonal international fishery. Nevertheless, in 1713,
Great Britain was granted sovereignty over the island by the
Treaty of Utrecht and thereafter dominated the area.
'the island portion canprises an area of 42,000 squilxe
miles. 1 In 1927, after much political and legal wrangling and
considerable acrirrony between Newfoundland and Canada the
Judicial Coomittee of the Privy COlUlcil confirmed
NewfoW1dland's ownership of Labrador. This added another
110,000 square miles to the Domi.nion.~ Geologically it is
Appalachian but it is much rrore rugged than the Appalachian
region of the rreinland. In the period of glaciation its
highlands were scraped bare of soil and its valleys clogged
with infertile glacial drift. In consequence rrore than
seventy-five per cent of the total area is agriculturally
unredeemable. Even where the soil is tillable the short
growing season and alrrost constant threat of frost place
lvavid MacKenzie, Insjde the Atlantjc Trjangle: CanadaJUld
the Entrance of Newfoundland Into ContedeJ:at.iQn, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1982) p.3.
~ C.J. Frother, "canada·s Tenth Province?" in.canadian
=:J~;~~tbel&b;hPA~iant~~e~;jd ~g~:l ~;~~kingston and
toontreal: McGill-QUeen's University Press, 1988) p.8.
severe limits on production,) In fact, even in the 1930s,
Nf:wfoundland's environmental realities would defeat the
determined efforts of the Newfoundland government to prorrote
agricultural settlement as a way of solving the social and
economic crisis of the Great Depression. 4
The 6, 000 miles of shoreline cOl.-responds to the general
topography; it is rough and barren, bordered in turn by flats
and cliffs and dotted with countless reefs and islands. 5
Although there are many bays and inlets which offer safe
inshore anchorage, good harbours are relatively rare since
IIDre often than not "they are too small, too foggy, too
shallow, too open, too liable to freeze in winter or be filled
with northerrl pack ice for long periods in the spring. ,,6
Newfoundland has often justifiahly been maligned
accOlUlt of its climate. In fact, Newfoundland's climate is
lMalcc:m H. Clark, "OUtpost No.1: Newfoundland" in HaI:pem
Maga"zio,e, (Vol CLXXXII February 1941) p.249.
·W. Gordon Handcock, "The cemni.ssion of GclVernment' s Land
Settlement Scheme in NewfoundlancP! in James K. Hiller and Peter
Neary (eds.) , Twentieth centm:y MewfOllOdland' Explqratjons, (St.
John's: Breakwater, 1994) pp. 123-151.
5R.A. MacKay, NewfouO!'Hand. Econcmjc p;pJqnatjc and
Strategic Stlldjes, (Toronto: OXford University Press, 1946)
p.486.
6A.R.M. Lower, "Newfoundland in North American Strategy" in
~i5W Affajrs (Vol XX July 1942) p.767.
carparable to that of Southern Alaska. Because of the virtual
encirclement of the island by the cold water of the Labrador
CUrrent the sea exerts a dominating influence on the climate,
rroderating roth sumner and winter temperatures."/ Perhaps the
rrost serious climatic handicap is the descent of pack ice fran
the north which normally reaches its greatest extent in April
and delays the arrival of spring. 8
In 1B17 London appointed a full-time governor but
Newfoundland's status as a colony was not fully established
until 1825, ~ In 1B32 a legislature similar to that of Nova
Scotia was established. 10 Then in 1B55, Responsible
Government, again on the lines recognized seven years earlier
in Nova SCotia, was granted.H Nevertheless Newfoundland's
political and constitutional evolution did not parallel that
of the rest of British North .America; NewfOlmdland's uniq,Je
geographical and political situation resulted in a different
7Mac«enzie, Atlantjc Triangle, p.3.
SLower, "Newfoundland ll , p.787.
~St. JaM Chadwick, Newfoundland· Island into province
(London: cambridge University Press, 1967) p.l3.
l0C3~ory Goldwin, "Newfoundland is all North America's
Problemll J.O Satllrday Njght, (November 30, 1940) p.7. See also
Neary, North Atlaptlc World, p.G.
llNeary, North Atlantic World, p.4.
sort of developnent. U
When the Fathers of Confederation rret in Quebec in 1864
Newfoundlar.d was represented as a prospective province. The
people of Newfoundland, however, had limited political, social
and cultural, or even ccmnercial affinity with the other
3ritish colonies of North America and so the proffered terms
were rejected. ll A bank crash in 1894 resulted in financial
collapse and social distress in the country and led
Newfoundland to reopen negotiations for entrance into
Confederation. canada, however, set such unsatisfactory terms
for its entry that, although in grievous distress,
Newfoundland could not accept. 14 This left a legacy of
bitterness on both sides and solidified a deep resentment
towards canada on the part of scme Newfoundlanders. 15
The rejection of confederation notwithstanding there were
numerous ronds between the two countries. canadian banks
rapidly took advantage of the economic hiatus. They initiated
Newfoundland operations bringing their canadian currency with
HMackenzie, Atlantic Tda'"'Gle, pp.7-8.
llGoldwin, North lvrer;ca's pmblem, p.? See also Neary,
North Atlantic World, p.G.
14.Ibid.
lSMacKenzie, Atlantic Trjangle, p.10.
them. In fact, in 1895 the t\roO currencies were made equal by
law. canadian banks soon daninated the island's econcmy and
followed by other ccmrercial interests which becaJre
p::YtoIerful in transportation and mining. Inescapably, social
relationships followed. '!his included the interchange of
people which led to significant links between churches,
fraternal and service organizations. Mutual interests led the
two goverrments to cooperate in several permanent arrangements
for joint administrative action for such functions as the
building and maintenance of lighthouses and sharing
meterological services. Even in the field of education there
were nurrerous official ties between the two countries. The
result was a linking of shared experience which inevitably
brought the two CCIlTTlJIlities closer together. l'
After World War I, as many of the Dcrninions sought
greater autonany fran Great Britain, Newfoundland was
curiously reluctant to follow their lead. '!be Dcminions, with
the exception of Newfoundland, signed the Paris Peace
Agreements and opted for separate mentership in the League of
Nations. In the period 1919 -1926, as the II'Ore assertive
Dominion Coventrents sought to enhance their stature by
"For a wider discussion of Canadian/Newfoundland links see
Malcolm MacLeod, Kjndred CQllntries· NewfOundland and CBnadrl
Before Omfederation Historical Bc:xJklet No. 52 (Ottawa: Canadian
Historical Association, 1994)
participating in international relations, Newfoundland,
although exercising sorre of the prerogatives of an independent
Dominion, was content to leave international negotiations up
to the British GOvernment, taking direct part only when its
particular and narrowly defined interests were at stake.
Newfoundland participated in the drafting of the Balfour
Declaration of 1926 which defined the positions and relations
of Great Britain and the D:::minions. This declaration of
equality notwithstanding, Newfoundland's failure to seek
membership in the league of Nations or to undertake direct and
substantive international initiatives ensured that its
position as a Dominion remained both ambiguous and confused. 11
The economy of Newfoundland was essentially a colonial
economy, that is to say, the dynamic factor in the econcmy was
the production of staple products for export rather than a
production of consumers' goods for the home rrarket. 18 Econcxni.c
returns frem natural resources at any given m::::rrent depended
solely uPJn the market. Newfoundland, exporting up to
seventy-five per cent of what it produced, was dependent uPJn
17william c. Gilrrore, NeHfa\JndJand and IJqnjnion Statl!6,
(Agincourt, Ontarll,: carswell Co.Ltd., 1988) pp. 1.-8.
I°MacKay, NewfQl mdJ and, p.17.
world fl\3.rkets which its government was powerless to
influenceY Yet, with an optimism which was hardly warranted
by the econcrnic limitations of the country, succeeding
Newfoundland governments, particularly after World War I,
substantially increased the public debt by borrowing abroad,
When the storm of the Great Depression struck the """rId in
1930 Newfoundland suffered drastically. 20
In the early stages of the Depression the Newfoundland
Government atterrpted to alleviate the crisis in the
traditional manner: by relief, public works and additional
borrowing. These measures had no effect, It might have been
possible to balance the budget by defaulting on the public
debt but the government was unwilling to take that fateful
step, By 1932 Newfoundland was unable t.o borrow any
additional funds in world markets. Finally in 1933 with the
economy in virtual collapse the Dominion asked the Government
19Stanley saunders and E. Black, "Newfoundland: Sentinel of
the St, Lawrence" in Behjnd the Headlines (Vol III September
1943) p.3, see also Neary, North Atlantic World, pp. 10-1!.
2°Maxwell Cohen "Newfoundland in Transition" in~~iJ:Ufua~h;'1~~6~b:P'~~' ~~~lsR~d ~I~iH~~~~W~~~ and
=~n~j;~:{ j ~£h~&i'n~te~~aa~~li:nIT~t~g:~t~~iZ~ e~sa~
jn Interpretatjon (Toronto-Buffalo-London: 1980) F;lP, 181-204
arovides an excellent expose of Newfoundland politJ..cs in the
A~r:~j~e~,u~~o19~~1~reat Depression, See also Neary, Noz:t.h
of the United Kingdan to appoint a Royal carmission to
investigate conditions and recorrmend a course of action to
address the situation. Frcm this inquiry emerged the
celebrated Ann]] Tee Report _~l In a scathing indictment the
report attributed Newfoundland I s plight to the venality of its
past political leaders and to unsound practices in public
administration and finance. While admittedly Newfoundland
politics left much to be desired, the Ccmnission treasured
Newfoundland's };plitical leadership and administrative
efficiency against the highly-developed structure of the
United Kingdom. Given Newfoundland I s tmique historical
circumstances and its tiny population spread over a large area
severely lacking in carrnunications the carparison was hardly
fair. Arrong the comni.ssion' s recorrmendations the most
important and far-reaching was that elected government be
suspended until the emergency had passed. In 1934, therefore,
representative and responsible government was surrendered and
administrative and financial control was passed to a British-
appointed COOmission responsible to the Parliament of the
United Kingdcxn through the Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs. It carprised a govenlor and six cemnissioners:
I'Great Britain. Newfoundland Royal camdssion 1933. RepQrt.
Presented to the Secretanr of State for JXmj don Affajrs to
Parliament by CgIrMnd of Hjs Majesty Noyember J933. (London:
H.M.S.O., 1933)
three British and three Newfoundlanders. 2~
The aim of the cemnission was to get the country back on
a firm econcmic footing by balancing the budget while
providing the basis for long-term economic planning and
developuent. 2J with the help of grants-in-aid from Whitehall,
the Cornuission irrplemented many achninistrative changes and
atterrpted several irrq;lOrtant social and ecol.omic reforms; but
on the eve of the Second WOrld War Newfo\.U1dland was still
mired econanically. 24
NEWFOUNDLAN[)' s PART Pi tN mRLP WAR I
For nearly a hundred years after 1815, Newfoundland had
lived an existence undisturbed by any thoughts of war. Since
the War of 1812 no fighting had taken place near its shores.
After the withdrawal of the Ircperial garrison in 1.870,
soldiers and uniforms had becane objects of curiosity. TIle
only war-like instruments to be seen were a few old cannon,
relics of half-forgotten struggles with the French during the
22Peter Neary, "Great Britain and the FUture of Newfoundland
1939-1945" in Newfoundland Stlldies (Vol.1, No.1, Spring 1985)
p.29.
nPeter Neary, ed, The PO] j tjcal Economy of Newfoundland
~ (Toronto: COpp Clark Publishers, 1973) p.ll.
24Neary, "Great Britain", p.29.
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only the occasional
visit of a warship of the Royal Navy served to remind the
islanders of the great force to which they owed their
protection against possible foreign aggression. War appeared
irrpossible, at least as far as Newfoundlanders were concerned,
and even if it came, it was not expected to disturb greatly
the tranquil habits of life of this small and remote
camn.mity.2s
Newfoundland, however, retained a strong sentimental
attachlTent to Great Britain as the "M::lther Country" and
whenever an enemy appeared to threaten any part of the Enpire
the colony was always ready to take up arms. 26 Regiments of
volunteers for army service had been raised periodically since
the early eighteenth centlrrY while her seamen, known for their
stamina and strall lxJat handling ski Us, had served throughout
the fleet fran the earlieBt dayB of Bettlement .27 At the sarre
time the Royal Navy had controlled. the Atlantic and interposed
its tremendous power between Britain I B North Arrerican
~6Saunders and Black, "Sentinel", p.ll.
~1C.P. Stacey, Military problems of canada· A Sllrvey
of Defence problems and strategjc cnnditjons (Toronto:
Ryerson Press, 1940)p.17,
11
possessions and any possible enemy. Newfoundland had grown to
nationhood in its shadow and "had care to accept it alrost as
a fact of geography. "26 The aim of British naval strategy was
to contain a European enemy in hare waters to prevent his
escape westward, and if that occurred, to engage and defeat
the enemy fleet in a single decisive battle as Nelson did at
Trafalgar. This strategy proved successful for nearly a
century after the Battle of Trafalgar .29 But by the twentieth
century technological changes and naval rivalry had gravely
weakened the British hegerrony of the North Atlantic. 30
In the S1..1lTITer of 1914 Newfoundlanders paid little
attention to the growing possibility of a European conflict.
Nevertheless, on 4 August, as a loyal mefl1ber of the Ehpire,
Newfoundland fourxi itself at war. Although few of its
citizens could have even the slightest carprehension of what
this rreant, in an outpouring of patriotic fervour the
Newfoundland government irrmediately placed the Newfoundland
28Joseph Schull, The Far pjstant ShjpS' An Qfficial
30Paul Bridle, ed., DQClIID;mts on Relations Between
canada and Newfoundland 1934-1949 Vol I (Ottawa: Department
of External Affairs, 1974) p.XLVII
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Royal Naval Reserve (NRNR) on active duty.31
At the end of the nineteenth century the Adniralty
recognized the value of having available in Newfoundland a
reserve of trained seamen prepared to augment the fleet when
required. '!he initial intake of fifty fisherrren enrolled in
1900 proved so successful that in 1902 HMS~ was sent to
St. JaM's to be permanently stationed there as a training
ship. The NRNR was an Imperial force, not a colonial or
dominion one. '!his meant that all the officers and staff were
of the Royal Navy and that the NRNR was administered by the
Admiralty. Recruiting and training continued during the
succeeding years with a pattern of training which was well
suited to the seasonal occupations of the Newfoundlanders.
Regulations provided for naval training to be carried out in
warships during the autumn and winter since this would cause
the miniIlU.lm of interference with the men I s normal errployrrent
in the fishery. In addition to their pay as naval ratings
they received an annual retainer which bound them to report
for service afloat when called upon. During World War I the
unit proved its value since 1,964 rnent>ers served throughout
the fleet. By 1920, however, enrollees had been discharged
and no further enrollments were made. The Newfoundland Royal
l1S.J.R. Noel, POljtics jn Newfoundland (TorontO:
University of Toronto Press, 1971) p.120.
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Naval Reserve with its splendid war record and first rate
tradition of service ceased to exist.J2
At the same titre as the Royal Naval Reserve mustered the
Newfoundland Regiment was formed in St. John's and from there
on 4 OCtober, 1914, five hundred. and thirty seven volunteers
sailed for Ergland. It was brought up to full strength in
SCOtland where it was designated the First Newfoundland
Regiment. From Gallipoli to Flanders it fought with
distinction and covered itself in glory in innumerable
actions, winning scores of decorations, and producing the
youngest VC in the Dtpire. Of particular note was the Battle
of Beaurront Halrel, where, on July 1, 1916 the Regiment was
coomi.tted in a futile and suicidal attack and was virtually
annihilated, suffering 720 casualties in less than one hour.
In February 1917 it was accorded the prefix "Royal", a
singular mark of distinction since it was only the third
British regiment in history and the only one in World War I to
receive the award in war-time. Of the Regiment's total
enlistment of 6,242 no less than twenty percent were killed.
Upon the Regiment's return from overseas the Colours were laid
up and like the many units fran Newfoundland which,
periodically since 1709, had served their sovereign in war, it
J2Hector Swain, History of the Naval Reserves in
Newfoundland (St. John's: Provincial Archives, 1975) pp.1-S
14
too passed into history.33
World War I brought the first threat since Trafalgar to
tHe security of all North l\merica, Newfoundland included,
because for the first time Great Britain's naval supremacy was
contested. Of particular worry were enemy subnarines for if
they penetrated. the Atlantic they could pose a serious
challenge to the surface navy. Extremely alarmed at this
prospect, Admiral George Patey, COlTmander-in-Chief of the
American and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy informed
the Admiralty that his "comparatively large and slow cruisers"
were useless for anti-subTlarine warfare.34 Newfoundland was
similarly alarmed.
The jugular vein of the Newfoundland
econc:rny was tormage. Saltfish was
transported to Europe and Caribbean
=~~'Li~~t>t :a i;;wt~~tsg~~:d
paper went to Great Britain; iron ore to
Nova SCOtia and the United States.
Incoming carriers brousht basic foodstuffs
from canada and the United States, rrolasses
from the British West Indies, coal fran
North Sydney, salt from Spain, and fran the
l3G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadjan ExpedjtjQDa~
Official History of the canadian Army in the First WprJd
war, (Ottawa: \).leens Printer, 1962) pp.507-510.
Po] it~~6reH'j:i~;f1rnaaU~~t:gje~~iHig%:r
(University of Toronto: D:ct.or of Philosophy Thesis, 1982)
p.303.
uni ted Kingdom, dry goods and confectioneries.
The colony also irrported raw materials and
~~~~~i~fu~~l~r~~~~lrr:df~tu~~~el~rposes.
provided the chief, and often only link, with the
coomunities along the coast .35
NeWfOW1dland's defence resources were extremely limited
but on the advice of the Admiralty the Home Defence Comnittee
put into place rudimentary anti-subnarine measures.
Detachments of the Newfoundland Regiment and Newfoundland
Constabulary manned look-out posi tions along the coast of the
island and labrador and three vessels, only one of which was
anned, patrolled inshore waters. Their task was to lI watch the
rell'Ote bays and inlets where U-boats might refuel with the
help of local agents or a disguised mother-ship."36 At St.
John's guns were installed overlooking the entrance to t.he
harbour. 37
lSpatricia Ruth O'Brien, The Newfollndland patriotic
Association' The Adminjstration of the War 8ffurt ]9]4-]918
(Merrorial university of Newfoundland: Master of Arts
Thesis, 1982) p.228.
l'Sarty, Silent sentry, p.304.
l70'Brien, Patriotic Association, p.228. In fact, it
was not until 1918 that German sub:rarines penetrated as far
west as the continental shelf of eastern North America. In
that ~ear one hundred conmercial vessels of all types
~~~lc~gC:~~r-&~~~r~~Shtdk~~~e~~e~I~~~~i~i;hor
Participant? Allied Fishing Fleets and U-Boat Attacks in
World Wars I and II" in "'e Northern Mariner/Ie Marin dt!
Nm:d (Vol 1 No.4 OCtober 1991) pp. 2-5.) See: also Michael
L. Hadley and Rcger Sarty, Tin POts and pirate ShipS'
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In 1916 Newfoundland re3.ched an agreement with the
Canadian Government whereby c:.,;astal patrols were coordinated
under a central ccmnand bas,:d at Sydney. 38 A wireless
ccmmmications system between the two countries was
established so that information concerning enemy subnarines
collected by their respective patrol and coast-watching
organizations might be quickly shared. canada's anti-
sut:marine patrol in the Gulf of St . Lawrence took
responsibility for the south and west coasts of the island
enabling Newfoundland to concentrate its efforts on the
exposed north-east coast fron cape Race to Cape Chidley.39 By
1917, however, lacking the means to provide effective forces
against an increasing sutrrarine threat Newfoundland dropped
back its participation and relied on canadian anti-sul::marine
patrols for the protection of its coast. 40 By the end of
World War I Great Britain had reemerged as mistress of the
With the Genran navy carpletely vanquished no other
European rival could challenge her naval power. Newfoundland
was able to resume its place as a remote and seemingly
l8Q'Brien, Patriotic Association, pp.228-229.
l~Sarty, SiJent Sentry, p.30S.
4°0 'Brien, Patrjotjc AssocjatioD, p.232.
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uninportant island in a safe and secure North Atlantic. 41 But
the reliance upon canada foreshadowed events in World War II
when the island I s strategic irrportance required similar
cooperation.
NIiWfPl'NJ)]' !NP I S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
By the mid 1930s it was obvious to rrany that the
collision course embarked upon by the European powers must
eventually drift into war. Defence, however, remained a low
priority for the Ccmnission of Government. Faced. with
danestic crises of unemployment, poverty and economic
stagnation that were alrrost insunrountable, the Ccmnission had
little titre and fewer resources to spend on defence problems.
Nor did defence seem scmething for which Newfoundland should
take responsibility. Unlike the other Dominions, Newfoundland
had never assumed responsibility for its own local defence;
with the demise after the war of the Newfoundland Royal Naval
Resezve and the Royal Newfoundland Regirent, the civil
constabulary becare the only organized force on the Island. <12
With its tiny population and weak econcrny it was impossible
for Newfoundland to maintain a separate defence establisrunent
41MacKay, Newfoundland, p.G.
42Stacey, Mjljtary problems, pp. 17-18.
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without outside help. Yet, when the suspension of responsible
government in 1934 placed liability for its defence directly
on Great Britain, the Irrperial government took no steps to
provide either military establishrrents or naval facilities on
the island. Newfoundland's defence continued tu rest solely
on the Royal Navy 1 s control of the North Atlantic. 43
canada was also reluctant to enter into defence
agreerrents respecting Newfoundland though the
international situation was deteriorating rapidly in the 1930s
and despite the fact that Canada had several good reasons to
be concerned with Newfoundland's defence.44 For one thing the
Bell Island mines were the source of iron ore for the Sydney
smelters which represented thirty per cent of canada's
productive capacity in stee1.45 For another Newfoundland
projected far out into the Atlantic and was closer to Europe
than any other part of the Western Hemisphere. As a result
the island was the linchpin in the trans-Atlantic
ccmnunications system since no less than sixteen underwater
dMaCKay, Newf01IDdJand, p.492.
~4MaCKenzie. Atlant.k....D:iangle, p. 22.
~sMacKay. NewfOlIDdJand, p.493.
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cables terminated on its shores. 46 Most irrportaJ.1t,
Newfoundland carmanded the approaches to the St. Lawrence
River and lay alongside the shipping lanes t.o Europe. No
potential enemy could fail to note the imnense advantage to be
gained from its possession and in hostile hands it would pose
a severe threat to the neighbouring mainland, limiting
canadian access to the sea by way of the Straits of Belle Isle
and the cal::ot Strait and threatening the approaches to Halifax
and Saint John. In friendly hands, however, Newfoundland
contributed to canadian security. since it would cover the
Bt. Lawrence, naval forces based on the island would be in a
position to protect the sea approaches and strike effectively
at the flank. of any enemy roving by sea against Halifax or
Saint Johr1.41
World War I showed that the old device of naval warfare,
the convoy system, was the roost effective protection against
the sul::marine threat. In support of convoy operations the
dockyard and oil storage facilities at the port of St. John's,
long a minor British naval station, could prove invaluable.
Although its harbour was too small to be used for collecting
46G.W.L. Nicholson, "OUr Fighting Forces in World War
Ill' in Book of Newfound] and (Se. John's: Newfoundland Book
Publishers, 1967) p.497.
47Stacey, Mjlitary Problems, p.1?
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convoyS, as an advance convoy escort base St. John I s could
extend SUWOrt across the long gap in the mid-Atlantic and
provide a secure haven for rest and replenislTnent. 48
Nevertheless the war would be rrore than a year old before any
concrete steps would be taken to strengthen its defences and
make use of its facilities.49
Not only would its harbours be useful as naval stations
but airports in Newfoundland could provide bases fran which to
fly reconnaissance, convoy protection and strike missions out
into the Atlantic. And, fortuitously, by 1939 there were two
available. 1be Gander and Bot\\lClOd air bases, which were ':0
figure so prcminently as military installations in World War
II, were C'aTI"l'ercial rather than military in their inception.
In 1935, based on a IU.Jltber of successful experirrental flights
between North Arrerica and Eurqle. the goverments of Great
Britain, canada, Ireland and Newfoundland agreed that a
regular trans-Atlantic air service should be established as
soon as landing and servicing facilities could be made
available. 'lb this end Great Britain, with NewfOl.mdland
48Bridle, External Affairs rhcnments, p.XLIV.
49For a description of the RCN I 5 wartime efforts at
building and maintaining the advance naval base at St.
John's see Bernard Ransan, t1canada's 'NewfyjOM' Tenancy:
The Royal canadian Navy in St. John's 1941-1945" in
Acadiens.is. (Vol XXIII No. 2 Spring, 1994) pp. 45-71.
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sharing the cost, undertook to construct in NewfolUldland an
airfield and seaplane base. 50
Botwood was selected as the site for the seaplane base.
Located on the Bay of Exploits, BotW<X>d was a seaport for the
shipnent of newsprint and are. It was connected to the main
line of the island's railway by a spur line and offered a
large sheltered harbour for landings. The necessary
preparations proceeded quickly and by 1937 the first flying
boats had landed. ~1
The site selected for the ai't'field was on a wide level
plateau in central NewfolUldland which had a reputation for
good weather. 52 Additionally, it was close to Gander lake
50Bridel, External Affairs !bcJlments, p. XLIV.
~lMichelle Martin, The Mi litarv Hi story of Gander
Ai..rpQI:t. (unpublished manuscript prepared for canadian Forces
Base Gander, 19BB) pp.3-4.
52Th.e name Gander is now so familiar that it is hard to
~~l~i~fi~rdt~~rit:a~a~~ye~~;~si~~ ~~~~1:mI~hitne: of
known as "the airport at Hattie's canp near Gander Lake."
~~tKa:~r~~~ien~~u~~~cinaih~~I~i~~~y~ I ~nt~red
the area at Mile Post 213 on the Newfoundland Railway. The
first aizport workers referred to Mile Post 213 as 'Hattie t s
carrp'. A few miles to west of Mile Post 213 a railway work
section had established a carrp near cobbs Pond, which became
known as 'cobbs C8rrp' a name sanetimes erroneously used for
~~~ ~i~~he ~~i~i~~n~c7~~~f~~a11~1I~~~7.ai~r~ew
railway station built to support the project was similarly
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which could acccmrodate seaplanes. 'I11e original architects of
the airfield were indeed visionaries since tHe aircraft which
would eventually use the facility had not yet been built and
thei:r: perfonnance could not be forecast with accuracy. To
allow for future requirements they decided to construct
extensive landing and taxi areas with unobstructed approaches.
The airfield was designed and built on massive lines. By the
outbreak of war in 1939 it was ceupletec and ready for
operation. It had four large runways, the largest paved area
of any airport in the warld. 53 The cost which had caused so
much consternation in peacetirre was quickly forgotten. The
value of a fully operational airport in such a strategic
position could not yet be fully assessed. There was, however,
a very strong perception at the time that the loss of Gander
to an enemy would bring the industrial heartland of Canada
within the radius of its planes. 54 Although we now know that
natredi thus the mailing address became 'Newfoundland
Airport, Newfoundland Ail.port, Newfoundland'. This name
continued in use lUltil 1941 when it was su~ested that since
~g~~eo~~~; ttr~e~~~ioc~reda;~o~~~~~f~~e~e~ii~:~and
Argentia) the name was continually causing confusion. And
~~seg~fe~s~~~ I~~t~nPa~~ g:ena~d~~ ~~ITt~'us:r
throughout. Michelle Martin, The Mi 1i tary Hi story of Gander
A.i...l:::PQr.t. (unpublished m:muscript prepared for canadian
Forces Base Gander, 1988).
5J.Ihid....., pp.6-7
:MGraham, "Britdin's Defence". p.278.
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the Gennan~ aircraft did not possess that ability,
perceptions outweighed plausibility and shaped defence
thinking.
NEWFOtlNDLANP I S DEFENCE DILmMA
As the intemational situation deteriorated and
rearmament continued apace there was consensus in Whitehall
that although serre increasingly belligerent states, chiefly
Japan and Italy, might well threaten the far-flung territories
of the British Enpire, only Germany, because of its geographic
position and its industrial potential, could directly threaten
the survival of Britain itself. ~s
The Admiralty measured naval power in terms of battleship
tormage. Naval balance was calculated according to the
relative strength of capital ships possessed by British and
foreign fleets. By this calculation the fledgling German navy
at the begirming of the 1930s scarcely counted since it was
coopletely outgunned by the fifteen capital ships of the Royal
Navy. Based on World War I experience, however, some far-
sighted Royal Navy officers pointed out that in a future
sSWesley K.Wark, The mtjIT\3te Enemy' BritiSh
Intelligence and Nazj GexwlDY 1933-1939 (Ithaca, New York:
Comell University Press, 1985) p.l?
conflict with unrestricted subnarine warfare, anti-subnarine
warships, convoy escorts and perhaps the fleet air arm would
bear a greater part of the burden. Britain was somewhat
deficient in these weapons but the Admiralty placed great
confidence in a new invention - ASDIC - a sonar device for
locating su1::m::!rged sul:::u>arines, which it believed would largely
nullify the sul:::marine threat in a future war. 56
By 1939, however, a revitalized German navy posed a
formidable threat to British naval supremacy. British Naval
intelligence estimated that Germany's ultra-rrodern navy
consisted of:
two 45, 000 ton battleships, superior to any
vessel afloat, but believed about a year fran
ca:rpletion, a large aircraft carrier also
uncarpleted, two 26,000 ton battleships, three
10, 000 ton pocket battleships, whose deadliness far
exceeded their displacement; ei$ht cruisers,
twenty-two destroyers, twenty-s~xmerchant vessels
which were being converted to armed merchant
cruisers, and some fifty su1::Jn'larines whose number
was increasing by about two per rronth. 51
The protecting shield of the Royal Navy, Newfoundland's only
security against this growing threat, was little rrore than a
56.Ibid....., p.1l3.
51Schull, Far Pj stant Shjps, p.7.
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barrier eatprised of ships in constant rrotion. While it might
eventually catch and destroy any large German assault force
and probably any lone ship, it could not eliminate the
possibility of a "oolt fran the blue," a swift incursion by an
enemy around or between the far-ranging squadrons. SB Defence
planners believed that bc:rrbardrrent of land targets by a single
battleship or one or two cruisers or anned. rrerchant ra:l.ders
was likely. s, A raid could be carried out against any coastal
comnunity, including St. John's, and in an hour or two would
leave the town and its harbour installations a srroking ruin.
Using larger ships as launching platfonns, planes and rootor
torpedo ooats might utilize mines, torpedoes, l::la'rbs, gas or
assault raiding' parties. 50 German U-boats were especially
feared since they would certainly deploy into the Atlantic
without waiting for a declaration of war. Carrying up to
twenty-one torpedoes many were also heavily armed and equiwed
to carry mines. If serviced by SUW1Y ships they could
operate for rronths over vast expanses of OC.'ean." Finally,
although strategists had long considered the island's rigorous
S8Ibil:L.., p. 7.
s'Marc Milner, The North AtJantjc RlIn' The Royal
60.Ibid...., p.lO.
"Schull, Far pi stant Ships, p.B.
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climate and difficult terrain a sufficient deterrent to
invasion, the Nazis were to deroonstrate in Norway in 1940 that
successful military operations could .be carried out under
comparable conditions. 6~
'!he spectre of a re-armed and increasingly .belligerent
Germany had already prompted the Dominions Office in 1936 to
direct that the Cornnission of Government establish a Defence
Comnittee to investigate the state of the island I s defences.
The Conmittee's survey resulted in NewfQundland [)efence Scheme
.l2J6. which listed the island I s defence aims and Objectives and
made suggestions as to how these could best be met in time of
war. 63 It recomnended, arrong other things, raising a unit for
home defence rrodelled after Great Britain t s Territorial Army
and reviving the Royal Naval Reserve. 64
In March 1939 the GoveITJJrent of Ne\'1fOlmdland fonrally
proposed the forrra.tion of the militia force recomnended in
Newfoundl and [)Pfence Scheme: J 936 for the protection of the
capital city and "other vital areas." Throughout the spring
and surrmer its proposals for raising such a force and for
nClark, "OUtpost No.1", p.252.
G3MacKenzie, Atlantic Triangle, pp.22-23.
'fNicholson, "OUr Fighting Forces", p.484.
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financing, equipping, training and maintaining it were the
subject of much correspondence between St. John's and l.ondon.b~
Since cost was the overriding factor, the aTTOunt of funds
available rather than its proposed mission detennined the size
and composition of the unit. In one despatch the frustrated
Governor suggested that if Great Britain could not provide the
wherewithall, perhaps Canada could. The Overseas Defence
Ccmnittee eventually accepted the proposal and authorized the
recruitment of persormel. The llilit was to have an
establishment of 189 (11 officers and 178 other ranks), and
was to be errployed guarding vulnerable {X)ints in and around
St. JOM' s and at the Bell Island iron ore mines /,r,
In St. JOM' s plans were hastily drawn up to irrplerrent
the Ccmnittee'a decision. Yet, as war approached, recruiting
had not yet begun and wea{X)ns, ammmition and uniforms had
still to be fOtu1d. Finally, on 30 August, Governor Walwyn
learned that 100 rifles and 54, 000 rounds of anmunition were
to be shipped to Newfoundland on 5 september. However, since
this allotment of weapons was leas than the unit's
6Slhid., p,497.
JOhn,:~·Wd;;e~~~~f'N:f~U:~j;-e1:~tp;ng~Q:g~3.(StAn
establishment is the authorized cOlTpOsition of a unit
expressed in numbers and ranks of personnel and nwnbers and
types of equiprrent e.g. weapons and vehicles.
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requirement, the D:::mi.nions Office directed Britain's High
Conmissioner in Ottawa to request that canada make up the
shortfall. As a result of urgent correspondence and a hasty
visit to Ottawa by the Newfoundland Minister of Justice, 100
Ross rifles were provided. 61
And so on the eve of war Newfoundland was without local
defences and still dependent on the Royal Navy for its
security - a military posture TOOre suited to the previous
century. Its rerroteness had been reduced by teclmology and
its location as North America I s nearest point to Europe had
increased its strategic worth. It would, however, take a
catastrophe in Europe before these facts were fully
appreciated by Great Britain and Canada.
61lbid..., p.523.
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THE APPROACH:IW CRISIS
In the aftennath of the "war to end all wars,"
considering the enonrous task of social and economic
restructuring facing the country, it is hardly surprising that
the last thing in the minds of itlOst Canadians was preparing
for another war. In less than a generation, however, the
European };X)wers again fauna. themselves drifting towards
hostilities and Canada, woefully unprepared, found itself
drawn inexorably into the maelstrom. Yet, while the
international situation was deteriorating rapidly during the
late 1930s, canada was curiously reluctant to enter into any
defence agreements respecting Newfoundland, a neighbourir.g
cemronwealth state which ccmnanded the approaches to Canada's
eastern gateway. This position changed when the world order
established at Versailles collapsed like a house of cards. In
the face of a perceived threat to its safety, Canada was
forced into a closer defence relationship with Newfoundland.
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Although world War I had significant and far reaching
econcmic, social and even political effects on canada it had,
strangely enough, negligible effect on the country's military
policy. During the war the al.Tl1j" had grown to 600,000 and at
the end of hostilities all its ~quipment, less \T'Otor transport
was brought back to Canada. Tne government's view, however,
was that a large and well equipped army was too expensive to
maintain. And so canada quickly demobilized its armed forces
and reverted to an inconsequential defence posture hardly
different from prewar times.1
Recorrmendations made by the Otter comni.ttee in 1919 set
the Militia establishment at eleven infantry and four cavalry
divisions. Given peacetime constraints, the actual strength
never approache<i these figures, while inadequate funding
severely restricted training and IT'ade new equit=ment purchases
all but irrpos5ible. By the 19305 the fact that the Non-Active
Permanent Militia existed at all was due in great part to the
public spiritedness of its officers and men while the
in tb;'§~~;dc~;'Jf§ae:fl1t12J;~~tnn7 ;!rt?&g~;~j~e~~
printer, 1957) pA. See also James Eayrs, In pefence of
~anada Vo] I From the Great war to the Great DepreSSion
~ITi~~:ofU~~~~~~~li~ua:t~t;~~:re4s1s':6t~64)Chapter II 'tlI'he
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Permanent Force was only half manned. 2 C . P. Stacey has
pointed out that:
on 30 June 1931 the Non-Permanent Active
Militia'S strength was 51,287 officers and
other ranks as against a peace
establishment of 134,843. As for the tiny
~£i~,a~'~~~e~=ii~~~~~as6,925
all ranks but its actual strength on 31 Mat-ch 1931
was only 3,68B.3
Personnel and equipnent limitations notwithstanding, in
the years following World War I the Army General Staff had
prepared several defence plans intended to cover all military
exigencies then envisioned. During the 19205 both the United
States and Japan figured largely as the only two countries
which could possibly present any direct threat to Canadian
territory.
It is hardly surprising, then, that during the 19205 the
United States was cast in Canada's militaty I .anning not as an
ally but as a potential aggressor.4 And, until 1931, when it
was finally repudiated, Defence ScheJre No ], which dealt with
this contingency, held sway as the official strategic doctrine
2Stacey, ~,p.4.
4James Eayrs, In Defence of canada Vol II Appeasement.
and Reannanment (Toronto: University of Toronto Preso, 1965)
p.176.
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for the Dominion. The central asslIITption on which all
military plarming was based held that the principal external
threat to canadian security lay in the possibility of an a:rrt'ed
invasion by the forces of the United States. 5 NewfOlU1dland' s
strategic irrportance to the defence of Canada in this scenario
was considerable, as outlined in Section 10:
American occupation of the Island
would have far reaching results. It
would be on the flank of the sea
routes between Great Britain and
canada and it would be a menace
to all our shipping and a base for
~~a~ile~tt~~~sr.:~~g6~ ~d\~~tia,
St. Lawrence River generally. Newfoundland
~~~~aba~~ ~ ~~~i~ufo~~he
Bntish Grand Fleet.
Defence against Japan was dealt with in Defence 5cberre No 2.
Work was done on this plan during the years imnediately
following World War I but it was ccxrpleted only in outline.
During the 1930s it was revised to address canadian neutrality
in the event of a war between the United States and Japan.6
Defence Scheme No 3 was designed to counter the emergency of
a general war when a threat to eanadian territory was possible
and overseas intervention on Canada t s part probable. It
therefore provided for the rrobilization of the Permanent Force
SJames Eayrs, In Defence of ca~..YQL.I. p. 71.
~.Ibi.d..... p.83.
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and the Non-Active Permanent Militia. Finally, Defence Scheme
~. dealt with military action required following a
decision by the canadian Government to dispatch a contingent
to take part in a minor errpire crisis. This plan never got
beyond the draft stage.?
pefence Scheme No..l...., approved by Colonel D. M.
Sutherland, Minister of National Defence on 20 January 1932,
became the army's main war planning doclUTlent and was regularly
amended and kept up-to-date. Tedmically, it could not be
considered a general war plan or a plan of operations until it
could be discussed with potential allies, something not
permitted by the govet:Tlll'ent of the day. Defence Scheme No 3
remained in effect lU1til the outbreak. of war in 1939. The
other two services did not possess equivalent war plans
although proposals had been considered to cover all three
services.a
Canada's woefully inadequate defence budget suffered even
greater cutbacks as the full force of the Great Depression
spread across the Daninion. As well, in reaction to World War
I, anti-militarism and isolationism were widely held feelings
which any canadian government had to take into consideration.
?.Illid......, p.8S.
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And so, while the war clouds gathered throughout the world,
the King government, re-elected in 1935, was able to follow a
policy of non-intervention with minimal opposition. Hitler's
reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 prropted a reassessment
of defence requirements in 1937, when a rrodest rearmament
progranme for home defence was approved and again in 1938 when
a plan to reorganize the Militia reccmrended in Defence Scheme
NQ....l.... was accepted. 9
'Ibe Austrian~ and the seizure of the Sudetenland
in 1938 presented King with an inescapable dilerrma, If war
came Canada might again be divided along linguistic lines and
the Liberal party would be scattered. All that he had worked
for, national unity, the I,X>litical dcxni.nance of the Liberal
party, world peace and greater cooperation am:mg the English-
speaking nations, might be lost. As the European powers
postured, he dithered. Should he announce canada's support
for Britain in case of a European war and risk alienating his
QUebec cabinet ministers? sane canadians demanded that canada
support Great Britain unequivocally. Many Liberals, North
American nationalists and French-Canadians, however, demanded
that canada pursue an isolationist course. King's solution
was to await further develqxrents .10
~~, pp.4-6.
'OJ.L. Granatstein, Mackenzie King- His Ufe and WorJd
(Toronto-Montreal-New York-London: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.,
1977) pp. 120-134 and Bruce Hutchinson, MackenZije King, The
3S
By this time, however, even King could no longer ignore
the grave situation. His governlTlS!nt was therefore forced to
take steps to strengthen canada I s defence posture. These
belated preparations, although not nearly sufficient, ensured
that the country was at least better prepared than it had been
in 1914. Heme defences were in better shape than any time
since World War I and at least scrne consideration was given to
expanding the armed forces in the event of war. But canada
was in no way ready for any substantial overseas undertaking.
This was a direct result of the government's policy of "no
corcrni.tments," a policy which prohibited any consultation or
joint plarming with neighbours or those COlU1tries, principally
the United Kingdom, with which Canada would be allied in the
event of war.ll And yet, canada had two advantages: the vast
distance of the Atlantic OCean, and powerful friends.
Consequently, while Great Britain and France held back the
enemy in the opening phase of the war, canada, secur.e behind
the barrier of the Atlantic lX:ean, had breathing space in
which to prepare for the coming conflict and to COCIplete
preparations that were long overdue .12
CANNlA'S JlNCERTAtNl'Y 'l"OWARDS NE.WFOQNDLAND
Incredjble Canadian (London-New York-Toronto: Longmans Green
and Co:, 1953) pp. 225-246.
llStacey, Arrna, p. 6 .
12ll2id....., pp.5-6.
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Early on military planners in canada had realized that if
broke out in Europe, the country would likely be
involved.ll They also realized that because of its strategic
irrportance Newfoundlani nust be included in any oonsideration
of the defence of Eastern canada. In a merrorandum prepared
for the Defence Minister in 1937, the Joint Staff Ccmni.ttee
pointed out that the Defence of canada's Atlantic coast was
intiJrately bound up with the defence of Newfoundland arxi since
the two problems were really one it would be a mistake to
treat them separately.14 In view of this the coomittee went
on to suggest that ma..tters of mutual interest concerning the
defence of the two co\U1tries should be discussed at the
forthcoming Inperial Cbnference. Pri.rre Minister King,
however, was reluctant to oonsider any undertakin:J for
collective security and instructed. the officers of the three
services attending the conference as advisors to the canadian
Delegation oot to involve the country in anyt.hi..ncJ that might
be construed as a ccmnibrent and to steer clear of any
discussion regarding the defence of Newfourdland .15 For
Canadian military planners, Germany' 5 annexation of Austria in
March 1938 W1derlined the gravity of the~ situation
and revived concern aOOut the defence of the Atlantic
llGilbert 'l\J.cker, 1tle Naval Sen'; eft Of Canada Vols T and
1.I. (Otta\to'a: Kingls Printer, 1952) p.360.
14Stacey, AIms., p. 92.
ISIbi.d..., p.9l.
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seaboard. Strictly on their own initiative, military
intelligence authorities requested and received from the
British High Ccmni.ssioner in Ottawa a copy of the Newfotmdl and
pefence Scheme 1936. Having studied the document they noted
with alarm that no action had been taken to irrplement any of
its recorrrnendations and that the island was still totally
without defences .16 The Joint Staff Comnittee therefoL"e
proposed that since Vice-Admiral Sir Hurtphrey Walwyn, the
Governor of Newfoundland, would be visiting Ottawa at Easter,
the opportunity should be taken to meet with him to discuss
the situation.17 The meeting was held on 12 April 1938 at
canadian Naval Services Headquarters with Captain C.M.
Schwerdt RN, the Q:lvernor's Secretary, representing the
Newfoundland Governnent .18 It was agreed at the time that
l61an Stewart, The Revolutjon of 1940 jn Newfoundland
(Mefrorial universi ty of Newfoundland: Master of Arts Thesis,
1974) p.40.
Hurnp~ta~:r~~Cs)·,9h,~i:~fdi~e~6 ~sVi~~=-:a~~tl
the en~ of world War II, the last of many British naval
nfficers to hold the position. He had had a long and
distinguished career in the Royal Navy which began when he
~~i~lt:ehein~if1~e~ tigt89~no~a:inis~~~~~
L1eutenant in 1904. In World War I he ccmnand.ed HMS l:ia.l::sp.it.e
and was awarded the DSO for gallantry at the Battle of
g~~~ed~~~S~O~l~~r~fV~~~~~~W~sI~i~~~
=~~~nN~~1~in;:~~ ~s~l1~nOf~~Ci~t=ni~nr9j~~
~, 16 January 1936, p.4.
RN, w~;~a~i~e~h~~~?~hO ~d~~~~·~~ ;h~W:;~\ ~~ ~~
a::r:;~r ~a31~~S W~f~at~i~c~~t:~:Pt~rI~; w~~i~~~~~ ~~
the talks were merely exploratory and that no firm ccmni.tments
would be rrade by either side. captain Schwerdt, aware of the
political irrq;:llications of any Canadian involverrent in
Newfoundland, was anxious to point out that Newfoundland's
defence was a British responsibility. The canadians, for
their part, were concerned mainly with the securi.ty of their
iron ore supply fran Bell Island and the p:lssibility of an
enemy using the isolated bays along the coast of Newfo\.U1dland
and Labrador as bases for attacks on canadian shipping and
territory. H
The I.'eeting did little to alleviate canadian concerns and
the Joint Staff Cannittee urged King, in his capacity as
Secretary of State for External Affairs, to inquire at the
D:minions Office for details concerning measures planned for
the defence of Newfoundland in the event of war. 20 The
Dcminions Office informed King that Newfoundland's overall
defence rested with the Royal Navy and that the only local
defence rreasure conterrplated was the despatch of six mine
sweepers at the outbreak of war to be followed later by three
anti-subrarine vessels. In addition, a squadron of patrol
would serve as Naval Officer-in-Charge St. John's 1939-41,
Captain of the Port of St, John's 1941-42 and Naval Officer-
in-Charge Sydney 1942-45. Stewart, ..Be:lcl.1J.t.i, Appendix A and
Schull, Far Distant ShipS, Appendix II.
19Stewart,~, p.41,
20Stacey, AI:ms., p. 93.
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aircraft, which it was hoped would "be provided fran some
other source in the British Conmmwealth" (obviously Canada) ,
'w'OUld be based at Halifax.2l 'The Dominions Office authorized
direct coomunications between the canadian and Newfoundland
Governments over Newfoundland's defence. 22 Nevertheless,
although war in Europe appeared unavoi0able, the King
Government was still reluctant to make any peacetime military
carmi tments outside canada and no further action was taken for
six rronths.
Direct contact between the canadian and Newfoundland
governments began finally in June 1939. Prarpted by the
deteriorating international situation, canada became anxious
to obtain as much infonration as possible regarding the
IIinlets and harbours of the coast of Labrador which could be
made use of by any enemy employing subnarines or aircraft
against trade converging on the Gulf of St. Lawrence or
Atlantic searoard. "23 'I'he canadians wanted permission for a
flight of the Royal canadian Air Force (RCAF) to conduct an
aerial reconnaissance. The Newfoundland Goverrunent
inmediately agreed and the mission was successfully executed,
but no further official contact was made between the two
21.Ibid....., p.93.
22Stewart,~, p.40.
23SecretalY of State for ElCternal Affairs to Governor of
Newfoundland. Ottawa: 6 June 1939, 9475-40, Bridle,
~, D:x:uments 27.
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countries before the outbreak of war and no co-ordination or
joint planning of any kind took place. It was a situation
which led Colonel C.P. Stacey, canada 1 a preeminent military
analyst, to opine, "Military absurdity could not have gone
much further. 11201
CANADA I S MILITARY READINESS FOR WAR
Finally, on 24 August 1939, the day the details of the
Soviet-Gennan non-aggression pact became known, Prime Minister
Mackenzie King was forced to face reality and as a result met
with his cabinet to discuss the critical international
situation. They agreed that canada would participate in any
general conflict involving Great Britain but that the Canadian
Parliament would decide the exact nature of its camU.tment.
Within a few days the Chiefs of Staff Ccmnittee as the Joint
Staff Comnittee had been renamed in 1938, submitted their
reconmendations for military operations to the Minister of
National Defence. 25 The army and the navy were in favour of
direct support to Great Britain. The Chief of the General
Staff, Major-General T.V. Anderson, advocated raising an
e.xpeditionary force of at least divisional strength while the
Chief of the Naval Staff Rear-Admiral Percy Nelles recOImlended
24Stacey, AJ:ms., p. 93.
25W.A.B. Douglas, The creatjon of a National Ajr Force·
The Offjcial History of the Royal canadian Air Force Vol IT
(TorontO: University of Toronto Press, 1986) p.346.
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that his naval forces be placed at the disposal of the Royal
Navy. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal G.M.
croil, on the other hand, was ll'Ore concerned with the air
force'S responsibility for the direct defence of Canada than
he was with overseas ccmnitments.26
At that time, the penranent establishIrent of Canada I s
naval forces consisted of 145 officers and 1,674 men. If the
twenty-one divisions of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer
Reserve were included, the navy had a total paper strength of
336 officers and 3,477 men.27 Its equitxrent consisted of six
rrodern destroyers, five mine sweepers and two training
vessels. TWo of the destroyers and two of the mine sweepers
were based at Halifax, while the remaining four destroyers and
three sweepers were at Esquimalt, "a disposition which
testified to the faith in the Royal Navy and to an W1easiness
about Japan's intentions. "28 On 31 August, in response to the
danger on the Atlantic side, two of the west coast destroyers
were ordered to the east coast. On 10 September, the day
Canada entered the war, the two ships were transiting t:he
Panama canal. 'Ihey arrived at Halifax five days later.29
:U;.Ibi.d.., p.343.
27Schull, Far Distant Ships, p.2.
28Ibid....., p.9. and Milner, North Atlantic Run, pp. 13-14.
211Ibid....., p.15. For a description of conditions in
canada's pre-war naY)' see Corrrnander Thny German,~
our C'..ates· The Hl story of the Qmadi~ (Toronto:
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On the same day that the two west coast destroyers sailed
for Halifax, the eight existing permanent force squadrons of
the RCAF began to take up their war stations. On 5 September
they were joined on active service by the eleven squadrons of
the Auxiliary Air Force.3o None of the units, however, was
fully manned or equipped. The air force had only 4,153
officers and ail.Tllell, littl.e over half its authorized
establishment. There were only fifty-three serviceabl.e
aircraft, thirty of which were on the east coast. A large
percentage of these were of civilian pattern converted with
floats for patrol work. The remainder ~.;ere, for the ll'Ost
part, obsolete. 31
On 2S August Major-General Anderson reccmnended to
cabinet that it should consider partial mobilization of the
army. The government agreed and two days later all coast
defences were rranned and guards placed at the Trost vulnerable
McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1990) Chapter 4 "Intermission"
pp. 55-70 and Hugh Francis Pullen, "The Royal canadian Navy
Between the Wars 1922-1939" in James A. Boutilier, ed., The.
~?1ti~hR~).O~t Jr~8~-,1 9l9~2()va;:,~v2e:7f'ndon: University of
Jonouglas, Tbe Creatjon, p.1Sl.
lllbid....., p. 343. Also for a description of conditions in
~~~sQfTI~w~~iNkxi~Jf:n:1; =sW~~;n;' Br~~e~k~
Ltd., 1984) d1apter 2 "The Inter-War years" pp. 14-25 and
Larry Milberry, Sjxty years· The RCAP and Ajr cmrnand 1924-
~ (Toronto: Canav Books, 1984) chapter one, "Starting from
Scratch" pp. 11-58.
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points - bridges, canals and hydroelectric stations.32 On 1
September the government ordered full rrobilization and the
rrobilization order was sent to all Military Districts.
District Officers Corrrranding inmediately put into effect the
already prepared district rrobilization plans and notified the
militia units concerned.33 Although these troops were
rrarshalled with considerable speed and efficiency, they were
anned allOOSt entirely with the weapons of the previous war.
The tiny Permanent Force of only 4,261 all ranks was incapable
of independent action. 'Ihe Non- Permanent Active Militia with
a strength of 51,418 all ranks, but poorly trained and
equipped, was not ready for overseas intervention.
Nevertheless together the two forces constituted a suitable
foundation upon which a m::x:l.em a:rnry could be built
CANNlA' S mI"Rl>.NCIij INTO THE WAR.
World War II began on the rroming of 1 September 1939
with the German invasion of Poland. When Great Britain
l2Stacey, ~, pp.40-44.
ll.Ibid....., p.42.
34.Ibid....., pp.33-3S. Also for a description of conditions
~~s~;,~swfkj~~f :~f~~~i~:fh:~Jj 8~:;r;:9 (g~~~~~~
Buffalo-London: university of Toronto Press, 1988) Part IV
~e~~~:S:~cil s~~~~tg::J:, ~o~;fdi\;;:a~~l~'?95~11.1-2~e
Mj litary History of an nom; 1jrary Eeopl e (Toronto: Maanillan
Co. of Canada Ltd., 1954) Chapter XIX l18etween 'TWo Wars" pp.
325-343.
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declared war on Germany on 3 September Newfoundland was
autcxnatically a participant, making it the first relligerent
in North Amerca. By then King had sunnoned the canadian
Parliament to meet on 7 septerrber. At the same titre the
governrrent announced that a state of "apprehended war" existed
and had existed since 25 August when the pe:rnanent forces had
been placed on alert. This allowed the gov,.=rnment to invoke
the powers of the War Measures Act. Parliament duly met on 7
Sert· 'lTlber to deliberate a declaration of war and on 10
september Canada declared war on Germany. 3S
In Newfoundland, Canada's declaration of war was anti-
climactic, rating m:::d.est space on page four of the St. John's
Evening Telegram. Already at war for seven days, Newfoundland
had been the scene of the first hostile act in North America
when a German m~rchant ship had reen seized and thirty German
prisoners taken.36 The YWCA in St. Johnls was converted into
lSA.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, Tbe Histrny of tbe COrps of
Royal Canadjan Engineers Vol II (Toronto: Thorn Press, 1966)
pp. 10-11. and J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken
Pranises' A Hj story of Conscription in canada (Toronto:
OXford University Press, 1977) p. 133.
16The Chrj st~l"? fJoqmnm I a German cargo vessel docked~~eBo~~~, ;:iI~mhi~ tak~h~n ~rdc~e~~ape~f~
Newfoundland Constabulary acting in accordance with
NewfOllDdland Defence Scheme 1936 which stipulated that all
enemy aliens were to be interned. After her seizure she was
renamed the SS E)J]pj re Cqnnerce and entered service in the
British merchant marine. Her service was short lived,
unfortunately, as she was sunk by enemy action on 9 June 1940.(The Evenjng Telegram, St. John's 16 september 1991, p.5.)
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a detention centre to house the prisoners. 37 As provided for
in ~~D!lndlandDefence Scheme 1936, wireless, telephones and
private radio stations were silenced, mail and cables censored
and rationing was irrposed. In September the militia LUlit
authorized by the Overseas Defence Ccmnittee began recruitment
and training Wlder the direction of captain C. Fanning-Evans
and two senior NCOa, who had arrived in St. John's on
secondment frcm the British Army. 38
canada 1 S entrance into World War II allowed the Canadian
Prime Minister to voice public!y his concern respecting the
defence of Newfoundland. Speaking in Parliament on 8
september, King not only acknowledged the need to defend
Newfoundland but also admitted that eanada' s own defence was
dependent on Newfoundland's security:
the safety of canada depends upon the adequate
safeguardIng of our coastal regions and the great
avenues of approach to the heart of this country.
Forem:>st arrong these is the St. Lawrence River and
Gulf. At the entrance to the St. Lawrence stands
the neigilOOuring British territory of NewfoLUldland
and Labrador. The integrity of Ne'i,foundland and
Labrador is essential to the security of Canada. By
~~~~~di~ asan~art~~ ~~hZ:r ~;i;is~he~dfe~:n~~
territories in this hemis£here, we will not only be
defending canada but we WIll also be assisting Great
Britain and France by enabling them to concentrate
their own energies more in that part of the world in
l1Tbe Eyenjng Telegram, St. JaM'S, 11 september 1939,
p.5.
lBG.W.L. Nicholson, More Newf01!Odlanders, pp.529-530.
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which their own imnediate security is at stake. 39
However, urgent defence problems at heme such as organizing
and dispatching the 1st Division overseas prevented the
canadian Govenunent fran taking any inmediate direct action
concerning Newfoundland' s defw.~~. 40
Canada's only involverrent in Newfoundland during the
opening weeks of the war carre when the Admiral of the Royal
Navy's Arrerican and West Indies Squadron requested the RCAF to
tmdertake an aerial reconnaissance of the Newfoundland coast
on his behalf to ascertain if any enemy ships were in adjacent
waters. In response Canada requested authority from the
Newfoundland Government to overfly its territory and make use
of local landing facilities should they be required. 41
Governor walwyn prarptly agreed.42
The Newfoundland Government by now realized that although
the airport at Gander and the seaplane base at Botwood would
19Ex:tracts from a speech by the Prime Minister, Ottawa,
8 September 1939, H.D.C. Bridle, Dccurnenta, Document 41.
~OIJ'ucker, Naval sendee Vol I, p.186.
USecretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of
Newfoundland, Ottawa, 2 September 1939, 1156-D-39. Bridle,
~, Ibcument 35.
4~vernor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for
External Affairs, St. John's, 3 SepterrU:ler 1939, 1156-0-39.
Bridle,~, Document 37.
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undoubtedly prove to be extremely useful assets in the war
effort, Newfoundland, for obvious reasons, would be unable :::'0
make maximurn use of these resources. In light of this and
prarpted by Prime Minister King I s speech of 8 September in
which he publicly proclairred interest in the defence of
Newfoundland, the Governor proposed in a cable to the
Dcxninions Office on 15 September that Canada be invited to
assume control of roth facilities for the use of the RCAF for
the duration of the war .43
This proposal, however, received little support in u:mdon
and was ultimately rejected on the grounds that it would
interfere with plans for civil aviation! 'l11e British
Government had no objections to the RCAF using these
facilities on suitable tenns should canada request it. But
because Britain had invested heavily in these facilities and
since an attack on Newfoundland seemed highly irrprobable they
saw no advantage in turning them over to the canadians. 'Ihe
future d.i~sition of Gander and Botwood was silTply too
inpottant to allow them to pass out of British control for any
period of time, 44
4lGovernor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary, St.
JOhn ' 5, 15 September 1939, NPA GN1/3 39/1-7. Bridle,
~, DoctUnent 44.
44Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland, London,
6 November 1939, NPA 5-5-5-2. Bridle, ~s, Docwnent 5l.
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'I11e protection of the Dcrninion Steel and Coal CoTpany's
iron ore mines and the load..i.rYa and shiwing facilities at Bell
Island, however, had long been of prirre concern to canada,
since it was the main source of iron ore fC'r the Sydney
smelters and aC'O:lUllted for thirty percent of the country's
productive capacity in steel. If the war was protracted. Bell
Island \«JUld increase in inportance as the need for canadian
steel expanded.45 In view of the paucity of local resources
the NewfolUldland Governrrent decided that canada should be
asked to take on resp::>nsibility for Bell Island 1 s defence and
requested the Dominions office to ask the British High
Ccmnissioner in ottawa to take up the matter with the canadian
authorities.46 Despite the admitted urgency, Canada was slow
to respond, and it was not until 13 March 1940 that the
cabinet decided that. because of the irrportance of the Bell
Island iron ore slJR)ly. the defence of Bell Island should
becane a canadian responsibility. AcOOrdingly. coast defence
guns along with two searchlights were installed.47
On 25 March Newfoundlard accepted the canadian proposals
concenring Bell Island. On 17 June, Major H.E. Dickson of the
3rd Fortress CaTpany Royal canadian Engineers (RCE) travelled
to Newfoundland to carry out the necessary reconnaissance. By
45MacKenzie. Atlantic Triangle, pp.32-33.
4'.Ibid..... p.33.
47Stacey. AIma, p .135.
the end of the tronth sappers of 2nd Fortress Ccnpany RCE under
Lieutenant J .C. Arsenault started construction of a well
carrouflaged battery position overlooking the loading pier on
the east side of the island, the first of many such projects
in Newfoundland.48
Despite Prime Minister King's public statements, as late
as the sl.DllTer of 1940 military cooperation between canada and
Newfoundland was still very limited. Although serne tentative
steps were taken during the period of the "phony war" they
were not of any great significance. Up to this point Canada
had only undertaken reconnaissance flights over NewfolUldland,
provided sorre equipnent for the fledgling Newfoundland Militia
and supplied coast artillery for the defence of Bell Island.
canada's use of Newfoundland's potentially valuable harbours
and air facilities had not yet even been discussed. This
state of affairs, however, soon changed.
Fran the outset King maintained that Parliament would
detennine the extent of canada's war effort and, as much as
anyone, he hoped that canada's military contribution could be
kept to a minimum. '!he period of the "phony war" had given
rise to the hope that the action taken up to this point, that
is, limited naval support to Britain, the dispatch of an army
division overseas and the air force's assumption of its
48Kerry, Engineers., p.66.
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wartime posture in canada, might prove sufficient. And
although at the outbreak of war Newfoundland had been included
within the canadian defence perimeter, it was hardly foreseen
at the time that it might becorre a liability. Drarra.tic events
in Europe, however, would soon force an abrupt turn on
canada's part.
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THE OPENDp PHASE
Although Newfoundland I s strategic location made it
central to military planning for the defence of North America,
its lack of defences left it vulnerable to attack. The
probability of invasion was rerrote, but, given the then
current perception, raids by sea or air could not be ruled out
of the question. The canadian Chiefs of Staff Cc:mnittee,
recognizing the potential of Newfoundland I s two major air
facilities, Gander airfield and Botwood seaplane base,
recemnended that they be secured. No action was taken,
however, until the fall of Europe when Canada offered to
station troops at both places. As this small component took.
up its duties in Newfoundland the canadian Army set about
reorganizing its military posture in Eastern Canada, part of
which now included framing military requirements for the
defence of Newfoundland. A formation, designated WForce, was
created to defend the island against an enemy incursion, man
fixed defences and to provide security for existing and
proposed defence facilities. Its arrival in Newfoundland in
52
November 1940 bolstered lcx:al defence organizations such as
the Newfoundland Militia and the Civil Defence Organization.
THE DECXsIQi 10 sBNP TROOPS 1P NEWFCIlN[)LNm
In the spring of 1940 the entire war situation changed
drastically as Hitler unleashed the full force of his war
machine against western Europe. As a consequence, on 16 April
1940 Mr. 0.0. Skelton, Under secretary of State for External
Affairs, advised the British High carmi.ssioner in canada that
an off.! cer fran Eal::ltern Air Catmand would travel to
NewfoW1dland to inspect local air facilities. He also
confinned. canada's desire to deploy at sane future date an air
force detaclTnent at Botwood. on terrporary duty. 1 Although
Govennr Walwyn again urged the D::mi.nions Office, in t"-Q
separate cables, to re-examine his prop:>sal to hand over
Gander and Botwood to canada for the duration of the war, the
British Goverrrrent remained reluctant to transfer the control
of these resources to a third party. 2
By the end. of May 1940 Air Cc:xmodore N.R. Anderson, Air
Officer Coomanding Eastern Air cemnand, concluded that Gander
lUnder Secretary of State for External Affairs to High
CaTrnissioner of Great Britain, ottawa 16 April 1940, 1156-0-
39. Bridle, Dcc:IJIIIent..a, Document 71.
:ZOOvernor of Newfoondland to Daninions Secretary, St. John's,
14 May 1940, NPA Gm/3 320/35. Bridle,~, D::x::lInent 74.
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Airport, as the main airport from which to dispatch aircraft
to the European Theatre, would be of pararrount importance to
the Allied war effort. He reccmnended to the Secretary of
Defence that canada station i:xlmber-reconnaissance and fighter
aircraft along with adequate ground defence at the airfield to
ensure its protection.3
on 3 June 1940 Walwyn sent off yet another dispatch to
London this time informing the British Government that Air
vice Marshal G.M. Crail, Chief of canada's Air Staff, expected
to visit Newfoundland while on a tour of Maritilre Canada.
Walwyn was anxious to get the future status of Gander and
Botwood settled while Crail was in St. John's and he pressed
the British Governme:nt to make a decision before Crail
arrived. 4 Two days later, he received the reply he wanted.
The British Governrent would allow the RCAF to operate fran
the Newfoundland. air bases. It also agreed in principle to a
canadian take-over of these bases for the duration of the
Walwyn was no politician, consequently his performance as
lAir Officer CormIanding, Eastern Air Comnand, to Secretary,
Department of National Defence, Halifax, 29 May 1940, DND HQs
35-8-1. Bridle,.QQcI.lIneD.t:., Docurrent 79.
~Governor of Newfoundland to Dcminions Secretary, St. .John' 8,
3 Jun 1940, NPA 5-5-5-2. Bridle,~, Document 80.
5Dominions secretary to Governor of NeWfoundland, London, 5
Jun 1940, NA, GN1/3 320-35. Bridle,.QQcJment.a, ~nt 81.
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head of a civilian administration was arguable.6 The retired
admiral, however, proved his worth in war time. His service
background rrade him acutely aware that in the new strategic
situation of 1940 Great Britain's control of the North
Atlantic was essential for its survival and Newfoundland's
strategic location made it vital in this struggle. Realizing
that the hard-pressed Royal Navy could no longer guarantee
Newfoundland's safety he aggressively lobbied for canada's
involvement in its defence. This position would be fully
vindicated as the war progressed..
The day following their visit to Gander croil and
Anderson rret with representatives of the Newfoundland
Government in St. John's. Their mission, they pointed out,
was a fact finding one. '!hey had no authority to enter into
negotiations. But, in Croil's view, neither base was suitable
for air operations until ground forces were in place to
provide security. And, if Gander were captured by an enemy
force the base would be a "menace" to North American defence.
As to canada's assumption of full control of the air bases
Croil felt that tClere were grave concerns al::x)Ut the country's
GS.J.R. Noel describes walwyn as "a bluff and hearty sea-
feari~ man totally irmocent of any experience in (overrurent
~ufta~C e~~j\~s~~ngov~~o;Oinan17~fi~i9~6.~i(~r
~, p. 238.) See also p.3?
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ability to discharge so great a responsibility.?
The speed of the enemy victory in Europe was astounding.
In April Germany struck at Norway and Derunark overrunning
Belgium and Holland a ITOnth later. The full force of the Nazi
blitzkrieg was then directed at France and in three weeks the
governrrent capitulated. Although the British expeditionary
force was rescued from Dunkirk, they were without weapons.
The Nazis now controlled all of continental Europe from the
North Cape to the Bay of Biscay and Italyl s entry into the war
on Gennany's side, on 10 June 1940, carried the battle to the
Mediterranean and Africa. B Within six weeks all of Great
Britain' s European allies had been knocked out of the war
leaving canada, as the largest Daninion, Great Britain's major
partner. With the addition of the Italian fleet the Axis
powers, in a single stroke, had become a major naval threat
and there loomed the distinct possibility that the French
fleet might also COOle under enemy control. 9 The question on
every mind was, can Great Britain hold out? If Great Britain
collapsed the Atlantic would be an open highway over which the
enemy could proceed without hindrance.
1Gove:rnor of Newfoundland of Dcminions secretary, St. John I 8,
6 June 1940, NPA 5-5-5-2. Bridle,~, Document 82.
"Bridle, Doc!JIIlent.S., p.XXII!.
'MacKay, Newfollndland, p.493.
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As the magnitude of the disaster in Eur"q)e sunk in,
canada's relations with Newfoundlard underwent a fundamental
change. To this point canada had resisted mak:ina any formal
defence agreerrents with Newfoundland, but the catast.rcphic
events on the western front spurred the Canadian Goverment
into action. Q1 14 June 1940, the same day that Paris fell,
the canadian cabinet war camri.ttee held a special meeting to
discuss the Eurq:lean crisis. On the agenda was Newfoundland's
defence. The island's strategic location and the importance of
its air facilities made its security a matter of vital concern
to Canada.IO While no large scale attack on Newfoundland was
irrmediatelyanticipated, Mr. e.G. Power, then Acting Minister
of National Defence, considered it prudent to provide
sufficient troops to COlUlter a possible rc..id on Gander or
Botwcx:xi. As it was within canada' 5 means to provide an
adequate force for this limited~, he reo::mnended that
Canada irrmediately contact the governrrents of Newfoundland and
the United Ki..ng<bn with an offer to sen::i troopS.ll with
cabinet awroval he sent the following telegram to St. John's:
'!he canadian Government having
viewed the matter of the defence of
Newfoundland in light of existing
conditions are now of the opinion it would
be advisable to have additional defence
forces stationed in NewfO\.U1dland for the
'OMinutes of a Meeting of cabinet War ~mittee, Ottawa,
14 June 1940, ewe. Bridle,~, Document 84.
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protection aerodrare [Gander] and Botwood
seaI?lane base. The forces considered
desuable for th? purpose are one flight of
banber-reccnnaissance aircraft to be
stationed at the Newfoundland aerodrane
~~h~e~~i~~r~ta~;~~t~l~n~i~~~~~
~~~i~~~~~ti~S~n;i:t~a~~~~ce
infantry battalion with personnel of other
arms as required.12
Replying inmediately, Governor walwyn informed the canadian
authorities that "the Coorni.ssion of Government have examined
the pro:PJsals and approved them. "13 On 17 June five Douglas
Digby aircraft of the RCAF No. 10 (Bcmber Reconnaissance)
Squadron arriVed at Gander Airport from Dartrrouth, Nova
Scotia.
Given the clarity of hindsight and the now-established
fact that Nazi Germany did not have the capability to rrount a
cross-Atlantic assault, Canada I s reaction to events in Europe
might seem extreme. It was, however, based on the best
intelligence available to the government at that time. After
a meeting with the Minister of National Defence celonel J.L.
Ralston and C.G. Power, now Minister of National Defence for
Air, the United States Minister to canada, Jay Pierrepont
"Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of
Newfoundland, Ottawa 15 June 1940, 1156-0-39. Bridle,
~, Document 106.
'l(3Qvernor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External
Affairs, st. John's, 16 June 1940, 1156-D-39. Bridle,
~, Document 108.
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Moffat, confided in a dispatch to Washington on 29 June 1940:
The canadians are definitely worried about the
possibility of an air raid. They understand that
Gennany has a vessel capable of carrying about 40
aircraft and if this should escape the British
blockade, particularly if acccmpanied by a cruiser
she could do 9"l:eat damage. 14
The feared "great damage" was, of course, a raid on Gander.
At the same time as No. 10 Squadron prepared for its
deployrrent Lieutenant-Colonel K.G. Blackader, officer
Ccrnnanding the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders of canada)
received a directive which read in part:
~~~f~~~l~~~~;fa~~~~~~~t~~
separately will come under your earrnand when it
arrives Newfoundland. Your task will be protection
NewfOlUldland Airport (Gander] and Botwcxxl seaplane
Base against sab:JtaQe and/or ground. attack by enemy
armed Forces. You w~ll also provide small arm anti-
aircraft defence above localities .15
Given the urgency of the situation the unit departed its
UNancy H. Hooker, ed., The I'IQffat Papers· Selectjons fran the
Diplomatic ,Jollrnals of !Jay pjen=pont Moffat, (camridge
Massachusetts: Harvarci University Press 1956) p. 315.
"Chief of the General Staff to District Officer Coomanding
Quebec, 16 June 1940, OOD HQs 7410. Bridle,.Doc.1.lJ:nent.,
D:xument 110.
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station at camp Valcartier the following day for Quebec City
where it roarded the SS AntQo.ia.16 For security reasons
persormel were not infonned of their destination until the
ship was though the Gulf of at. Lawrence and out into the
Atlantic. When they learned it was Newfoundland and not
Britain reaction was mixed, although rrost felt that if nothing
else the battalion's efficiency and high state of training had
been recognized.17 On the advice of Governor Walwyn the troop
ship headed directly to Botwood since that port provided an
excellent harbour, wharfage space and train cotUlections.
Furthermore, it was much closer to Gand<.. -.lB In less than a
week the AntQni.a berthed at Botwood and, while the battalion
prepared to disembark, Blackader and his adjutant undertook a
reconnaissance ashore. The following day the unit proceeded
to its duties in Botwood. and Gander. 19
'lWo CCllllpaI1ies under Major I. L. Ibbotson remained at
Botwood to protect the harbour and prepare local defences
while the balance of the battalion under Blackader entrained
for Gander. In the absence of military barracks tented carrps
were hastily erected at both locations. There were no proper
16WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 006, 17 June 1940.
".lbid...., 19 June 1940
~~i~~r1~fJ~ewi~~~l~~6=g_~~~re::idie~f~!;;mi~~ ~=~
113.
'''WD, MAC, RG24, Volume 15, 006, 21-22 JLU1e 1940.
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maps available, Ibootson rrade do with an old Admiralty Chart
of 1903 and Blackader an Imperial oil Company tourist map. 20
Conditions were extrerrely primitive, described as "a few rough
buildings, a bleak terrain, hordes of giant mosquitos and
blackflies and constant rain. "21 Conditions notwithstanding,
rm..lch was accomplished during the Highlanders I short stay.
During the first week at both locations a detailed
reconnaissance was carried out and although the terrain was
extremely rocky, the Highlanders quickly established a
defensive perimeter with dug-in weapons pits and sandbagged.
and carrouflaged sections posts manned around the clock.
A military organization, of whatever size, upon being
assigned a defensive task, must imnediately formulate a plan
of defence based on - to use World War II parlance - "A
Military Appreciation of the Situation. II If or when the
situation changed a new appreciation was wldertaken and the
plan revised accordingly to reflect the altered. situation.
The whole procedure rests on possible and/or probable enemy
action based on his capabilities and/or intentions as
estimated by the intelligence staff. As we shall see later,
however. despite a changing situation the enemy threat
assessment or "scales of attack" as it was then called. little
'~Paul P. Hutchison, canada's Black watch· The Fjrst Hl]ndred
YearS 1862-1962. (Don Mills, Ontario: Best Printing Co. Ltd.,
1962) .
"J:bid...
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changed in Newfoundland until after the successful Nomandy
landings. The result was that defensive measures inplerrented
early on were kept in place even after their necessity had all
but disappeared.
In the Gander/Botwood area the canadian military
intelligence believed the enemy could attack the Gander
facility "by I:x:::mbing by parachutists, by landing troops frcxn
aircraft on the runways or Gander Lake or by advancing
overland from some point or by a combination of these
methods. "22 In Botwcx:xi intelligence assessed the threat as
"bombardment by a capital ship, one or two 8-in cruisers or 6-
in merchant cruisers; attack by subTarines, small surface
craft or raiding parties; torpedo, bcmb or gas attack by
shipoorne or long-range shore-based aircraft. "2) As far-
fetched as these enemy threat assessments might seem today
they were based on the best informa.tion available at the time
and were considered an accurate reflection of enemy
capabilities and intentions.
We now know that Nazi GertTJaJ1y did not have the capability
of lOOunting a coordinated attack against North Arrerica in
World War II. Given the perception at the time, however, the
threat of hostile action, although rerrote, was not
2ZWD, NAC, RG 24, Volume 13, 807, 7 May 1941.
23.Ibi.d.
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inconceivable and the possibility of air or sea raids was a
contingency which had to be considered. Perhaps even more
irrportant ir. the minds of many of the civil population, given
the alanning achievements of the Nazi war machine in its
opening carrpaigns, not only was an enemy assault viewed as
possible, but also even likely. And, as we have seen earlier,
the threat of enemy ships in Newfoundland waters , given the
danger they posed to Canadian shipping and territory, was not
taken lightly. It is hardly surprising then that when reports
of enemy activity off the top of the Great Northern Peninsula
reached Naval Headquarters in Halifax during the first week of
July 1940, reaction was swift. With Newfolll1dland' s
concurrence a joint naval/army operation wad hastily
rrounted.24 The plan called for HMCS Qt..t.a'd.a, ccmnanded by
Ccmnander E.R. Mainguy RaJ, to undertake a patrol in the area
of cape Bauld to conduct a search. Additionally, an infantry
detachment was embarked to undertake a reconnaissance ashore.
B carpanyof the pictou Highlanders, stationed at sydney Mines
took on this mission. To mask his movements, on the night of
10 July, Major C.D. Sanpson led his company, less one platoon,
aboard the destroyer at the Newfoundland Railway Dock in North
Sydney and inmediately set sail for the Strait of Belle
Isle.25
2SWD, NAC, 0024, Volurre 15, 138, 10 July 1940.
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Upon arrival on the rroming of 13 July the Qt..t..a.\oia
conducted a thorough search of the coastline from Cape Norwan
to Crema.illere Harl:our. The infantry detachnent, divided into
six independent sections supplied with all necessary weapons,
anmunition, and radios plus sufficient rations for three days,
landed by whalers at Cook's Harbour, Pistolet Bay, cape Onion,
Quirpon, Griquet and St. Lunaire. Their task was to question
local inhabitants concerning any suspicious activity and to
reconnoitre the area for evidence of any enemy landings.
Locals claimed to have sighted subrarines of f the coast at
different times but the inforwation was \.U1verified and
therefore considered unreliable. When no evidence of enemy
activity was discovered the sections were re-embarked on the
15th for return to Nova SCotia.26 Nevertheless the assignment
probably benefited the Highlanders. In his report to
Headquarters Military District NO.6. Major Sampson wrote "I
wish to state that every mefl1ber of the detachment was at all
times fully prepared for action. The rrorale of my cc:rmand is
of the highest order, and we earnestly hope that we may be
able to take part in an assignment in which enemy action is
encountered. "27
In Botwood, from the rrarent of their arrival in June
1940, the Black Watch were badgered by jittery inhabitants
".Ibid...., 15 July 1940.
2'.IbiJ:L.., 19 July 1940.
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with accounts of sUpp::lsed enemy sighti03s in and around the
settlement, the surroondi03 waters and adjacent coastline.
since every report had to be verified, the unit '5 normal
routine was interrupted to the point where the war Diary entry
for 5 July 1940 cerrplained that nunfounded rE!lXlrts by locals
of enemy aircraft and ship sightings plus landings, which nllSt
all be checked out [are] causing considerable work and
oother. "28
The main funct.ion of the Botwood detachl'rent was the
security of the harbour and seaplane docking facilities.
Sentries were posted at several locations around the harOOur
and the approaches to it, supplerrented by a roving patrol.
'!hese duties were assigned to one carpany. A second conpany
supplied rren for c~ fatigues, caxlucted individual training
as time permitted, arxi remained on stand-by prepared to
reinforce any threatened area.29 (be section from the guard
carpany was stationed a1:x:>ard. the Newfoundland custans cutter
MaDlitt.a arrl boarded and inspected each ship before it entered
the harboJr. Qlce the visiting vessel was tied up, the
dockside guard inspected sealTell' s passes and prevented crew
merroers fron W1authorized landings. At the docks they
inspected longshoremen' 5 passes and prevented unauthorized
~'WD, NA.C, RG24 , Volurre 15, 006, 5 JUly 1940.
~~~={~kai~~~~~eaidf~~ris\h:~~~l~~~~trb
this word throughout the paper.
65
persons from boarding the ship. During the winter freeze up,
when the harbour was closed to shipping, sentries were
withdrawn fran the outlying areas and concentrated within the
port itself.3o A plan to evacuate the civilian p:Jpulation in
case of an air raid was worked out with the local Bane Defence
CO'Ttllittee.31
In Gander the principal military task was the protection
and security of the airfield organized around two separate
duties. One conpany ;.'as assigned to guard the outer perimeter
or lIoutpost duty" as it was called, while the other lCX)ked
after the security of the facility itself referred to as
"airport duty." The third coopany carried out what training
it could while supplying men for calllJ fatigues. Liaison was
quickly established with the RCAF detachment and "strafing and
bcmbing" exercises designed to practise anti-aircraft drills
were carried out. 32
On 25-26 July Major-General T. V_ Anderson, famer Chief
of the General Staff and now the Inspector General, visited
the unit. On the whole, Anderson was satisfied with the
aCCCln'plishlrents of the battalion. Blackader, however, pointed
out that given the irrrrense size of the airfield (the perimeter
'tIWD, NAC, 0024, Volurre 15, 227, 11 December 1940.
)'WO, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 006, 18 July 1940.
"WO, NAC, 0024, Volum.: 15, 006, 30 June 1940.
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was greater than seven miles) it was highly improbable that it'
could be defended by his two lightly armed infantry CQ'Il)alli.es.
In the event of a determined assault by a large attacki.ng
force the facility would have to be destroyed am abarrloned.33
'Ihis assessrent o:>incided with that of Air camodore N.R.
Anderson, Air Officer Cr:rnnandi.ng Eastern Air Ccmrand, wiD had
reconooitred the airfield earlier. Andersoo had reported that
the aiIlX'rt was unsafe to use until provision had been made
for adequate ground defence including "strong anti-aircraft
(AA) defence consisting of guns, searchlights, and soUJ'ld
locators. "34 Since there was an alrrost total lack of these
weapons systems in canada at the time, rrore than a year would
go by before they were put in place.
SC:rre work had been done to inprove the facility wt in
July sappers fran 2nd Fortress o:rrpany arri.ved am. began
clearirg canpsites and CCflSt:ructing wooden barracks to replace
the tents that housed the troops in Bot·...cod.. 'Ihe canp was
sited. just west of the village prq:er. nestled in a small
valley between tt«> praninent hill features, ~s Rid3e an::l
canning Rock. ntese provided excellent observation posts of
the hartx:>ur and its approaches. By the end of the rronth daily
routine was in phce and sorre unit training organized within
"Ib.id..., 25 July 1940.
"Air Officer cannanding EastenL ,..(~1'Mrxi to Secretary,
De~trrent of National Defence, 291"..1:" )940, IWl HQs 35-8-l.
andle,~, DocLJrent 79.
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the constraints of fatigues and around-the-clock guard duties.
!"Orale was the most difficult issue since the hours were long
with little recreation to relieve the 1x>redom. Regimental
spirits soared when, on 27 July, a ccrled rressage was received
warning that the battalion would soon be proceeding
'!be Queen I s am Rifles of canada, then stationed at Camp
Borden, Ontario, had already been warned on 22 July of a
possible move. Preparations began inmediately. On 4 August
the battalion advance party, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel
H.C. MacKendrick and four officers and twenty other ranks,
departed by train for Newfoundland. Two days later the
remainder of the battalion departed by train for Quebec City
where it inrrediately enrerked on the SS IAltchesa...oL.Ricl1loond
arriving at Botwood on 10 August. 36 A and B Coopanies and a
detachment fran Headquarters company under the corrmand of
Major W.L. Bryan relieved the two coopanies of the Black Watch
in Botwood while the rerrainder of the \mit under Lieutenant-
Colonel MacKendrick proceeded by rail to Gander. The change
of ce:mnand took place at Gander on the afternex>o of 10
August.3? Although guard duties and fatigues accO\mted for
the bulk of activity, W"lit training continued. Likely
"WO, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 006, 27 July 1940.
)OWO, NAC, 0024, Volume 15, 166, 22 July - 10 August 1940.
ll.Ibid....., 10 August 1940.
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approaches for enemy raiding parties were recormoitred around
Twillingate, Port Leamington, Notre Dame JUnction and along
the Gander River frem Glendale to Gander Bay. The RCAF
provided aircraft for reconnaissance of the coastal areas. 38
On 19 August C.G. Power, Minister of National Defence for
Air, accoopanied by senior officers of all three services,
arrived in Gander on a tour of inspection.39 During their
discussions MacKendrick endorsed Blackader's earlier
reccmnendations for the construction of concrete emplacements
and installation of M artillery.4o satisfied with the unit's
acccmplishnents the dignitaries departed for St. John's to
hold bilateral discussions with the Newfoundland government.
MacKendrick accanpanied the party to discuss training of the
Newfoundland Militia, a task taken on by the canadians for the
duration of the War.
Shortly thereafter Major-General Elkins, General Officer
Ccxrrnanding-in-Chief Atlantic Corrmand, and his Chief of Staff,
~~W.T. Barnard, The Otlftenls Own Rifles of canada J86O-J960,
(Don Mills, Ontario: Best Printing Co. Ltd., 1960) p.147.
l~WD, NAC, RG24 , Volurre 15, 166, 19-20 August 1940.
~"Additionally, he suggested that a small detachment be
stationed at I.ewisporte to the northeast to guard its
important fuel depot and provide early warning of any
emergency. In consequence, an infantry section under the
conmand of a sergeant was despatched to t.ewisporte on 22
August. Lewisporte would grow in military irrportance and
ultimately be horre to a coast artillery battery, an AA
battery, an infantry canpany and ancillal:)' troops. .Ibid.....
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Colonel L.C. Goodeve, visited Gander to rE7connoitre positions
for coast artillery in the Botwood and Lewisporte areas. <11
Later Colonel C. s. Craig, CCmnander of Halifax Fortress and an
experienced permanent force gunner whose advise senior
ccmnanders on the east coast respected and sought, arrived to
select positions for M guns. 42 In the meantime construction
of pe:rrranent huts to house the unit began in Gander under the
supervision of second Lieutenant R. Macleod RCE and a sma.ll
engineer detachment. Work continued apace and by the first
week of OCtober, all the men were in barracks.43
In mid-November news arrived that the battalion was to
return to canada in the near future. Final confitTMtion came
on 18 November. On 6 December the Queen's OWn enbarked Eor
canada to join 3 Infantry Division in carrp Sussex, New
Brunswick. 44 Their replacements were the Royal Rifles of
canada, then stationed at camp Sussex. On 20 November 1940 an
advance party under captain E. E. Denison departed by train Ear
Newfoundland, followed by the main b:x1y which arrived in
Botwood on 25 Nove111ber aboard the SS New Nortbland.ots r"irst
irrpressions were not favourable as the regimental diarist
"WO, mc, RG24, Voltune IS, 166, 5 September 1940 .
...Ibid...., 20 September 1940.
"Barnard, The Qileen's Own, pp.150-152.
"WO, mc, RG24, Volume IS, 166, 15 November - 6 Decerrber 1940.
45WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 227, 12-2- Noverrber 1940.
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recorded: "'!his rroming we awoke on t:oard ship to gaze for
the first tiTre: on our new home. Bot~ we found to be the
rrost dismal apology for a town any of us had ever seen. "46
Nor was he impressed with the accenm::x:lations: "taking over the
Botwood Barracks we found them to be in the lTOst wretchedly
filthy condition imaginable. __ our men were amazed. that other
men, and fine looking soldiers at that, could and would
tolerate such unwholesane conditions. "47 lDcal conditions
notwithstanding by 6 December the battalion was fully
deployed and Lieutenant-Colonel Home took over carmand from
Lieutenant-Colonel MacKendrick of the Queen's OWn. A and D
Coopanies under Major C.A. YOlmg remained in Botwood while 8, C
and Headquarters Cofrpanies took responsibility for the
security of Gander.48 For morale purposes, e<:xrpa.nies were
rotated between Botwood and Gander regularly since the Botwood
detachment was able to proceed on pass to Grand Falls and
Bishop's Falls, where the locals made them welcome. Gander on
the other hand was totally isolated.49
SECURITY OF THE Al1.ANrIc mAST
At the meeting of 14 June the Cabinet War Corrrnittee also
'~.Ibid..., 25 November 1940.
"Ibid......, 26 November 1940.
'.lhid..., 6-10 December 1940.
"lhid..., 10 January 1941.
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reccmnended that joint staff talks begin imnediately between
canadian and Arrerican armed service officers concerning the
defence of the Atlantic coast. so As a result of these
meetings canada decided to station military and naval attaches
in washington to join the air attache already serving there.
But no provision had yet been made for permanent and
continuous high level consultations between the two
countries, 51 Consequently a rreeting between the President and
the Prirre Minister was arranged.. The outcane of this lTeeting,
which will be dealt with in greater detail later, was the
03densburg Agreement which created a Canadian-American
Permanent Joint Board on Defence iPJBD) to study hemispheric
defence problems, The Board provided the mechanism whereby
the two coWltries -one at peace, the other already a
belligerent - could harrronize their defence initiatives. The
first and lTOst irrportant of these for canada at this jWlcture
was to strengthen its Newfoundland garrison.
During the Sl..lITiTer of 1940, as the magnitude of the
disaster in Europe became clearer, the Chiefs of Staff
Ccmnittee turned their attention to creating a new ccmnand
structure for the Atlantic coast to include Newfoundland. Up
to this time each District Officer Ccmnanding had operational
SDMinutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War camti.ttee, Ottawa, 14
June 1940, Bridle, D!:!cl.Iment.a, Decurrent 84.
S18 Sri ef Hi atgry Of the canadj an - JJnited States LIgj nt Bgard
on [')efAnce 1940_1960, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960) pp.l-S.
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responsibility only for the forces within his own district.
Under this arrangement, however, there was a possibility that
a District Officer Conmanding might consider the needs of his
own d~strict to the detriment of defence as a whole.
Additionally effective co-operation with the Navy and the Air
Fo~ce had to be maintained. 52 Accordingly, the Chiefs of
Staff directed its Joint Planning Sub-Conrnittee, consisting of
senior staff officers fran all three services, to prepare a
full scale report on the defensive situation on the Atlantic
coast, The sul::xxmnittee suggested that, apart from maintaining
static defences, the army's main role should be the
maintenance of a large force of at least two divisions I
strength capable of reinforcing any threatened point. Major-
General H.D.G. Crer.).r, then Vice Chief of the General Staff,
rrodified the proposal by suggesting the creation of a rrobile
reserve of divisional size consisting of a headquarters and
three brigade groups to reinforce coastal garrisons, to
CQ\.U1ter any enemy raids on non-garrisoned coastal areas, and
to maintain internal security. 53 After he becarre Chief of the
GAneral Staff (CDS) on 22 July, Crerar reconmended that
operational C':llTTTIanCl of these forces be transferred fran the
existing Military Districts to a new Comnand Headquarters
responsible for the whole of the east coast including the
'·"G.W.L. Nicholson The Gunners of canada' The Hjstory of the
Royal Regiment of canadian ArHJ1ery yol II 1919-1967,
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972) pp. 450-452.
'''Stacey, .s.ix...YeaJ:s., pp. 161-163.
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Maritime Provinces, Eastern Quebec and NewfOlU1dland and
Labrador. Under this arrangement Districts retained
responsibility for the training, administration and
maintenance of all Wlits within their jurisdiction other than
those under operational co:nnand of the new Headquarters.
Administrative responsibility for NewfOlmdland would go to
Milit.ary District No. 6 (Nova Scotia) .54 Colonel J.L. Ralston,
the Minister of National Defence, approved the reccmnendations
and on 1 August 1940 AtlaJltic Comnand with Headquarters at
Halifax was established. 55 Major-General W.H.P. Elkins was
appoint.;d General Officer Ccmnan.ding-in-Chief (GOCinC) .56
"Atlantic Conmand reached its peak strength in the spring of
1943 at which time the number of personnel in the comflalld
numbered approximately 25, 000. In the course of 1943,
however, the threat of direct attack on canada, which was
never very great anyway, receded aj?Preciably and a reduction
~~r;~t~~~n~~~l~:r~~~n~arc;es~~;~~~e~i~l~1~~~
General Staff, recoomended the disban<:lire:nt of the 7th Division
as well as substantial reductions in coast and anti-aircraft
defences. His reccmnendation was accepted end in September
1943 the Minister of National Defence announced the decision.
This was the beginning of a long process of troop reductions
in Canada to free men up for overseas duty. In Dece~r 1944
a decision was finally taken to disband Headquarters Atlantic
Comrand. The Military Districts in easterrl Canada resumed
their normal function while Newfoundland was designated as a
separate corrrnand similar to a district. (Stacey, Six...Y.ears,
pp.175-1B6l
sOElkins had been COIllllissionro into the Royal canadian
Al:tillery in 1905. He served in canada and saw service in
India whJ.le attached to the Royal Horse Artillery. In World
War I he served with the Canadian Expedi tionary Force in
France and Flanders and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel
in comnand of an artillery regiment. He was mentioned in
despatches three times and was awarded the Distinguished
Service Order (DSO) and Bar. After the war he h"!ld a number
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Meanwhile, in early AugUst 1940, before the O::;:Jdensburg
meeting, the Minister of National Defence for Air, e.G. Power,
arranged during a visit to canadian troops in Newfoundland to
meet with the Newfoundland Government to consider bilateral
defence questions. He was en route to NewfOlrndland when King
was at Ogdensburg. 57 Accompanied by senior officers from all
three services he rret with Newfoundland ("::>0\0 :rnrnent
representatives on 20 J'.ugust. The meeting was chaired by
Governor Walwyn, who, on behalf of the people of Newfoundland,
offered full co-operation in meeting canada's proposals for
the defence of North Arrerica. Power outlined canada 1 s aims in
broad tenns and stressed that there were to be no
encroachments of Newfotmdland' s II autonoroous rights, II but he
did ask" if the principle could be admitted that canada should
be in charge of Newfoundland's defence without
modification. "58 The Newfoundland represent,tives demurred at
such a broad grant of power since they felt there might well
of conmand and staff appointrrents. In 1930 he was appointed
g~~~tiitt9~:~yaJeM~~~O~ITI~a~~~ic~~~i~i~~
the rank of Brigadier fran 1935 to 1938 when he Has appointed
the Master-General of the Ordnance (" ~ canada in the rank of
Major General. Major-General Elkins retained his f,ppointment
as General Officer Conmanding-in-Chief of AtlaIltJ.C ccmnand
unit his retirement in July 1943. (Evening Telegram 20 Aug
1940 p. 3)
"MacKenzie, Atlantjc Triangle, pp.45-46.
""Minutes of a Meeting at St. John's to Discuss Bilateral
Defence Questions, St. John's, 20 August 1940, 1156-0-39.
Bridle,~, Document 171.
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be scme "rrodifications" which they would have to consider. 59
Principle notwithstanding, progTess was made on a munber
of practical matters aimed at strengthening the island 's
defences. The Newfoundland Goven1ment agreed to enact a
Visiting Forces (British C<:rnronwealthl Act similar to those in
force in the self-governing Dominions of the Coomonwealth. In
accordance with this legislation both governments faunally
declared that their forces were "acting in canbination. "CiO
Under this arrangement the local canadian military cornnander
had overall conmand and Newfoundland became a sub- ccmna.nd of
Atlantic Comnand. canada agreed to station an additional
infantry battalion at St. John t s and to provide necessary AA
and coast artillery at selected locations when it becarre
available. Additionally, canada proposed to develop an
advanced naval base at St. John I 5 and a fighter air base in
the vicinity of the capital city. 61 The last agenda topic
dealt with relations with the United States. 62 The
·°As we shall see later, this issue would again surface during
the surrrrer of 1942 and cause considerable friction between the
two parties.
"Bridle,~, DoclUTlent 171.
~~r~iiTIitJ:~e~~l~~~~i~~~e~a:~I~a~~e~rt~B~t~~~~7~
Atlantic possessions. In return the Arrerican president
offered to transfer to the United Kingdom fif~ World War I
~I~~~~~ W~i~~att~:sriJf;rmf[:r; :~~~e~h~~~~es~~~~~
States would receive ninety-nine year leases in Newfoundland
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Newfoundland Government stressed the fact that it should be
represented in any discussions between canada and the United
States where questions affecting Newfoundland were involved.63
The fonnal announcerrent of these agreements was issued on
22 August 1940 and it was noted in the local press that "no
question involving in any way Newfoundland's sovereignty or
independence was being raised. "64 Power, by treating
Newfoundland as an equal, despite the vast discrepancy in
economic and political weight, rrade the presence of canadian
forces in Newf01..U1dland far Il'Ore agreeable. 6S
w FORCE COMES nrro EXISTENCE
At a meeting in Boston on 2 OCtober 1940 the service
members of the PJBD approved the establishment in St. John's
of a Headquarters canadian Troclps in Newfoundland consisting
and Be:muda as outright gifts while bases in the caribbean
~~~beha~=g~~p~O;n~~~ror~f'th~f~~gi~w~~~~~~:~
cognizance had been taken of their sens~tivitJ.es they had no
part in determining the fundamental basis of the accord. The
terms of the agreement were hamTered out between the British
and the Americans and they reflected the interests of the two
great powers. At CamdJ.an insistence, however, the three
countnes signed a protocol clarifying the Canadian interest
in Newfoundland. (MacKenzie, AtJantic Triangle, pp. 48-50 and
Stewart, ReYQJ.ut.iQn, pp. 57-59)
•'Bridle , ~,~nt 171.
"'The Evenjng TeJ.eql:aID, 22 August 1940, p.3 .
..··Bridle,~, p.XXVII.
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of a brigadier with an augmented brigade staff.66 Two weeks
later the Minister of National Defence announced the formation
of W Force. 67 Brigadier P Earnshaw was appointed COlnnander. 68
Earnshaw I S initial concern was che organization and
manning details of his new cornnand. On 4 November he
travelled to Halifax to discuss with Elkins details of the
ccmnand and administrative relationships between the two
headquarters. W Force was to be a sub-ccmnand of Atlantic
ccmnand and Earnshaw the "Military Authority" as stipulated in
the Visiting Forces (Comronwealth) Act recently gazetted by
the Governrrent of NewfolU1dland.69 on 11 November Earnshaw
~1WD, NAC, RG24., Volume 13, 807, 16 O:::tober 1940.
"Earnshaw, comnissioned in the Royal Canadian Engineers, had
served in France and Flanders with the canadian Expeditionary
Force during World War I where he was mentioned in despatches
and awarded the DSO and Military Cross (Me). After the war he
attended the Staff College at camberly, United Kingdom, and
held a number of comnand and staff appointrrents in the Royal
Canadian Signals Corps includi119 ccmnand of the Royal canad~an
~=de~)ttFo~~eth~et~do~~~s rh~i~~~~d~t~Y~r:i~t ~~
National Defence Headquarters, a position he held since 19'37.
(ottawa Evening citjzen 16 OCt 1940 p. 12)
"W Force reached its peak strength in 1943 when the personnel
of the formation numbered alrrcst 5,700. By this time it had
~~~~~r~~ili~:t~~~~eri;'~t~:n~n~~=:, ~:
airfield defence ccxnpanies (one at Gander and one at Torbay) ;
and one Conpany of the Veterans Guard at St. John's; two Anti-
Aircraft Regiments located at St. John I s and Gander/Botwood,
three coast defence batteries sited at St. JaM 's, Botwood and
Lewisporte; a Fortress CCXf1pany Royal Canadian Engineers; a
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arrived in St. John's to take up his duties.7o In accordance
with the Visiting Forces (British Cormonwf>.alth) Act negotiated
earlier between Newfoundland and canada, Earnshaw also had
Wlder his carrnand those "Military Forces of His Majesty raised
in Newfoundland and serving therein" corrprising the
NewfoWldland Mili t ia. This ccmnand relationship would later
cane under question. The canadian Army in Newfoundland, fran
the outset, had agreed to provide what assistance it could to
the local militia.
Recruiting and training of the Newfoundland Militia began
in September 1939 with the arrival in St. John's of captain c.
Fanning-Evans and two NCOs on secondment fran the British
army. The militia eventually reached a strength of over 500
and was employed guarding vulnerable points around the island
and in manning the coast defence battery at Eell Island. It
also served as preparatory training depot for
Newfoundlanders who volunteered for the Royal Artillery.
When Earnshaw arrived in St. John's the militia was already
actively employed. The 1st Coast Defence Battery, fanned in
August 1940 under the c.:orcmand of Captain D. V. Rainnie, a
C~y of Atlantic cmmand Signals; and tne numerous
administrative and support units required to maintain this
force. The Cormander W Force also had under his comnand the
Newfoundland Regiment which, in addition to a coast defence
~;;i~ ~~ted~~j.~~~l f~:fdde~~c~wof~~ti~Z.~~~~~h~
:iea1:.:a, p.180)
""'WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 807, 11 November 1940.
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canadian Artillery Officer, was at Bell Island where it manned
gw1S for the protection of the loading docks there. since the
autumn of 1939, the militia had guarded vulnerable points in
and around at. John's with sentries posted at the Ccmnercial
Cable establishment on Water Street, the cable Station
establishment at CUckhold' s Cove, the St. John I s water supply
at Windsor Lake, the Newfoundland Broadcast corrpany radio
station at Mount Pearl, the Dockyard and the Imperial oil
Limited storage facilities in the south side of the harbour .'JJ
In February 1940 the Militia took on the additional job of
guarding the internment canrp at Pleasantville in the east end
of St. John's, the only one to hold enemy aliens. These had
either been taken off shipping in Newfoundland ports or were
seamen fran enemy ships captured at sea.72
Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. Rendell, Comnanding Officer of
the Newfoundland Militia and a veteran of the First World
"E.P. Ke-ndall, "The Newfoundland Regiment" in Till:......Mil.arY-
Gazelle, (Vol 60, August 1945) p. 7.
7'In the autumn of 1940 the Newfoundland Government, on behalf
of the United Kingdom Government, constructed a Prisoner of
~:~t~~~~~r;r=~: ~~c~~nho:;e;~s~~d ~~ o~j~~~~
to the incarcel'ation of Gennan Jrisoners in Nejoundland on
the ground that this "... weul present a serious military
hazard which might jeopardize the Defence scherre for
Newfoundland which the Board is now preparing and thus menace
the safety of canada and the United States." (Bridle Appx "A"
P 1388) The proposal to confine captured German airmen in
~~w~~~dlri~w~fttge4r.;efio{~~:n~~~~s~d~h~a~~wf~; ~~~~~e
and the lacility was dismantled. (WD, NAC, RG24, Vol 13, 812,
14 April 1943)
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War I S Royal Newfoundland Regiment, called upon Brigadier
Earnshaw shortly after his arrival in St. John's to explain
his concern aOOut the state of the militia. Rendell was
candid, pointing out that the educational standard of the
soldiers was very low and that suitable officers were not only
difficult to find but of low calibre. FUrther, since there
was no war establishment, each prcxrotion had to be requested
and, if approved, there was no replacement in the ranks. '!he
militia, he declared, "is of no use as a force for field
action [and] must be totally reorganized before it will be
useful for anything other than police guard duty. "73 Earnshaw
offered to help by trying to secure vacancies on training
courses in canada. As an inmediate measure he initiated a
rigorous training progranrne under the supervision of Major
R.S. Leggett, a dental officer with W Force with long
experience as an infantry officer with the Toronto Scottish
Regiment.74 Under his direction the militia I s performance
irrproved steadily. F'rcm time to time, however,
misunderstandings between the Newfoundland authorities and the
Conmander W Force arose. On one such occasion the Chief of
Police instructed the adjutant of the Newfoundland Militia to
provide personnel for police duties without first referring
the matter to W Force Headquarters. Brigadier Earnshaw was
quick to point out to Edward Emerson, Ccrrmissioner for Justice
"WO, NAC, 0024, Volume 13, 807, 18 November 1940 .
."Ibid...., 18 April 1941.
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and Defence, that since the Militia came under his ccmrand:
all orders affecting their disfX)sition under the
situation as it exists must cane fran me. The
NewfOlDldland Militia have a place in the defence
~l~~;~~~~de~f6;df:~~lf~radt~~~~i: of
knowledge. 75
The issue was finally resolved when the militia was placed on
active service on 10 June 1941. As a further safeguard,
however, Brigadier Earnshaw reccmnended the appointment of a
Canadian as CaTrnanding Officer. As there was no suitable
Newfoundlander available, Rendell having becane secretary of
Defence in OCtober 1941, Newfoundland approved the appointment
of Lieutenant Colonel A. T. Howell, a World War I veteran and
a long time merrber of the Royal Montreal Regiment, as
Ccmnanding Officer. 76
As the war progressed and the unit was enlarged the
Militia accepted a greater role in the overall defence plan.
It provided troops to guard the Main Dam at Deer Lake, the
fluorspar mines at St . Lawrence, the Canadian Army'S
Whitboume rragazine and the cable stations at Bay Roberts and
Harbour Grace. In March 1943 the militia attained full
regimental status and was redesignated the Newfoundland
...Ibid...., ::. January 1941.
~'.Ibid...., 7 May 1941.
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Regiment. By this time it corrprised a headquarters, two
infantry crnpanies and a coast defence battery. 77
'Ihe Newfoundland Regiment was not the only Newfoundland
unit that served in defence of the island during hostilities.
Shortly after the fall of Western Europe in the sumner of
1940, the managerrent of the paper mills at Grand Falls and
Corner Brook prop::lsed to the governrrent the creation of a
volunteer force, to serve without rerrnmeration and outfitted
at company ~nse. In response the governrrent brought in the
"A!!xiliary Militia Act" authorizing the establishment of
auxiliary units of vohrntary, unpaid, part-time forces. By
the terms of the Act no persons of military age could join
lU1less they were medically unfit for active service, or were
holding key p::lsitions in industry considered essential to the
war effort. 78 '!he first of these Home Guard CCllll'anies was
fo:rmed at Grand Falls in May 1941. In April of the following
year a second unit was organized at Comer Brook. When on
parade or undergoing training the Herne Guard persotmel wore
battle dress and were equipped with service rifles. overall
corrmand of the Auxiliary was vested in the Cc:mnanding Officer
of the NewfolU1dland Militia. In March 1943, when the
Newfoundland Militia was redesignated the Newfoundland
Regiment, the Auxiliary Militia assumed the title Newfoundland
'''Nicholson, More NewfQlmdlanders, pp.522-523.
"".Ibid..., p.534.
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Militia.79
A further concern facing Earnshaw was the need to provide
training for civil defence in case of air attacks. Within a
month of his arrival in St. John's Brigadier Earnshaw was
visited by Mr. C.H. Hutching, Director of the Air Raid Patrol
(ARP), to discuss the precautions that were being put into
place in case of air attack. Earnshaw promised that he \\IOuld
do whatever he could to assist in organizing and training the
ARP.BO Practice air raid drills, which included blackouts of
varying success, were held periodically. Little else was done
although the Blitz of Britain had delTOnstrated fully the
horrendous destruction and loss of life that b:mbing attacks
could inflict on urban areas. Military and civUian
authorities were also concerned that a marauding warship
standing offshore could inflict similar damage by shell fire.
Earnshaw responded by directing that the size and efficiency
of the ARP organization be increased.Bl
;t'HE ST JOHN's C'.J\BRISQN
As a result of the bilateral defence discussions between
Canadian and NewfOWldland authorities held in St. John I s on 20
IOWD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 11 December 1940.
11Nicholson, More Newfoundlanders, p.357.
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August 1940, canada agreed to station an additional infantry
battalion, "in or in the vicinity of St. John'S."82 Here as
in Bot\o/CXXi intelligence assessed the threat as, "b'::rnbardnent
by a capital ship and/or t\tJO 8-in cruisers, by lrerchant
vessels rrountirg 6-io guns, attack by rrotor torped::> boats,
mine layers and sul:marines roounting 4. 7-in guns, attack by
small raiding parties landed fron war or rrerchant vessels;
ba11b or gas attack by aircraft launched fran war vessels,
arT'OOd merchant vessels or improvised carriers. "aJ canada also
premised to infom the Newfoundland Government of any strength
increase to its forces in Newfoundland. TIle Secretary of
State for EXternal Affairs therefore duly advised Governor
Walwyn on 30 septerrber 1940 that "arrangerrents are being made
to rrove one Infantry Battalion to St. John's as 5(X)n as
satisfactory tenp:>rary aca::nm:xiation can be arranged. "84 In
reply the Governor pointed out that the only tenporary
accamodation available in St. John's large enough to house an
infantry battalion was Me:n'orial University Cbllege, which was
already in session. He was willing, however, to shut the
institution down and order its evacuation -if your military
advisors are satisfied that military necessity justifies such
"Bridle, D!::l!:lJI:neD., Document 184.
uWD, NAC, RG24, VolUfTle 13,807, 31 December 1940.
"Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of
Newfoundland, 30 september 1940, 1156-0-39. Bridle,
~, Document 137.
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action. "% King, however, demurred at such a draconian
solution. Instead it was decided to proceed post haste with
the erection of barracks acccxrm::Jdation, IY'Oving the battalion
independently by corrpanies as construction progressed.
The unit selected for this assignment was the Victoda
Rifles _ The battalion advance party under the cOlllnand of
Major R.H. Budden departed Montreal by train on 10 November
1940, arr~'.ving in St. John I s by the overland route on 14
November. The remainder of the lUlit travelled by sea in
coopany-size groups and by mid-December Lieutenant Colonel
I.H. Eakin and his entire battalion were housed in the newly
contructed barracks at Lester I 5 Field on the northwest edge of
the capital.86 Part of its job was lOOunting sentries at
various points around the city such as W Force Headquarters
and the Ordnance Depot.S? In addition to sentry duty the w1it
provided coast watching detachrrents at Topsail, Petty Harbour
and Portugal Cove. "Stand-to" canpany was confined to camp
with its vehicles loaded and ready to IOOve to reinforce or.
.IGQvernor of NewfOWldland of Secretary of State for External
Affairs, 1 OCtober 1940, 1156-D-39. Bridle, ~l1tS.,
Document 138.
town, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 278, November - December 19'10.
''These 6entry and guard duties would continue to be the
resI;X>nsibility of the St. John's garrison battalion until the
arr~val of a cOOlpany of the Veterans Guard of canada in
November 1941.
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counterattack at any threatened location _8e. The CCk"1st
watching detachrrents \ task was to obsenre and/or contain all
enemy lodgement pending the arrival of the "Stand-to" ccxrpany.
A duty company provided the canp quarter-guard and fhe-picket
and supplied the men for fatigues. The remainder of the unit
carried out such training as it could. This consisted mainly
of lectures and practical training on a multitude of subjects
fran military law to weapons handling. When possible,
tactical exercises were carried out in and. around the ciLy to
the delight of the local citizenry .89
And so as the magnitude of the disaste::- of the fall of.
Western Europe dawned, Canada's relations witn Newfoundland
underwent a fundamental change. Up to this point
Newfoundland's security had rested on British seapower but it
now became obvious that the island could not be adequately
protected by this or any other means at Britain's disposal.
'this fact drove Canada to a fuller realization of tile
interdependence of the supremacy of the Royal Navy and tile
defence of the Western Hemisphere. That realization finally
corrpelled Canada to consider her own protection in a new light
and by extension it carre to a greater appreciation of tile part
that Newfoundland must play in Canada I s defence. Thus in the
U}I.M. Jacksr':l, The Sherhrpgke Re~nment (22.tlL_Arrro~d
~, (Pn.vately Prmted 1958) pp.69-73.
,,~
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face of a perceived threat to its safety, canada was forced
into a closer relationship with Newfoundland. Self-interest
favoured increased involvement in the defence of its
neighbour. The two countries were drawn closer together in
wartirt'e arrangements whose far-reaching consequences, although
not fully appreciated at the time, would forever change the
relationship between the two.
BB
During 1941 Ottawa had not only acknO\...ledged a special
responsibility for the defence of ita neighbour, it had also
taken steps t<.. discharge that responsihility. The Anerican
decision to station trcxJPs in Newfoundland under the leased.
bases agreement (first announced in september 1940) challenged
the aSSlllTption that NewfOWldland carre within the canadian
sphere. 'Ihe canadian military was determined to remain
preeminent in the island's defence. 'Ib do so would rrean that
Canada would have to supply ackiitional resources to deferx:l the
island. '!he Chiefs of Staff Ccmnittee urged the govenrnent to
take action. A third battalion of infantry was dispatched
and canada hastened to fulfil its cmmitment to furnish the
premised coast artillery and PtA lUlits. Not only did the
personnel of W Force increase but the infrastructure expanded
greatly through continual constnlction. In all, approximately
600 permanent and 100 tenporary buildings were erected, At
the same time training became rrore rigorous in order to
prepare the canadian soldiers for the rtUch roore demanding duty
89
that awaited them overseas.
The first American servicemen arrived in St. John's
r:tboard the troopship Edrrnmd e Alexander on 29 January 1941.1
(The vessel had arrived a few days earlier but a severe storm
prevented it fran negotiating the narrow entrance to the
almost land-locked harbour).2 Under the Leased Bases
Agreement the United States constructed three major
facilities: Fort Pepperell in Pleasantville near St. John's;
Argentia Naval Station on the shores of Placentia Bay; and
Hauron Air Field at Stephenville on the west coast of the
island. Sirrply put, the mission and responsibility of the
United States anny garrison (designated the Newfoundland Base
eomnand) was to defend US installations and, in co-operation
with the canadian forces, to defend N~wfoundlandagainst enemy
attack.
'since winter weather handicapped the construction of
quarters, this initial force of 58 officers and 919 enlisted
men rem:tined quartered aboard the Edt:mJod B AJ exander. In
June barracks construction began and the Fort Pepperell
Garrison consisting of the 3rd Battalion Infantry, a retteZJ
~~et~~h5~~~tlfi\~~e(An~t_~~r:~)en~~~~reba~~e~a~.
~~;tCa~:j~39_'jJ4W,a7wa~tl~i~~s&tmig~eoi"fjh~e~~~1t;~
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959]) p.96.
'WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 25 January 1941.
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Upon arrival the American ccmnander, Colonel Welty,
aCCOITPanied by his adjutant and the US Consul, visited
Headquarters W Force. The following day Brigadier Eamshaw
reciprocated cooylimenting the American contingent as "fine
looking" and "well equipped. ") Fran the outset, contact
between the canadian and American army in Newfowldland
occurred on an alIT'OSt daily basis and although they each had
their own perception of their duties and resp::msibilities,
relations between the two were surprisingly good. When
problems did arise they were Trore of a political nature <:lnd
had little effect on relations at the working level.
Brigadier Earnshaw and Colonel Welty, who developed a healthy
professional respect for each other, had soon worked out an
amicable nxxllls operandi. In a letter to his GCX:'inC on 6
February 1941, Earnshaw was able to report that "on my request
he (Colonel Welty] was prepared to put his 155mn nobile
battery into action in defence of St. John's haroour and also
his AA ba.ttery. ,,4 Further II I could count on his forces being
available to take actual part in any defensive action." This,
Welty assured Earnshaw, "would not require reference to
'WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 30 January 1941.
4The canadian amty member of the PJBD had suggested that
~ ~~i~c~ef~d~s'~~t~#lw~hse l~~l~t ;~r~~~~l~t~
included in Colonel Welty's contingent. {DzJ.Uban, Militat:Y-
Relatioos, p. 116 . I
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Washington. ,,5
canadian-Arrerican relations were in some respects a
unique problem in Newfoundland for, although the Canadian and
American peoples had much in COflll'On, their military traditions
differed greatly. For most of the personnel of WForce it was
the first time they had had direct dealings with Arrericans and
while the language used by the Americans was familiar, to the
ears of the canadians, trained as they were in the British
Army tradition, it sounded "unmilitary." They were intrigued
by US equipment - especially tho:'!ir robust four-wheel drive
vehicles and versatile weapons so different from the British
designs adopted by the Canadians - yet there was little of the
Anericans that they envied, certainly not their clothing or
their rations.
Military units, however, especially from different
nations, are inclined to be critical of one another,
particularly when in garrison. They dwell on small points of
difference and make flUlch of IT'atters which to a civilian eye
seem unirrportant - as the entry in the W Force War Diary
describing a UN Day Parade in St. JOm1' s indicates:
~WD, lilAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 3 February 1941.
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canadian troops averaged nore huskier lcx:>king and
definitely in better physical condition than the
=~han~l~i~y·c;htf~~h~~~elo~elt~ts~ii~~~s
[siclwere roughened. G
Th~re were occasional fights due to canadian resentment over
higher pay for Arrericans and the inevitable carpetition over
women. But these were minor problems. In general the
canadian soldier got on reasonably well with his Alt'erican
counterpart. The consensus was that the Americans were good
guys and fine soldiers and while the canadians respected them
they also recognized that the Americans had their own way of
doing things.
During the same rronth that the Americans arrived,
Brigadier Earnshaw recorrmended to Atlantic Corrll\,md the
rotation of his infantry battalions to prevent them fro:n
l:ecc:xning "stale" and also to facilitate training."J The duties
at Gander and Botwood were particularly trying. Not only was
the unit split between the two locations but at each the task
required a large number of round-the-clock guards that
severely r'=!:stricted unit training. In St. John's, on the
other hand, the duties were less onerous and since the unit
was concentrated in one camp, training was rrore easily
6WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 808, 14 June 1942.
7.Ibid...., 27 January 1941.
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handled. Morale also suffered in the smaller corrmuni.ties
while in St. John's the soldiers had access to a bustling
seaport and all that it had to offer in the way of
entertainment. a At Earnshaw's suggestion the change-overs
were to take place in early April, Uto enable me to get the
reliefs COO1pleted before navigation opens. ,,9 Consequently in
April the Victoria Rifles were transferred to Gander/Botwood
area and the Royal Rifles moved to St. JOM' S. It was not to
last long, however, for by August the Royal Rifles were on the
rrove again, this time to carrp Valcartier, Quebec. 10
Both the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet were resolved to
maintain canada's preminence in defence matters in
Newfoundland. The fact was underscored in a meeting of the
War cabinet camti.ttee held on 5 June 1941. During the meeting
'l!li.d.
'o.rheir stay in Valcartier did not, unfortunately I last
long either. The Royal Rifles of canada would be one of the
two canadian infantry battalions p:>sted to Hong Kong. In an
ironic twist of fate it was ncminated for this duty because
the Director of Military Training felt that the unit was not
~~~U, f~ tw:~~~~~na~~:Jie:e;;ed.~~ ~~e~frfio~et~n~~~
to be performed in Hong Kong would be quit.e similar to that
performed in Newfoundland and not only would the NewfolU1d1and
tour be of great value but it had proven the units efficiency!
When Ho~ Kong fell on Christmas Day 1941 the entire unit was
either hlled or captured by the Japanese. (Stacey, .s..ix....YeaI:,
pp. 442-444)
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the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Crerar, p:>inted
out that the protective measures recarrnended for the defence
of Gander airfield were based on a joint recormaissance
carried out by the senior canadian and American officer-s in
Newfoundland. 11 (Brigadier Earnshaw and Colonel \~elty
travelled to Gander by train in Ap"n 1941 and prepared a
joint "military appreciation of the situation"). Up to this
point the infantry duties of Gander/Botwood had been carried
out by positioning two rifle conq;>anies, plus supporting
troops, in each location. In their assessment, however.
Earnshaw and Welty deemed that the substantial increase in
military air traffic and the inminent deploY1T~nt of M and
coast artillery in the area fully justified additional
infantry troops, whose main role was now local ground
protection and security. Crerar was of the opinion that if
canada was not prepared to provide these additional troops,
the United States would send forces of their own. In view of
the canadian policy regarding the defence of the island, this
would be unfortunate. He therefore recorrmended the dispatch
of an additional infantry battalion to Newfoundland. Prime
Minister King agreed that every effort necessary should be
taken to "keep Newfoundland within the canadian orbit. IIll '!he
llMinutes of a Meeting of the War cabinet Conmittee,
Ottawa, 5 June 1941, ewe, Bridle,~, Document 102.
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Corrrnittee therefore approved an additional infantry battalion
for errployment in Newfoundland and in July the Prince Edward
Island Highlanders (PEIH) headed for Newfoundland.
The Highlanders had been IT'Obilized for Active Service
imnediately upon the outbreak of war in September 1939.
Within two weeks the battalion was on duty guarding vulnerable
points in the Halifax/DartlTOuth area of Nova Scotia. In May
1941 it rroved to Carrp Valcartier for unit training. July saw
the unit advance party on its way to Newfoundland by the
overland route, followed by the main body which travelled by
ship. By the end of July Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Thompson had
paken ccmnand of the Botwood Defences from the Victoria
Rifles. ll
'!he PEIH was the first battalion to be posted to Botwood
intact. The strength of the canadian military establishrrent
in Botwood had already increased considerably over the past
year and with it the infantry's defence and security role.
The guard carpany now furnished infantry protection to the
106th Coast Battery Royal Canadian Altillery (RCA), situated
at Phillips Head and WisemanB Head fmther up the Bay of
Exploits, and out-post detachments at Point Leamington to the
lJWD, NAC, RG24, volume 15,147,26 July 1941.
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northwest, Lewisporte to the northeast, Bishop's [<'aIls to the
south and Notre Dame Junction to the east. The stand-by
canpany was on irrmediate call ready to reinforce or counter-
attack. wherever required. A third carpany acted as duty
corrpany perfonning fatigues and routine tasks al-ow"ld the camp.
'!he fourth company trained. Headquarters, the specialist
corrpany, provided. local protection within Botwood itself and
rrounted rrobile supfX)rt weap:lns patrols. In order to provide
some variety and to ensure that the troops did not beccxne 1'".00
bored, coopany tasks were rotated every two weeks. 1·1 'This
helped bolster rrorale. In March 1942 the unit was relieved by
the Algonquin Regiment frcxn St. John' 5 and rroved to Gander to
replace the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. Their stay in
Gander would last one full year.
Gander underwent a major expansion in 1940-41. The
arrival of the UC; Army Air Corps increased day-to-day
operations while the munber of ferried aircraft increased
exponentially. This in tunl resulted in a corresponding
increase in the numbers of infantry required for protection
and security. The enonrous size of the base, the largest in
the Ccmronwealth, required a minirrnJrn of three canpanies to man
the defensive positions, furnish local protection for the AA.
14Ibid...., July-August 1941.
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batteries, and provide sec..urity for base facilities such as
hangars, fuel tanks and the like. Another company provided
personnel for carrp fatigues and provided a detachment at Gamba
to the southeast whose task it was to keep Freshwater and
Indian Bay,; under observation. Headquarters Conpany rrounted
rrobile patrols and was ready to deploy its support weapons in
an emergency. is
Thus, as the autumn of 1941 approached, Brigadier
EaITlshaw I s camand had expanded considerably from the infantry
battalion and coast battery he had inherited less than a year
before. His Headquarters at "Winterholm" in St. John's was
larger than that of a brigade with a ccmnand signals
detacrurent. later it expanded to include a conpany of the
Veterans Guard of Canada for security. The Royal Rifles,
errployed basically as a counter-attack/counter-penetration
force for St. JOM' s and the coast to the south as well as the
east coast of Conception Bay, was housed at Lester'R Field
Barracks. The Newfoundland Militia, headquartered at Shamrock
Field Barracks in the capital, manned the coast defence guns
at Bell Island and guarded vulnerable points in and around the
city. There were two rrore infant};}' battalions, the Victoria
Rifles at Gander and the PEIH at Botwood. In addition to
~~.(P:~~:iy ~r?;Ked~f 1~~:) i;b~rg§~lO;~
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we] land
their primary duty of securing these defence facilities they
manned detachments at such places as LewispCll.-te, Notre DanlE!
Junction, Indian Bay and Gamba to secure thp. land approaches.
At all locations, of course, there were the necessary
ancillary service, ordnance, engineer, rredical corps personnel
and the like who supported the infantry.
As both the canadian and .American military presence
continued to expand during 1941 some friction developed
between the local ccmnanders. And 80 Canada, for reasons
which will be explained in greater detail later, decided to
up-grade the rank of the Ccmnander W Force. In December 19111
the Minister of National Defence announced the appointment of
Major-General L.F. Page as General Officer COlTTl\3J)ding (GOC) W
Force. 16 Soon after his arrival Page visited each unit to
16At the outbreak of war in 1914 Major-General Page went
overseas as a subaltern with the 5th Battalion Canadian
Expeditionary Force. In 1917 he was appointed Ccmnanding
Officer of the 50th Battalion in which capacity he served with
distinction until the Armistice, having been mentioned in
despatches five tires and awarded the DSO and bar. On return
to Canada he joined the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal
Canadians) . A number of ccmnand and staff appointments
followed, culminating in his prorrotion to Brigadier and
appointment as Corrmander of Military Distdct 7 in 1937. In
~ei~9t~~rw~ft t~~ ;~any~~sh~~~d~~a:;:r:~;:l[~r~~~
united Kingdan as Comnander canadian Base Units. Nine months
later he returned to canada to corrrnand 4 ArTToured Division
where he remained lUltil his posting as General Officer
Coornanding WForce. St. John's~ (29 December 1941)
p.3.
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conduct a thorough staff inspection. Page was generally
pleased with what he found rot was dissatisfied . -;i.th the
standard of tactical training of the Newfoundland garrison.
He had stipulated that all infantry battalioos ttl.lSt be battle
ready, but on his ::.oors of inspection he saw that this was not
the case. 'Ihe prcblem was the infantry's duties such as
guards, sentries and coast-watching. 'Ihis allowed tirre for
inciividual training but junior officers failed to gain prcper
leadership training, a concern which Page raised in a letter
to his infantry battalion comnanders on 18 February 1942.
Based on re:p::lrts received on officers attending courses at
training establishments in canada, it was apparent that "their
performance indicates a dangerously low standard of training,
a rost unsatisfactory and disquietening state of affairs.,,11
Sane officers had even been retw.ned fran training courses
because of insufficient preparatory training. More serious,
officers were appallingly weak in their knaw'ledge of military
Olyanization and basic infantry tacticr. -If this were the
case," Page concluded, "it is difficult to visualize how the
unit, as a whole, can be properly trained. ,,11
To correct this state of affairs he ordered special
1"WD, NAC, RG24, Volurre 13, 808, 18 February 1942.
18.I1ri.l:L
100
training classes to begin inmediately. All officers below the
rank of major were to attend. To avoid interfering with
normal day-to-day training, instruction was to be "in the
evening or late afternoon or over the weekend. ,,1" In addition
to a certain required number of classroom lectures,
instruction was to "consist principally of field exercises and
<rerronstrations." Equipped as private soldiers, officers were
organized in sections and acted as such in the field.~"
COurses were to be of six weeks' duration with weekly reports
subnitted to Headquarters. Page suggested that comnanding
officers and CCXlpaIly comnanders should monitor these courses
since they were resp::msible for the training of their jW1ior
officers and "should take an active interest in order to
ensure that these courses produce the results required."
Finally, "while courses were underway leave and. off -duty
passes were to be subordinated to the requirements of
training. 1I21
Page 1 S remedial trai.ning prcgrarrme was well timed. No
sooner had the jW1ior officers honed thei.r tactical skills
than infantry field training received a new and realistic
101
stilTn..llus proopted by the return of a handful of officers and
NCO I s who had been sent to the United Kingdom for advanced
training. They introduced W Force to a British Army
innovation - "Bat.tle Drill. II Battle Drill was based on the
theory that in c<:xnbat rrost difficulty sterrmed fran the
unfamiliarity of junior cc:mranders with the noise and
confusion of battle. To overcome this, at least in part,
every soldier had to lealn to execute a few routine tactical
manoeuvres by habit so that eventually fire and movement on
the battlefield would becane autcxnatic to the infantryman and
his section. To this end, Battle Drill called for the firing
of live armtl.ll"lition over the heads of manoeuvring troops as
they crawled under barbed wire and negotiated obstacles to the
constant chant of their instructors COWN! CRAWL! OBSERVE!
PIRE! Later in the war many higher r.omnanders questioned
Battle Drill IS effectiveness. 1here is little doubt that many
of its praroters had overdone and oversimplified the benefits
to be gained from it, but as a catalyst to training and as a
vehicle for toughening troops under realistic conditions it
proved invaluable.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIXSD COASTAl. DEFENCES
Unlike the decade prior to World War I, planning in
Canada for coast defence during the 19305 was well advanced.
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By 1936 the anrerrents required for coastal defence were based.
on the scales of attack projected by the mil italY intelligence
cormnmity. Unfortunately, the arraI1g'errent for defending
canada 1 s coastline was dependent on suhstantial construction
and the manufacture and purchase of new ordnance and was not
expected to be in place until 1943 or 1944. With the outbreak
of war in 1939, therefore, il'lprovisation became the watch-word
and ordnance, no matter of what nature or age, had to be
utilized. In short, any equiprent that could be adapted for
use in the coast defence role was pressed. into service _ This
serious shortage of modern equiprent was to playa m-:tjor role
in the tardiness of providing proper coast de(ence for
Newfoundland. 22
Generally speaking the requirements in armarrents and
their disp:>sition at a defended port followed a canoon
pattern. Against an 8-inch cruiser standing off-shore and
borrbarding the port a gun in the eight to 10-inch class that
could fire at extreme ranges presented the best deterrence_
Sited in pairs these guns constituted. the counter-bombardment
(CB) batteries, the first line in any coast defence
organization. Supporting the long range guns were the guns of
the close defence (CD) batteries which were sited nearer the
22Nicholson, ~, pp.447-448.
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harbour to be defended. 'I11eir main role was to engage any
enemy shipping which managed to evade the outer defences. The
third and inner line of defence corrprised the anti-lTOtor
torpedo boat (AMTB) batteries normally positioned within the
p:Jrt. Thus the ca, CD, and AMI'8 batteries comprised the basic
defence of a defended port. Super-imposed uIXln this
organization were the AA batteries, the naval examination
service, the IXlrt war signals sections and the infantry
defence and employment troops. Additionally, the Navy and the
Air Force were responsible for reconnaissance and observation
beyond the outer perirreter of the port's defences. An. army
artillery officer invariably corrrnanded the defended p:Jrt. 21
As early as its first rreeting in ottawa in August 1940
the PJBD recemnended that, given Newfoundland's strategic
position, coast artillery defence should be established on the
island and put in place by the spring of 1941. Canada would
take responsibility for construction and manning of the
batteries ·....hile the United States would help with the
provision of ordnance. 24
In the sunmer of 1940 there was only one operational
~).Ibid.., pp.44B-449.
24..I.bid..., p.464.
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battery in NewfoutKllancL '!he 1st Coast Defence Battery of the
Newfoondland Militia consist:ed of two 4. 7-inch guns am Lwo
searchlights used for the protection of the iron ore mines and
shippi.n; facilities at Bell Island.:S St. John's, the capital
and t.he island's ITOSt irrportant port, was without protection.
Consequently it was decided that until a proper defe:nded p:>rt
organization could be put in place and as a stop-gap measure,
a rrakeshift battery, "0" Battery, should be dispatched to St.
John'S.26 The organization of "Q" Battery RCA under captain
R.R. ward took place at Royal Artillery Park in Halifax during
the first three weeks of OCtober. Personnel were drawn fran
the 1st Halifax Coast Brigade RCA, 3RD (NS) Coast Brigade RCA,
16th Coast Brigade RCA and fran Military District NO.6 RCA
establishment. 27 Equipped with 751m\ guns it acted as an
Examination Battery. 21 Q1 5 Novenber 1940 guns were installed.
tenporarily at Fort Antlerst, a hastily prepared position
consisting of gun enplacements and barracks acccmrodation
15Iftle Q.Lick Firi03 (QP) 4.7 inch gun on its field rrounting
was utilized in close defence during the early years of the
war. The field trountings were gradually replaced by locally
=iJe~f~~~~th;h~~O~~~e~nl::f~rrp=n~
doubtful. Nicholson, ~, p.449.
26lbid....., p.464.
21WD, NAe, RG24, Volurre 14, 356, 1-18 OCtober 1940.
28.Ibi.d... 'Ihese weapons were British pattern, Prench type,
75 millirretre guns with standard rrountings manufactured in the
United States in 1917.
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perched on a rocky prcrrontory at the south entrance to the
harbour and sur:rounded on three sides by the sea. 29 In May
1941 these guns were rooved across the harbour entrance to the
newly constructed Fort Chain Rock and "Q" Battery
redesignated "eu Troop, l03rd COast Battery RCA.
In a dispatch on 13 May 194~ the secretary of State for
External Affairs informed Governor Walwyn of the Canadian
Army's plans to install new fixed coast defence and AA defence
in the St. John t s area. 30 The coast artillery positions would
be manned by the l03rd Coast Battery, RCA (formerly the 103rd
Heavy Battery RCA) under Major D.V. Rainnie. u The l03rd
Battery was to occupy three "forts" in the St. John's area.
"A" Troop was stationed at Fort Cape Spear, on the most
easterly point in North America, manning two American lO-inch
guns. J2 These guns would provide counter-Ixxnbardnent against
enemy warships carrying large calibre gwls standing off shore.
Fort cape Spear's exposed position, which gave it a 7, ooo-yard
2~lbid....., 5 November 1941.
30Secretary of State for Exten1al Affairs to Governor of
Newfoundland, Ottawa, 13 May 1941, ~156-D-39. Bridle,
~, r:ccument 633.
Him, NAC, RG24 , Volume 14, 372, 17 May 1941.
12The American 10-inch coast gun, 1888 ll"Odel, mounted on
a disap~aring carriage, was capablt of firing a 617 pound
projectJ.le sane 17,000 yards. Its weight with trounting was
thirty tons. Nicholson, G:u.1:lI1e.I:a, p.449.
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advantage over any hostile vessel approaching St. John's, also
required an infantry detachment frem the St. John's garrison
batt.alion to provide local protection against a possible enemy
raiding party. "8" Troop occupied Fort Amherst at the south
entrance of the harbour. It was equipped with two 4. 7-inch
guns combining a close defence role with that of an
Examination Battery. "C" Troop was installed in Fort Chain
Rock at the northern entrance to the harbour where its two
75rrm guns gave protection against subrarines and surface craft
that might elude the outer defence. In support of this role
the troop was also equipped with two 60-inch searchlights."
'!he ordnance for "A" Troop arrived in St. John's by ship
from the United States on 24 April 1941 and was inmediately
placed in storage at the Furness Withy dock W1til construction
was carpleted at cape Spear.)-4 The reinforced concrete
positions, dug into the clirf face, and the necessary barracks
acconroodations and ancillary buildings were not ready until
late surrmer. In OCtober the dismantled guns were moved on
borrowed Alrerican equipment with great difficulty over the
narrow dirt track that served as the only road connection
between Bt. John's and cape Spear. once the guns were
llWD, NAC, RG24 , Voll.lJre 14, 372, 15 May-IS August 1941.
HWD, mc, RG24, Volurre 13, 807, 24 April 19'11.
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installed, intensive training was carried out using a 1.457-
inch sub-calibre device. Final calibration took place during
the first week of Decenber 1941 ard on the 9th the first
practice shoot was held. 15 'Ib help disguise its actual
locat.ion the position was cleverly carrouflaged and a -dtum1y
positionn , which it was \'q>ed would draw enemy fire,
locat.ed on a nore praninent rid:Je sare distance away. U
While these fixed coast artillery positions were being
prepared in the St. John's area, work had already begun on
similar positions in the Botwood area to provide protection
for the rosy PJrt and seaplane base and the sea approaches to
Garrler airfield. D.1ring the stll1Tl'er of 1941 nen of the 106th
Coast Battery RCA. (fo~rly 106th Heavy Battery) under Major
C.J. MacO:mald arrived fran the Halifax Fortress. '!be fixed
coast defences of the Bot....ood Defended Area consisted of two
t.ro::p positions fac~ each other diagcnally across the Bay of
Exploits. At Wisemens Head "A- Troop was equipped with two
Alrerican lO-inch guns while at PhiJ lips Head -B" Troop manned
two 4 .1-inch guns. "DN Trcx::p manned the supporting
searchlights. n Local protection was provided by Botwood
lSWD, NAC, 0024, Volurre 14, 372, 9 Decenber 1941.
3Glbid....., 4 April 1942.
3~, NAC, RG24, Volure 14, 374, 11 July-1.8 Septenber
1941.
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infantry battalion. In May 1942 the 107th Coast Battery RCA
(formerly the l07th Heavy Battery) under Major R. Sinclair,
recently reorganized and equipped with two 75mn guns and two
60-inch searchlights,lB left Halifax for Lewisp:>rte, where its
role would be to guard against submarines and light surface
craft. n A platoon frcrn the Botwood infantry battalion
provided local protection.
Given the situation, at least in the early war period,
the greatest fear was the threat of enemy surface raiders
which, in addition to their powerful ordnance, might carry
assault parties. 'The rep:lrt of an allied encounter with a
German raider off Bermuda on 25 November 1940 elicited an
imrediate response by W Force Headquarters. Realizing that
the same vessel could be off Newfoundland by the evening of 26
November the Victoria Rifles were placed on general alert "in
case St. John's was raided or shelled," a threat never far
fran Brigadier Earnshaw's mind.~o Soon after his arrival he
had determined that the coast artillery, which at this time
COlfPrised only one battery of 75 nm guns, was insufficient to
prevent the shelling of Be. John's by any capital ship
leWD, NAe, RG24, VoltIlle 14, 377, 26 January 1942.
19lDid....., 24 May 1942.
,own, NAC, 0024, Volume 13, 807, 25 November 1940.
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standing out of range of shore defences. On 1 January 1941 he
wired the GOCinC Atlantic Carrnand:
Officials here agree St. John's dangerously open to
attack by raider or specially fitted cargo boat
(sic]. Harbour full of shiJ?:s which could, if sunk,
render it useless. If possible bcxnbers placed here
on Quidi vidi Lake as terrporary measure and coast
batteries rushed. 41
since nothing was available the GOC'inc responded that the
"risk must be accepted for the present. "~2 Earnshaw's fears
were, ho·....ever fully justified. In early 1941 German surface
raiders, in greater strength than ever before, penetrated
further into the Northwest Atlantic. The pocket battleship
Admiral Scheer and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper were on
the loose in the North Atlantic and they were soon joined by
the~ and Prince Eugen. In one two-day period in mid-
March the powerful battle-cruisers sct@tDhorst and~
sank sixteen ships bound for the united Kingdc:m within four or
five hundred miles of St. John's. At the same time the
submarine Jreoace was also rrounting . In March U-boat
operations were extended a further six hundred miles out to
"lhid..., 1 January 1941.
Hlbid...., 9 January 1941.
no
sea - as far west as 40 degreesY The Krjegsmarine, however
did not confine its attentions t.o merchantmen alone. One can,
therefore, appreciate the consternation occasioned by the news
of the sinking off Greenland on 24 May 1941 of HMS HoQd, which
inmediately resulted in a rurrour t.hat Greenland had been
occupied by the enemy.H Worse yet,~, flushed with her
victory over the Hoed, was reported 95 miles off St. John's!
As a precaution a black-out was imposed on the city and the
adjacent coastline and all military and naval units were
placed on full alert.~s However, the first confi:r.med sighting,
for W Force at least, came on 29 OCtober 1941, when Lieutenant
E.P. Hall of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers attached to l03rd
Battery, RCA, at Fort Amherst on look-out duty relayed to W
Force Headquarters the sighting of an enemy submarine by a
Royal canadian Navy destroyer. 46
German raiders ceased to be a serious threat after 19011
but U-boat wolf packs lurking in waters off NewfoW1dland
remained a threat for much of the war, sometimes sallying
"wn, NAC, RG24, Volume 15, 27B, 24 May 1941.
'~WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 807, 25 May 1941.
uJackson, Sberbrooke Regiment, p.6B.
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close to shore. Enemy sutmarine sightings, rrostly mistaken,
were ccmnon around the island. Many of these fanciful
encounters originated with fishermen and other small craft
owners but coast watchers were just as imaginative. These
reports gained some credence in the spring of 1942 when mines
began to appear off the east coast of the island. Believed at
first to be evidence of enemy activity, they proved in the end
to be of British design. Further investigation determined
that they had originated in Europenn fields laid by the Royal
Navy. Having slipped their il'OOrings they had, unfortunately,
drifted across the Atlantic - poor consolation for any Allied
vessel unlucky enough to strike one! 47
Not all reports of enemy activity were exaggerated,
the men of B Troop, 103rd Coast Battery leamed on 3 March
1942. At 1415 hours the sealing vessel~, having
been cleared by port signals and the Examination Battery,
steamed through the Narrows and entered the harbour. At 1454
hours a violent explosion shook Fort Amherst I throwing up a
pillar of water 100 feet high directly in front of No.l. gun
position. Two minutes later there was Cl second powerful
explosion at North Head on the opposite shore. In the
inmediate aftermath there was sane conjecture as to what the
47t>ID, NAC, RG24, VohllTe 13,908, 23 April 1942.
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cause of the explosions had been - mines, shells or torpedoes.
However, it was SOCln agreed that an enemy su1::marine had
attempted to block t.he harl:xJur entrance by sinking :ren:a.....N!:n
as she entered. This theory was confirtred the following; day
when netal fragments identified as pieces of a torpeOO warhead
were recovered fran the shoreline.·'
Further northeast in Notre Dame Bay the following mnth,
Private LisCOO1be of the Algonquin Regiment and his section on
sentry duty in the Point Leamington area were astonished, just
after dawn as the fog lifted, by a German U-I:oat surfaced in
the calm waters of Southwest Ann with the crew on deck in full
view. since the observation post was without ccmnunications.
Liscanbe had to make his way to Headquarters on foot to give
the alann. By the tirre heavy weapons could be brought to the
scene the boat had disaweared. '!he incident. OClwever, served
to put ev~e on alert and LiscaTbe was cc:mnenied for his
For roost of the tine coast gunners stationed in
Newfoundland were caught. up in the necessary but lx:lring tasks
that differed little fran what they had been doing in Canada.
".Ibid..-, 4 March 1942.
"C.L. Cassidy, waxpath. 'I11e Story of the A]goru;ru..in
Regiment J 939-1 94.5., (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1948) p.41.
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For young volunteers hankering for action, the progress of the
war to that point seemed to offer little excitement and
certainly no inmediate prospect :>f overseas duty. But during
wartime, things could change qu.1.ckly. A lazy sunmer day could
erupt into a nightma.re, as hapPE:..1ed in Lewisporte on 25 June
1942. On that day a store of dynamite, belonging to a
civilian defence contractor but stored terrporarily in the
107th Coast Battery tented carrp, accidently exploded. Five
soldiers were killed outright and eleven injured. A number of
nearby buildings were damaged while thirty bell tents and two
marquees were torn to shreds. A portion of the staff of
Botwood Military hospital was promptly rushed to Lewisporte
where the swift application of their medical skill was
instrumental in saving the lives of the seriously injured.
Their efforts did not go unnoticed as they were all
subsequently ccmnended. 50 Three officers were ultimately
charged with negligence, although the court martial cleared
them of any blame in the tragedy. 51
While service-related accidents claimed both military and
civilian lives in Newfoundland throughout the war, far m:::>re
were lost frcm direct enemy U-boat action. Such was the case
"'lbid... p.36.
"WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 808, 2 August 1942.
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when the long and lonely vigil of the NewfOlUldland persormel
of 1 CD Battery at Bell Island was dramatically broken on 5
September 1942. captain 01Driscoll and his men had spotted
what they thought were enemy U-i:x:>ats before, passing the
info:tl'lation on to the RCN. During the previous May they had
actually engaged a suspected target although no debris was
sighted. On the day in question. however, four freighters,
having loaded ore, were lying-to awaiting orders for their
outgoing convoy. At midday, without warning, the British
freighter .saga.naga was struck by two torpedoes and in less
than a minute went down with twenty-seven of her crew. Within
minutes the canadian freighter Tord Strathcona was al.-;o sunk,
fortunately without loss of life as her crew had already
abandoned ship. The men of 1 CD Battery, having alerted
Headquarters WForce, manned their guns in search of a target
while the infantry detachments stood to full alert ready to
repulse any atterrpted landing. A Ra:I corvette was dispatched
ilmle.diately from St. John I sand rrobile AA guns were rushed by
road to Conception Bay. 52 'l1l.e NewfolUldland battery engaged
what it thought was the U-boat but no damage seems to have
been done. 53 In reporting the action to Headquarters Atlantic
"'WD, NAC, 0024, Volume 13, 809, 5 Septerrber 1942.
'IAfter the war German records confirmed that the attack
was carried out by U-513 coomanded by Korvetten K1ipitan Rolf
~b~:~J'S::DW;l~'wf=fr!ri~~:=W~]wm~nrsg~
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Camand Major-General Page paid tribute to the
Newfoundlanders, stating that they had "behaved in a roost
exerrplary manner during the course of these operations. ,,54
But the daring U-boat comnanders did not confine their
action to naval and merchant shipping in the relatively open
and easily accessible waters of the east and northeast coasts
of Newfoundland. '!be single greatest event resulting in the
10s8 of life to both Canadian service personnel and
Newfoundland civilians in the waters surrounding Newfoundland
during the world War II was the result of enemy action in the
cabot Strait. In the early hours of 15 OCtober 1942 the
Newfoundland-Nova Scotia steamship ferry~ was torpedoed
as she was nearing the end of her ovenlight run from North
Sydney to Port Aux Basques. 55 Struck amidships, the vessel
sank within a few minutes in what was described. as "the
John's: Robinson Blackrrore Printing and Publishing Ltd, 1981)
Also for a fuller description of the incident see Steve Neary,
The Enemy at O1!r Doorstep, (St. John's: Jesperson Press Ltd.,
1994)
"WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 808, 7 September 1942.
~~After the war German records confinned that the attack
~;:f~arr~:fl~t~~-6~~d~~aKa~\lan~~~~~~~t~ir~~~
tragic incident see Douglas HOw, Hi gbt of the caritx))] ,
(Hansport, Nova Scotia: Lancelot Press, 1988) also see
Howard Yorke, "A Saga of the cari..l:xJu" in Naya Scotja
Historic:iaJ Reyiew (Vol 5, No.1, 1985) pp. 31-36, for a
survivcr's reminiscence of the event.
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greatest maritime disaster in the coastal waters fringing
canada annOlUlced to date [during the war] . ItS&
The first rescue craft on the scene was the car.i1:lcu.' s
escort vessel~, an RCN Bangor Class minesweeper which
managed to pick up 103 survivors. Irrmediately the news was
received that the ferry had been attacked and sunk,~
was joined by schooners and boats from Newfoundland ports.
They in turn were shortly joined by naval vessels fran Sydney.
In spite of these efforts the toll was considerable. OUt of
a total of 137 listed as missing and presumed dead fifty-seven
were canadian service personnel fran the three brancl-tes. ~'I
Among the missing were fourteen Newfoundlanders on hane leave
fran the Royal Navy. The newspaper concluded its account of
the tragedy by stating that "initial reports of the sul:marine
surfacing and machine gurming survivors proved false.lIs~
Again, at the Bell Island ore docks in the early rrorning
hours of 2 November, just a little short of two rronths after
~'~, St. JOM'S, 17 OCtober 1942. p.l.
~'Yorke, "A Saga," p.35. Among them was Lieutenant Agnes
Wilkie, Assistant Matron of the Naval Hospital at Se. John' 8,
,'the first NursiI'l$J Sister of the Royal Canadian Navy to make
the supreme sacnfice." (~St. Jalm's 17 OCtober
1942) p.l.
"Ibid..
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the sinking of S,aganaga and Tord Stratbcpna, two rrore
freighters, 55~ and the Free French ship.EIl1=.2.1., rret
the same fata. Visibility was poor in rain and fog as the
enemy U-boat manoeuvred into position. 5j It first engaged the
ore carrier 5S~ which was loading at the Scotia Pier
but the torpedo ran tmder the stern and struck the pier
instead, causing extensive damage. Two rrore torpedoes
followed, sending RQ.s.e..caS..t. to the botton with a loss of
twenty-eight crewman. 60 The enemy then turned to starl:x>ard to
sink 1?l..l::k2.Z with a loss of twelve lives. lil Although the entire
action took place on the surface, the siting of 1 CD Battery
in relation to the angle of approach of the U-lxlat prevented
any accurate counter-banbardment and the enemy was able to
escape to the safety of deeper water without teing effectively
engaged. '!he after action report attributed no blame to 1 CD
Battery.G2
~'After the war German records confirmed that the attack
was carried out by U-518 ccmnanded by Korvetten K!ipitan
Friedrich Wissmann. Wells, White Ensjgn. See again Neary,
Tl:le...EneIm<.
wr'he ship I s bell of the RQ.s.e..caS..t. was recovered and
currently hangs in the Royal canadian ~ion, Bell Island as
a grim reminder of this turbulent period J.n the history of the
cCXlTlIUIlity.
"Plans are now underway to erect a suitable I'llelTJjrial near
Lance Cove Beach to ccmnelOOrate the loss of the merchant
seaman who died as a result of the enemy attacks carried out
on 5 september and 2 November 1942.
"WD, NA..C, 0024, Volume 13, 809, 4 November 1942.
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Thus we can see that while the threat from enemy surface
ships, which intelligence staffs envisioned early on, never
materialized, successful enemy U-boat action accounted fm'
tragic losses of shipping and lives in Newfoundland waters. 6)
Coast defence batteries were IX'sitioned at what defence
planners had assessed as the rrost irrq;xJrtant and therefore rrost
vulnerable points awund the island. That these batteries
never successfully engaged the enemy cannot be attributed to
any failing on the part of the gun crews. They stood their
long lonely vigil and were ready to engage and, they hoped
destroy any enemy who chanced into their gunsights. The very
fact that St. John's, Botwood and Lewisporte were defended by
coast guns may well have provided the deterrence that ensured
their safety.
ANTI-AIRCRAFl' DEFENCE PROGRAMME
The outbreak. of war had found Canada with virtually no
effective M a:rmament. In 1938 a Joint Staff Sub-Ccmnittee on
Anti-Aircraft Defence had assessed the possible forms and
scales of air attack on canada. Based on its report, orders
6JFor a fuller appreciation of Gerrran U-boat activities
in Newfoundland and Canadian waters in World War II see
Michael L. Hadley, ll=EQat.a...Asa~
~, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's
university Press, 1985).
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were placed in England for guns and ancillary equiprent such
as searchlights and sound locators. vlhen the war broke out
in septeni:Jer 1939, the British War Office notified Ottawa that
it could no longer prani.se delivery of what had been ordered.
E'quiprent was available fran United States sources rot the
canadians were reluctant to abandon British standards and 60
it was decided to manufacture the required equipre:nt in
canada. 64 Unfortunately, the canadian armaments i ~ustry could
not pranise delivery of the guns by the spring of 1941, which
was the deadline set for their deployment by the PJBD. The
United. States offered to take responsibility for AA defence at
both Bt. John's and Gander but Canada's reluctance to lose
control over ground defence, which has already been noted,
caused this offer to be politely refused. Instead it was
decided to oorrow the required equiprent fran the united
States Anny.'s
A light anti-aircraft (IM) battery, the 16th I.M, was
hastily formed fran artillery personnel in Military Districts
r.4Nicholson, .Gl.lnD.eui., pp.481-483.
'SThe initial United States Army garrison in Newfoundland.
included an AA. battery. At canada's request the equipnent of
this battery was augyrented by the balance of the equipnent of
an M regiment. The equipnent, which consisted of heavy anti-
aircraft guns, .50 calibre rrachine ~s, searchlights, sound
~~;~~ci:na=~~~~r~~~~r~.~cJii~~tfrt~iv;:ja;f:~
p.93.
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No 6. and 7. 66 Arriving in St. John's in the spring of 1941
it was equipped with .50 calibre Colt AA Iri.l.chine guns supplied
by the United States Army. After a brief training pericxi
under the supervision of American artillerymen the 16th LAA
(r«:;) Battery deployed three AA troops of four guns each at
Gander while Battery Headquarters, two AA troops and a
searchlight troop took up positions in and arolUld St. John's. "I
In the sumner of 1942 the American .50 calibers were replaced
by canadian-built 40 rrm Bofors. 16th LAA (M3) Battery was
disbanded with the bulk of its personnel absorbed into the
newly fanned batteries arriving from Canada. GK
The arrival of the 16th LAA. (r-'G) Battery in Newfoundland
had been followed in turn by a heavy anti-aircraft (HAA)
battery. '!he 7th HAA. Battery arrived in St. John I s fl'"Olll the
York Redoubt on 19 August 1941 and rnanned four 3-inch heavy M
guns that were also oorrowed from the Americans. Upon landing
the unit went "under canvas" at Kilbride just west of St.
John I s and comnenced training with the assistance of American
artilleryrren at Signal Hill. n It corrpleted its tl"aining in
66WO, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 2 March 1941.
61WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 517, 1 May-IS June 1941.
6Q.Ibid......, 15 November 1942.
6'WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 512, 19 August-IS OCtober
1941.
121
mid-December and rroved to Gander via a special train hauling
five flatcars carrying the four guns, equirxrent and general
stores. On December 28, 1941 the 7th HAA Battery was
inco:rporated within the Gander defence sector and classified
"ready for action. ,,70 Four British Ordnance 3. 7-inch lOObile
heavy AA. guns (manufactured in canada) replaced the Arrerican
ordnance in July 1942. 71 On OCtober 29, 1943 the 7th BAA
Battery tumed over its equipment and sites to the 17th BAA
Battery, a French-speaking unit, and departed for Halifax.7~
By the end of 1941, canadian manufacturing plants had
carpleted their tooling and in the early roonths of 1942 AA.
guns were rolling off the assembly lines in canada in ever
increasing numbers. OCcasionally equiprent became available
before there were units ready to accept it. The number of AA.
batteries authori~ed increased dramatically in Atlantic
Comnand alone from five to thirty-seven. 71
One of the first of the new units formed in Atlantic
Comnand was the 5th 1M Battery. Authorized on 19 January
70.Ib.id..., 28 December 1941.
'l.Ibid....., 22 July 1942.
n.Ibid...., 29 OCtober 1943.
7JNicholson, ~, p.485.
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1942, it was equipped with 40 nm Bofors and conmenced training
at Debert carrp, Nova Scotia. It arrived in Gander in late
March 1942 to take up positions as part of that airfield's
defences. On 1 September 1943 the 5th was re-designated the
l05th and later that fall it became a French - speaking lUlit
as the English-speaking personnel departed for Canada and
reassignment and were replaced with gurmers from Quel::ec."'"1
It soon becarre obvious that in order to standardize
training and facilitate conmand and control, the fonnerly
independent AA batteries should be grouped tmder regimental
control. In line with this reorganization two AA regiments
were authorized for NewfolU1dland - the 25th PtA Regiment in the
St. John' s/Torbay/Eell Island area and the 26th AA Regil'oent in
the Gander/Botwood/Lewisporte area. 1S
The 25th AA Regiment under the conmand of Lieutenant
Colonel C.V. Harris, who had fonnerly cornnanded the Shelburne
Defences, was authorized on 1 May 1942 and placed in active
service 1 June 1942. 16 During JlU1e/July two new batteries,
supplied with the latest equiprrent arrived in St. John's. On
74WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 582, 19 January 1942-15
November 1943.
7SNicholson, ~, p.486.
76WD, NAC, RG24, Volurre 14, 492, 1 May-IS JW1e 1942.
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1 OCtober 1942 the 14th HM. Battery, under captain E.D.
Murray, equipped with 3.7-inch guns occupyin:] positions at
'Ibrbay airfield and the 27th 1M Battery, under the Ccmnand of
Major R.C. Zink mannin:] 40 rrm Bofors at the airfield and at
various p::Jints around St. John's. were classified "ready for
action. lIn These two original batteries were later joined by
three !TOre: the 54th HM. Battery (redesignated the 154th in
october 1943) i and the 48th (redesignated 148th October 1943) i
and 55th 1M Battery (which manned AA defenses on Bell
Island). The five batteries of the regiment were controlled
by No. 5 Gun ~rations Rocm (GOR). At the same tirre, similar
activity was taking place in Gander as the 26th AA Regiment
took shape. The 7th HAA Battery and the 5th 1M Battery,
already in place, fomed the nucleus of the new unit cc:mnaOO
by Lieutenant colonel I. B. Maceallllll. 'Ihese existing
batteries wer"=!: joined during OCtober/November by the 56th HAA.
Battery, and the 57th 1M Battery. 1he fire of the regiment
was controlled by No. 4 GOR. In July 1943 the regiment was
further expanded with the arrival of the 28th 1M Battery,
stationed in Botwood and the 29th 1M Troop stationed in
Lewisp::>rte. 7' The eatp::)sition of these AA regirrents did not
remain constant and fran tirre to tirre relieving batteries were
•
17lbid...., 1 OCtober 1942.
78WD, NAC, 0024, Volume 14, 493 f October 1942 - I::lecen'ber
1943.
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brought in from other parts of Atlantic Ccmnand. For exarrple,
the 14th HAA and the 27th 1M Batteries which were posted to
St. John's in June 1942 were replaced by the 49th HAA. and the
24th lAA Batteries in March 1944. As well, cOlTlTal1d of the
unit changed hand when Lieutenant Colonel Harris was replaced
by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Cappel."
The officer ccmnanding an AA regiment was the technical
advisor to the officer carmanding the Defended Port on all AA
matters. When his guns were put into action, the officer
ccmna.nding would direct the fire of his batteries fran his
GOR, the nerve centre of the AA defence. In addition to his
own resources, information for the direction of fire was also
provided by the airforce, the navy and the Fire CorImand Post
of the coast artillery. 80 Alerts were called at irregular
intervals to test the efficiency of the AA defences and since
the five batteries of the 25th M Regiment had been classified
"ready for action" and incorporated within the St. John's
defence, an alert was called on the night of 10 December 1942.
In a subsequent meeting arrong all three Canadian services and
the Arrerican forces called to review the event, it was
discovered that there were seven different aircraft
'!lWI), NAC, 0024, Volume 14, 492, 15 September 1944.
8l1Nicholson, GlJDI:ler.s., pp.486-487.
125
interdiction systems then in use in Newfoundland! 81 The GOC
ilT1'Tlediately instituted inter-service AA defence training and
directed that the GOR, which had been manned on a daily
rotational basis since it had opened in September, would be
manned by permanently assigned personnel. Consequently, on 19
December No. 5 GOR opened at Torbay with three officers and 10
other ranks on permanent staff. 8~
We may well ask today why Newfoundland rated such large
amounts of AA artillery. Yet Newfoundland was not unique in
this respect. Throughout all of Atlantic Cornnand, as ordnance
rolled off the production lines, increasing numbers of AA
batteries were deployed at ports, defence installations and
other sensitive sites. '!he main reason for this was the fact,
pointed out earlier, that the enemy threat as assessed by
military intelligence staffs from the beginning always
included a threat from the air by either shipoorne or long-
range shore-based aircraft. 8J This sUpp:Jsed enemy capability,
although non-existent, was never seriously questioned. In
61WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 14, 625, 14 DeceTT1ber 1942.
~~.Il2id...., 20 December 1942.
acros:o;~e~~i~n~ i~n~~i~hn~ge~~~~~w~vi~~Z~~~~th~t~
mission, would ditch the aircraft and parachute into captivity
as prisoners of war. Nicholson, More NewfQ!!Tjdlanders, pp.
536-537.
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fact, AA defences were still being put in place even after the
perceived threat had disappeared. This was partly due to the
long lead time required to produce the ordnance. Once the
decision had been taken to put the batteries in place that
decision was never questioned. The military bureaucracy
sirrply pressed on with their deployment.
In addition to fears of a bomber attack, as early as
1940, Nazi parachute operf.l.t.::ions in the Low Countries and
Norway had given a certain credl.bility, at least in the minds
of sane senior officers, to the idea of a parachute raid on
Gander. In fact, during his initial visit to Gander on 5
September 1940, Major-General Elkins, the GCX:inC Atlantic
Ccm:and, specifically warned against the seizure and
destruction of the airport facility by airoorne enveloprrent.
This concern was reinforced in subs€ .JUent visits by senior
airforce and army officers, especially Brigadier Earnshaw, who
frequently travelled to Gander to inspect the defences. In
his "appreciation of the situation" on the defence of the air
base one of the attack scenarios envisioned was "a coordinated
attack from the air with bombs followed by parachutists. "M
This perception was reinforced by the daring Nazi paruchute
assault on Greece and Crete in April and May 1941. Following
B4WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 807, 7 May 1941.
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this operation there was a ·spate of mistaken paratroc:p
sightings across the island. IS en several occasions the AA
batteries were placed on alert while the ·stand-to" carpani.es
of the infantry spent long demanding hours searching for
would-be invaders fran the sky, only to ~t:urn enpty handed.
Yet, as far - fetched as these reports were, each and every
one had to be checked out for authent:i.city.
SAPPERS IN NEWfPtlNpI.ANJ)
8very arm and service of W Force had its part to play
during the long vigil in Newfoundland but special rrention
sh<xJ.ld be made of the work of the RCE. While the other
branches of W Force carried out the necessary static role of
garrison trcx:Jps, the Sappers were actively enployed in a
myriad of tasks which tlXlk them all aver the island. and even
to Labrador. Broadly speaking military am civil requirerrents
in engineering services 00 not differ greatly. For this
reason canada was able to rrobilize its civilian engineers and
rapidly transform them into Sappers who applied to wartirre
requirements the same energy and initiative they et'll>loyed in
peacetime.
nwo, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 807, 26 January 1942. On the
night of 25 January 1942 there was a report of paratroopers
landing on the ootskirts of St. John' 5 !
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As we have seen already, sappers of the 2nd Fortress
Conpany, RCE first arrived in NewfOl.lJXiland in June 1940 to
construct the battery positioo for the Newfoundland Militia's
coast defence guns at Bell Island.. Another detaclIrent, also
drawn fran 2nd Fortress carpany, was attached fraq the
beginning to the infantry battalion stationed at
Gander/Botw:xx:l to assist in the construction of field defences
and plan and supervise the building of barracks before the
onset of winter. 86 In St. John's during that autumn, the
Engineers supe:rvised the construction of the Lester's Field
Barracks for the infantry battalion assigned t.o the ground
defence of the capital and shamrock Field Barracks to house
the NewfollJldland Militia. B1
During the period 1940-1941 engineer responsibilities
were divided arrong three separate units: W Force Engineers,
No. 3 (Erection an:i Maintenance) CClTpany and No. 6 Detadrrent
RCE. It '1bese units were responsible for a wide range of works
and services in the St.. John's, Gander and BotWLJd areas fran
field engineering tasks such as building of roads, bridg'es.
beach defences. obstacles and derrolit.ions to the erect.ion of
86Kerry. ~r.s., p.66.
8'Wil, NA.C. RG24. Vol\..llTe 14, 878, O:::tober-Noverrrer 1940.
8!.lbid..... 5 July 1945.
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coast and AA posi tions and small arms ranges. As well, they
were responsible for the supervision of large construction
projects such as carrps, anrnunition and fuel depots, hospitals
and hangars. Once these facilities were occupied, engineers
took responsibility for the maintenance of their heating,
lighting, water supply, sanitary and fire protection systems.
S03ppers also cleared large tracts of timberland and
constructed new roads such as the one that linked Torbay
Airfield with the capital. n The separate units often had
overlapping responsibilities which resulted in conflicting
demands. In May 1941 the carmander WForce corrplained to the
Director of Engineer Services that because of increasing
demands the engineer infrastructure in NewfoWldland "was
cexnpletely inadequate" and the "duties and works now exceed
the capacity of both officers and other ranks. ,,90 The
89Torbay Airfield, adjacent to St. John's, was built by
Canada to provide an air base for the defended port of St.
John' 5 and for coverage of the Atlantic convoys. It was an
excellent field with runways and hangars to acconm::x:1ate the
largest aircraft. 1he RCAF stationed fighter squadrons, long-
range patrol squadrons and shorter-range striking forces there
after it became operational at the end of 1941. The
i~r~~~~;?l;f~h~~~l~tiicl~)~ie~~d~~~~~~h~s~h~
distance over which air cover could be ~rovided to the
~~~y~i~orl~fi:c¥da~~~~;~~ an~~d~~~il:Ot~~~ ~~d~~
eastern terminus for Trans canada Airlines, making carmercial
air service to St. John's possible. (H.M.H. MacKirmon, "The
RCAF in Newfoundland" in Unjyersity of Toronto Qllarterly [Vol
15, April 1946] pp. 213-221).
9own, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 807, 12 May 1940.
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situation throughout Canada was much the sarre. This prorrq;lted
Ottawa to expand the establishment of fortress canpanies army
wide. These expanded fortress ccnpanies were designated as
operational troops and as such came und~r the direct COImlalld
of the GOCinC. As well as the construction, operation and
maintenance of engineer services generally within the fortress
area, they were responsible for local field works."
On 1 March 194:l, 5th Fortress Cc:xt;lany was authorized for
active service in Newfoundland and distributed as follows:
No. 1 Detachtrent and Headquarters DetachJTent plus a special
Camouflage Section at St. JaM's; No. 2 Detachment Botwood;
No.3 Detachment Gander; and No. 4 Detachment LewispJrte plus
a Detachment allocated to G Force at Goose Bay. Each
detachment was allocated the necessary military tradesmen to
carry out its assigned tasks. In addition to their
construction engineering and maintenance roles all detachments
had an operational role of denial of rrobility to the enemy in
case of a landing. The unit was COlllllaIlded by captain R. P.
Nicholson until his po.sting overseas in July 1943 when he was
replaced by Captain S.F. willett. n Early in 1944 all fortress
carpanies except the fortress corrpany in Newfoundland were
9lWD, MAC, RG24 , Volume 14, 878, 5 July 1945.
"lllid..
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disbanded to free personnel for overseas duty. 5th Fortress
Corrpany was redesignated No .16 Engineer services and WOl:ks
Conpany and with an expanded establishment continued to
perform its numerous tasks under a new ccmnanding officer,
Major C.B. Bate. 9l
From its fornation in March 1942 throughout 1943 the
carpany's main task was construction. With the delivery of AA
weapons in quantity in 1942, battery sites, requiring l:oth pit
installations and tower installations with ancillary buildings
for arrmunition storage and crew shelter, were fabricated. Gun
positions were camouflaged by the gunners themselves under the
supervision of engineers using materials drawn from engineer
stores. At the sarre tirre battery positions for the newly
arrived coast defence guns proceeded apace. Much of this
construction was underground and included reinforced concrete
emplacements, Il'agazines, gun stores and crew shelters.
Ancillary buildings in the battery area also had to be of
sufficient thickness to give bomb-proof or splinter-proof
protection. As well, the isolated situation of coast defence
sites called for self-contained catTq;ls with reasonable
amenities.~4 In addition to these defensive works other
~Kerry, E:ng.ineer,a, pp.522-525.
132
substantial projects undertaken by the sappers used directly
errployed civilians, large-scale contracts or a caTbination of
these. n In all 600 permanent arxi 100 tenpora:..y buildings were
erected." At the height of the construction perioo in
September 1942 rrore than 6,700 Newfoundlanders were esrployed
on canadian projects.'"' '!hese construction projects gave a
trerrenOOus boost to Newfoundland's depressed econany since, in
addition to jobs, many of the goods and services were
purchased locally. In all canada spent lTOre than $65.000,000
(Table AI,
~5.Ihid.....
96.Ihid.....
'7Malcolm MacLeod, peace Of the Cgntjnent. (St. John'S:
Harry CUff Publications Ltd.• 1986) p.12.
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Expenditures for construction and development of airfields and
facilities in Newfoundland and Labrador to 3~ f.l.arch 1945
BOtWOOd seaplane base ana facl1J.t~es
Buchans aerodrome and facilities
cape Bauld radio detachment
Donovans fuel dep:>t
Gander aerodrorre, seaplane base, and facilities
Gander radio detadment
Gander Lake-Lewisporte-Bishop's Falls Highway
Holvrood fuel dep:>t
LewJ.sporte fuel depot
Port-aux-Basques radio detachrrent
St. John's Headguarters
~~~~~~~o~anl~cilities
~t~riI~g :~~s road
Brig Harbour radio detachment
GoOse Airport and facilities
Sandgirt Lake radio weather station
~~~~r;~t~~~~i~ne~~~I=i;n
Total
SOurce: MacKenzie, Atlantic Triangle, p.Sl.
$2,808, 145
1,046,733
84,752
82,410
20,273, B60
8,095
1,423,200
121,705
5,376
66, ~92
1,831,156
200,389
11,709,431
64,997
9,370
16,239
25,382,526
44, ~07
12,518
1,267
$65,192,468
By the end. of 1942 WForce was nearing its peak strength.
'!he most dramatic change was the enormous increase in the
numbers of personnel and equipnent for the artillery and
engineers. The 103rd Coast Battery occupied three "forts"
guarding the defended p:lrt of St. JOM' s. The 106th Coast
Battery manned two troop positions on the Bay of Exploits
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guarcii.n:; the sea approaches to Botwood, while fUlther wt the
bay the l07th Coast Battery deployed its gwlS in defence of
the inportant fuel depot and railhead at Lewisporte. 'IWo M
regirrents. the 25th in the St. John' s/TorbaytBen Island area
and the 26th in the Gander/Botwood/Lewisporte area, deployed
a total of eleven light and heavy batteries to defend the
greatly expanded defence facilities at each of these
locations. 'I11.e rragnitude of these defence expenditures in
personnel and material indicated canada's cannitrrent to
NewfOlUldland. It would seem that canada had finally and
irrecoverably recognized a special responsibility for its
neighOOur and fellow Cc::mllonwealth ITlefTber.
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ALLIANCE AGREF71EN1'S AND DISAGREEMENtS
with the fall of Western Europe St. Pierre and Miquelon,
the French colony just miles from NewfOlUldland and now under
Vichy c. 0ntrol, presented a ticklish problem for the Allies.
At the sarre titre the IXJssibility that Britain might cave-in
under increased Nazi pressure brought canada and the United
States inexorably together to counter what they now perceived
could be a threat to both should Britain go down, In response
the leaders of both countries agreed to the formation of a
Permanent Joint Board on Defence to coordinate the defence
activities of the two countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Yet all was not srrcoth sailing. As the Canadian and United
States military forces in Newfoundland expanded, the
troublesane question of the ccmnand relationship between the
two surfaced. The .Americans favoured a unified conrnand under
their direction. The Chiefs of Staff Comnittee and the
government were determined that any unified caT'I'I'laUd rrust be
vested in a canadian officer. After the United States entered
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the war in December 1941, what had been a sinmering dispute
roiled over. At the saTre time differing interpretations of
the Visiting Forces Act strained relations with Newfoundland.
'!he canadian-NewfOlmdland dispute was quickly resolved. 'Ihe
canadian-.American problem, however, although addressed at the
highest level, was never satisfactorily resolved. Until the
end of the war, the military establishments of roth countries
remained independent, pledged solely to cooperation in the
event of an emergency.
nm ST PIERRE AND MIOUELON EP]'SopE
As we have already seen, the fall of France caused
something approaching panic in canada over its exposed eastern
seaboard. While Newfoundland was the main concern, St. Pierre
and Miquelon also became a worry. As a result Conmander Roy
of the ROJ was sent to St. Pierre to survey and rep:>rt on the
situation in the French colony. Roy concluded that other than
a GenTIan sukxtarine exercising its rights under international
law by using' St. pierre's p:>rt facilities, the territory would
be of limited value to the enemy.! In a follow-up the RaJ's
Director of Plans Division concluded that he could see no
reason for German occupation of the islands. He reasoned that
!Anglin,~, p. 131-
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even if the enemy garrisoned the islands he could not long
hold them without conmand of the sea. Further, if the enemy
could seize control of the sea cornnunications, "he would
hardly waste his time on a couple of barren and uninviting
islands when nost of our (Canada's) coastline and that of
Newfoundland would be his for the taking. 112
It is obvious now that the French islands were, in fact,
too small and their resources too limited to have been of any
great use to the Axis, and their use as a springboard to
attack either NewfOlUldland or canadian territory was out of
the question. In fact, Germany lacked the means to occupy St.
Pierre and Miquelon with or without Vichy agreement. l A TlUlch
rrore critical threat than German occupation of the islands was
the likelihood. that they would be used to provide vital
information to the enemy. 4
The foregoing notwithstanding, on 1 July 1940, Rear
Admiral Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff, reccmnended that
canada, possibly in concert with NewfoundlaYld, take over the
administration of St. Pierre and Miquelon for the duration of
:!.I.b.id...., pp. 128-129.
3.Ibid...., p. 128.
4.Ibid...., p. 131.
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the war. en 6 July 1940 a seoond military appreciation of the
situation proposed by the Joint Planni.n:J Cc:mni.ttee of the
azmed services estimated that the seizure of the islands would
require elements of all three services; in fact, work had
already begun, in secret, on a plan to seize the colony.
Mackenzie King, however, opp:lSed any drastic action. While
publicly reaffirming his earlier pledge of a September 1939 to
defend the colony, he apposed any overt action and for the
time being King \s views prevailed.S
The problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon arose again in the
spring of 1941 as a result of two separate developrents: the
growing p:JWer of tre collaborationist elerrents in Vichy France
(the colony was urrler Vichy control) and the intensification
of the Battle of the Atlantic (in February and March 1941
surface raiders sank twenty-one Allied ships within a few
hWldred miles of St. John's). Given the cit'ClJ(f5tances at the
time, suspicions increased that St. Pierre and Miquelon were
providing the Gennans with vital information. ~t
information could be passed by one of three means: the cable
station, the fishing fleet, and the St. Pierre radio station.
of these, the powerful short wave radio station posed the
Slbid..., p. 43.
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greatest threat to Allied security.' By the autumn of 1941
the situation had worsened. In addition to the powerful
surface raiders which marauded the North Atlantic that year,
the stepped-up U-boat offensive now exteo:led to Newfeundlarxl
coastal waters. As a result, the PJBD, proopted by its
canadian trerri:lers, stated on 10 Noverrber that "the existence on
the islands of an uncontrolled, high-powered wireless
transmitting station contributed a potential danger to the
interests of Canadn and the United States. n7 There seems
little reason to doubt that the radio station did aid the Axis
but the precise extent of its aid is still a matter of
dispute .11
It: was the Free French, however, who ulti.m3.tely settled
the prickly problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Shortly after
Pearl Harbor in Decen'ber 1941, a Free French suhnarine
accnrpani.ed by three corvettes under o::mnarrl of Admiral
Muselier sailed out of Halifax harboor ostensibly to
participate in m:tOOeuvres. en the day before Christrras they
arrived at St. Pierre and liberated the colony fran Vichy
6The radio station had been wilt in 1939 as part of a
conm.mications network to enable Air France to undertake
~~~i~;i~t~~o_ti~&~:s,(Ang\l~, ~g:{er~~n;. ~i~F' was
'Anglin, .s..t.........E. p. 132.
'lbid...., p. 133.
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control.~ Most canadians, Newfoundlanders and even Americans
and Britons responded with euphoria but the official reaction
was very different. 1.0 Overnight the event took all a
significance far outweighing it.s actual benefit since, by
acting without prior consultation, the French had seriously
irritated Allied national sensitivities. "'Ihe British were
efClbarrassed, the Americans enraged and the canadians
distressed at the resulting Wlseemly display of Anglo-Alnet-ico.n
dishartl'Ony. lin The whole episode caused anger, scepticism and
misunderstanding which plagued relations arrong the Allies for
some time. 12 It was partly to forestall this kind of friction
between allies that the canadian and American governrrents the
year before had entered into joint arrangement for the defence
of North America.
9.Ibi.d........, Introduction.
l0lbid......, p. 99.
uIllid....
12The machinations and intrigues which led up to Admiral
Muselierls action and the subsequent political ramifications
and recriminations are beyond the scope of this paper and will
not be dealt with. For an exhaustive interpretation see
Dc>Uglas G. Anglin's The St Pierre and MjmW10n Affai.t:_QL1~.u
cited above.
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THE OGDF'WBURG AGREfNENT AND THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON
On 14 June :1940, the day that Paris fell and Canada took
the decision to send troops to Newfoundland, Prime Minister
King met with J. P. Moffat, the American Minister to Canada.
During the discussion King pointed out that since France was,
for all intents and purposes, out of the war, an attack on the
British Isles now seerred predictable. He went on to explain
that if Great Britain should be in danger of imninent defeat,
the British fleet would in all probability rrove to canada and,
in this event, canada would require American assistance to
cope with the emergency. He therefore reconmended that joint
staff talks between Canadian and American anned services
officers concerning the defence of the Atlantic coast begin
irnnediately. ;J
These joint staff discussions were duly approved.
Accordingly, high-ranking officers from each country met in
secret for the first time in washington 11-12 July 1940. No
cannitments on either side were requested or given.
Discussions focused primarily on the exchange of infonnation
142
rot also on canadian requests for military equiprent. On the
wt¥:>le the talks proved inconclusive and soon reached an
inpasse. This breakdown revealed not only that regular
diplana.tic and military channels were inadequate to handle
defence matters but that no other structures existed between
the two countries to deal with such questions. H At this
juncture Prime Minister King suggested that the tirre had CCXT'e
when a personal meeting between the two heads of state might
prove useful. Consequently on 16 August 1940 President
Roosevelt telephoned the Prime Minister inviting him to meet
the following day. l5
'!he meeting took place in President Roosevelt's private
railway car on a siding near the station of 03densburg, New
York State just across the St. Lawrence River fran the
canadian city of Cornwall. The seeds of this historic
meeting, however, had been sown earlier. 'I\oo years before,
President Roosevelt, accepting an honorary degree fran ().Jeen's
university, had given this historic pranise:
canada is part of the sisterhood of the British
Empire. I 9ive to you assurance that the people of
Hll2id..., p. 11.
ISH.L. Keenleyside, "canada-United States Permanent Joint
Board on Defence 1940-1945" in International ,Toumal, (Voltune
XVI No 1 Winter 1960-1961) p. 51.
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the United States will not stand idly by if
domination of canadian soil is threatened by any
other empire.
And, in response to this assurance of aid, Prime Minister King
had stated at Woodbridge on 20 r"lgUst 1938:
We too have our obligations as a good and friendly
neishOOur and one of them is to see that, at our own
inslstence, our Country is made as imnune tro:n
attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably k:e
expected to make it and that should the occasion
ever arise enemy forces should not be able to pursue
their way eitr.er by land, sea or air to the united
States across canadian territory.
Thus it would appear that when the two statesmen met at
Ogdensburg they were already coomitted to the principle of
joint defellce of North America. 16
Roosevelt opened the meeting by describing the
"destroyers-for-bases" negotiations with Britain and proposed
the establishment of a naval and air base along canada's
Atlantic seaboard or in the St. Lawrence area. King made it
clear, however, that canada did not wish to sell or lease
sites but would willingly work out a plan whereby the United
States could utilize Canadian facilities. 'Ihe President then
prop:>sed the inmediate creation of a Joint American/canadian
16.Ibid..., p. 52.
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board consisting of representatives fran each COlU1try, ma.inly
fran the armed services, whose purpose would be to consider,
in the broad sense, the defence of the northern half of the
western Hemisphere. As far as Newfoundland was concerned,
Roclsevelt pointed out that, because of its Wlique p:>litical
status, the United States would have to negotiate directly
with the United. Kingdan. King concurred but interpJsed that
since Canada had already undertaken the defence of
Newfoundland the British would, no doubt, want canada to
participate in the negotiationsY '!his meeting resulted in
a press release on 18 August known as the "03densburg
Declaration." With it the two countries announced the
creation of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) which
would study mJtual defence problems and sul:xnit reccmrendations
to the two goverrrnents. This rrarked the beginning of a
formal, on-going, high-level channel of COTIlI.lIli.cations between
canada and the United States to deal with caT1IDn defence
concerns. 11
The Ogdensburg Agreerrent b:lth furnished a solution to the
urgent demands for co-operation in hemispheric defence, and
although overlooked by sorre of its detractors at the tirre and
l1seatty, "Canadian Corollary," p.l3.
lin Brjef History, pp. 1-5.
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many others since, associated the thlited States as closely as
possible with the belligerent Ccmronwealth. 1t Further it
assured canadians that the Arrericans would not stand idly by
if canada were attacked. 20 For canada this was extremely
irrportant since by mid-August public opinion was tI-.oroughly
aroused over events in Europe (on 8 1UJgust the full force of
the liJ.f.blaffe. had been directed against Great Britain) arrl had
grown fearful for the security of North America itself. It is
hardly surprising then that public response to the O':;Jdensburg
Agreerrent was generally quite favourable. In canada
correspondents lauded King's "master-stroke" and praised this
"tremendous event." Editorial corrrrent in the national press
was similar in tone.:1.1
'!here was 00 delay in iITplementing the Ogdensburg
Agreerrent. In fact, on the day follCMing its announcement
King prcp:>sed to washington that the Board should hold its
first rreeting in Ottawa that week an:i give its inmediate
attention to Newfoundland and the East Coast and to the
UJ.L. Granatstein, "The COnservative Party and the
Cgdensburg Agreement" in Internatjonal '1oJJmal, (Volume XXII
No 1 Winter 1966-1967) p. 74.
2°Beatty, "Canadian Corollary, II p. 15.
21Granatstein, "Conservative Party, II p. 73.
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accelerated procurement of anramemts and anmunition. ~~ Since
German successes in Europe and the destruction of Great
Britain's defences (which under the cirC\.U1lStances appeared
inminent) would, given the perception at the time, expose
North Arrerica to attack, it was inevitable that the attention
of the Board should first be directed to the position of
Newfoundland, the continent's rrost vulnerable part.:.l \
Although not created expressly with Newfoundland in mind,
the NED provided a forum wherein Newfoundland's defence could
be discussed in a North American context. In fact, during its
first year of existence, nearly one-half of the Board's
recoomendations dealt with Newfoundland, giving some idea of
the importance attached to its defence.:.l~ At its first meeting
on 26 August, Newfoundland therefore headed the list of
issues to be discussed. In reviewing the situation in
Newfoundland it became obvious that its defence required
strengthening, and since Canada had already asswned the
responsibility for the defence of the island, it was agreed
that the existing Canadian garrison should be increased/'
22Keenleyside, "Joint Board, II pp. 52-53.
~~1bi.d.., p. 56.
~4MacKenzie, Atlantjc Triangle, pp. 45·46.
251bi.d..
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During the early years of its existence the Board usually
met once a rronth. As the initial problems addressed by the
Board were ironed out, meetings were required less frequently.
Similarly the time spent in the meetings themselves reduced
pro!X'rtionally. It should be stressed that the Board had no
executive power but was and remains today, a purely advisory
agency. Yet, of the thirty-three recorrrnendations subnitted
during the war years, none were scrapped outright. '!here were
a few, however, on which no action was taken by one or both
signatories. Surprisingly, differences of opinion rarely
occurred along national lines but rather on service lines.
Decisions were not arrived at by majority vote. Instead,
issues were discussed lU1til agreement was reached. This is
not to say that every member agreed with every decision, only
that no other solution would gain general acceptance. ~6
Perhaps it is worth noting here that the United States
beccxni.ng a belligerent after Pearl Haroor had surprisingly
little effect on the npdus operandi of the NED. That the two
cotu1tries would cooperate in defence if either were attacked
from abroad was the essential reason for the bilateral
agreement and this had been agreed to fran the beginning. The
Board's ftu1ction was defensive in nature and in Decerrber 1941
~6Keenleyside, "Joint Board," pp. 54-56.
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both cotmtries were on the defence in North Arrerica against
any foreign aggression. And so, Pearl Harbor made little
difference to the military p:lsture of either of the countries
in Newfoundland. H
The problem of ccmnand in Newfoundland had its origins in
the two defence plans prepared by the PJBD in the first two
years of the war. The first plan, Joint Basic Defence Plan -
1940 or ABC-1, as it was known, was based on the assUlnption
that Great Britain would fall and that canada and the United
States would be open to enemy attack. Canpleted in OCtober
1940, it set out the obligations of canada and the United
States for the defence of the continent. Overall strategic
direction was given to the United States. lInforttmately the
question of organization and ccrnnand was not addressed, an
omission that would sour bilateral relations for some time
after.
As we already have seen, at the first meeting of the
FJBD in August it was decided that the Canadian garrison in
Newfoundland needed strengthening. canada would station an
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additional infantry battalion in St. John's imnediately and
provide necessary AA and coast artillery at selected locations
as the troops and equipnent became available. By December
1940 the Canadian anny garrison in Newfoundland consisted of
an infantry battalion, providing ground defence at Gander and
Botwood, another battalion in St. J"ohn's to defend against
enemy raiding parties, and a coast defence battery to secure
the port of St. John's. Ccxrmand was exercised by Brigadier P.
Ea:n1shaw fran his Headquarters in St. JOM' s. These troops
were ;:;oon to be joined by a contingent of the United States
Army which would act as the vanguard for .American forces
arriving in Newfoundland under the Leased Bases Agreement.
'!'he mission of the two forces was ccnplementary.
Consequently, there was no serious conflict in the role
allotted to the Canadian and United States forces assigned to
Newfoundland. Had an enemy attack occurred the action by roth
sets of forces would have been substantially the same in aim
and scope. In spite of a high level of cooperation between
the comnanders it was evident that some mechanism had to be
created to co-ordinate any joint operations that might have to
be undertaken. This need was recognized and would preoccupy
the respective corrrnanders in Newfoundland and high-level
staffs for sare time to cane.
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As the war progressed more favourably for a beleaguered
Great Britain, Plan ABC-l became outdated. The PJBD therefore
began work on a new plan based on Great Britain's continued
participation in the war. The second plan, Joint Basic Plan
No. 2 - 1941, or ABC-22 as it was called, was substantially
different in scope and intent from ABC-l as it provided for
action in the event of the United States becoming a
belligerent. If the United States entered the war, the
defence of North America would no longer be the prime
consideration. 1he canadian Chiefs of Staff Coomittee opposed
giving the United States overall strategic direction since
they believed that the American military equated strategic
direction with tactical control. Because Canada considered
Newfowldland to be within the orbit of its east coast
defences, the canadian government and the Chiefs of Staff
could accept unity of carmand in Newf.oundland only if overall
military direction there was vested in canadian officers.
After much acrirrony a carpromise was finally reached whereby
coordination of the military action of roth countries was to
be achieved by "mutual cooperation." A unified ccmnand could
be established but only with the agreement of both
signatories. Carmand in Newfoundland, for the time being at
least, would become a separate responsibility with neither
country having overall charge, a situation which would plague
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local camanders in the years ahead. ~8
Meanwhile, in June 1941 the canadians formed a joint
services Sub-Ccmni.ttee to encourage cooperation among the
three canadian services stationed in Newfoundland. It
consisted of the head of each branch and reported to the Joint
services Conmittee, Atlantic Coast. Brigadier Earnshaw, as
ranking officer, was appointed Conmander of the Ca:nbined
canadian-Newfoundland Military Forces. At the same time, the
question of a unified canadian/American Comnand, which was
never very far from the surface, again became an issue with
the arrival of Major-General G.C. Brant, who replaced Colonel
Welty as American eatmander in the Autumn of 1941. In a
letter to Brigadier Earnshaw on 12 November 1941 Brant wrote:
~~r~~~~~~l~h~,~d:;~:~h~~;rn~iple
of cooperation as indicated in present plans. Frcm
past experience I am of the op~nion, however, that
cooperation which may work very well in ~ace is apt
to break down under wartime conditions. ~9
When the United States became a belligerent after Pearl
Harbor, Plan ABC-22 carre into effect. In these new
28David MacKenzie, "Aspects of the Conmand Problem in
~wfoundland" in Newf01!Ddland Qllarterly (Volume LXXXIV No 3,
W~nter 1989). pp.25-31.
29wn, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 808, 12 Novenber 1941.
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circumstances Afrerican demands for unity of carmand beCul1'e
nD!'e insistent. For, although the Military Intelligence
Division (G2) of the War Depa.rt.ment's General Staff did not
think. the Nazis would invade the United States, they did think
that they could "walk across to canada on the causeway
provided by Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland."JO In these
circumstances unity of omnand, at least in Brant's opinion,
was a legitimate and essential wartirre requirement and he was
astonished by what he interpreted as canadian indifference.
As the sense of urgency intensified in the days following
Pearl Harbor Brant stepped up the pressure for tUlity of
camand. Earnshaw referred the problem to his cncinC. On 12
December 1941 Major General Elkins replied:
His (Brant's) contention [concerning ABC-22] is an
obvious misreading which you should not repeat not
allow tmduly to perturb you ... delicate problem of
divided or unif1ed o::mnand devolves on PJBD or
O'liefs of Staff ani not on local coomanders. II
Since the higher staffs could not agree on coordinating
arrangements it remained for the local ccmnanders in
Newfoundland to work out local solutions to cexrrnand problems.
JOBeatty, "canadian corollary, It p. 10.
J1lbid....., 12 December 1941-
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On 23 December 1941 the three canadian ccmranders and Major-
General Brant joined to form a Local Joint Defence Corrmittee
to function under the chairmanship of its senior member.
Initially the senior member was Brant. canada, however, had
already decided to replace Brigadier Earnshaw with a ITOre
senior officer who would outrank his American opposite nurrber32
and so it was at this point that the Minister of National
Defence appointed Major-General L.F. Page as comnander of the
combined canadian-Newfoundland Forces. 3J In making the
announcement the Minister said that the Newfoundland coomand
was raised to the rank of a Major-General in view of the
increased irrportance attached to the island in the scherre of
IDnpire Defence, and that Major-General Page's fine record in
the last war and his efficient perfonnance as the Conmander
canar ian Troops in Iceland lIparticularly well fit him for his
appointment. ,,14 Page was only two days senior to Brant but
this was enough to make him the senior officer in
the ~~ Jahsep~r;~~s~~~al ~1~ttoJk~~Si~; :IT~i~~lt~
military representative ahea~f the Arrer~cans in rank. In
~i~o~i~~i~:~fo~:rct;~t.t~~h:t~l~d~b~~=~Io~fOf
the naval ccmnander to a rank senior to that of the US Naval
station ccmnander at Argentia. For an eJ<PanSion of this
theory see Dziuban, Mjljtary Relatjons, pp.1l6-126.
HWD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 807 26 December 1941. See
also al:ove p. 100 .
)~~, St. John's, 29 December 1941, j.:..3.
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Newfoundland. l5 Nevertheless, difficulties persisted, not the
least of which was the fact that local canadian cOll1\'landers
could not act without consulting superiors who were located
outside Newfoundland. This situation was exacerbated furthel.-
by an inadequate carmunications system.
These problems notwithstanding, a spirit of cooperation
quickly developed between the two ccmnandersafter page
invited Brant to visit W Force Headquarters on 5 January 19<\.2
to discuss, in general terms, questions in connection with the
local defence plan. A broad basis of agreement was reached by
the two corrroanders on a nlllli::ler of major points. The current
disposition of their respective forces in the St. John I s area
would stand: the United States Army was responsible Ear the
east coast north of St. John's and the canadian Army for Bt.
John's, the coast to the south and the coast line of the east
side of Conception Bay. They also agreed that, in the event
of an attack on one or the other of the areas, the forces of
the country not lUlder direct attack would be made available to
support and cooperate wi th the other. l6 Final!y, for areas
outside the St. JaM I s region, definite of
responsibility were advisable. The: canadian zones of
lSStacey, Al::Ina, p. 363.
"WD, NAe, 0024, Volume 13, 808, 6 January 1942.
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responsibiliLy would be Gander and Botwood, the Arrerican,
Argentia. Both officers agreed to provide mutual support in
the event of an attack developing in one of these zones. J1 The
two corrmanders also discussed the question of the operational
control of the Coast Defence artillery in the St. John I s
area.)8 Page explained the Canadian system for the conrrand and
control of fire to Brant and stressed that the fire of all
available guns must of necessity be centrally directed. Brant
conceded this point and agreed to place the fire of his
batteries under Canadian comnand and control. J9
These arrangements were made without participation by the
other interested party - Newfoundland. The Newfoundlanders
had detected. sc:xre dishanrony between the canadians and
.Americans and feared that this could well jeopardize the
effective defence of the island. To make matters worse the
Newfoundlanders;. who had no seat on the Local Joint Defence
'''The United States eventually manned two I"bast Defence
batteries at St. JaM I s - a batte6K of 155 rrm mobile guns at
~~~I~~l~tnge~~I~~ryH~:d.8-i~~rr:i~~i1eidi~~:io~t~f
American artillery deployrrents in the St. John I s area see
James E. candow, "The Tactical Role uf American Armed Forces
at Signal Hill Newfoundland During World War II" in
Newfonndland Qllarterly Vol LXXXVIII No.2, Sllllll'erjFall, 1993)
pp. 25-29.
J''WO, NAC, RG24 , Voltune 13, 803, 6 January 1942,
156
Cotmri.ttee, felt isolated. The Conmission of Government
realized that under the circumstances, achieving lUlity of
ccmnand was un1ikely.~o However, Coomissioner for Justice and
Defence Edward Emerson reccmnended the creation of a defence
ccmni.ttee to include the canadian/American service heads as
well as the Corrmissioner for Defence. This comnittee, he
hoped, would allow Newfoundland a greater voice in its own
defence and provide a forum for the drafting of a joint
defence plan. U
Emerson was eventually successful in drawing together the
canadian/ArTErican comnanders at a meeting in 51•. John I 8 on 24
January 1942 where he presented his plan for forming a "Local
Combined Defence Comnittee. ,,42 There was little enthusiasm
fran the military men. But after scme arm twisting by
Enerson, they agreed that those present would corrprise a
connittee to meet as required in order to COClrdinate existing
military and civil defence plans. 41 In the interval Canada
reorganized its own conmand structure and on 18 March 1942
Ottawa established a unified coomand for both the Atlantic and
4°MacKenzie, "Aspects," p.29.
41llUd..., pp. 29-30.
42WD, NAC, 0024, Volurre 13, 808, 24 January 1942.
tJ.Ibid...
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Pacific coasts. Newfoundland .became a sub-corrmand of the East
Coast under Major-General Page, now designated Cannanding
NewfOW1dland Defences, with strategic control over all three
services. 44
Page in the meantime had concentrated his efforts
improving his working relations with the Americans. By the
sumner of 1942 cooperation between the forces of the two
countries in Newfoundland had irrproved considerably. Officers
of the United States Newfoundland Base Ccxrrrand joined the new
canbined canadian operations centre at St. John I s and in
August 1942 the militaI)' authorities of both countries agreed
to develop a Canadian/United States Joint Defence Plan for the
island. At the same time Major-General Brant proposed that
joint military training cc:mnence. As a result, canbined field
exercises as well as Conmand Post and cormnmications exercises
for the staffs began the following llOnth and were held at
regular intervals in the ensuing years. 4.5
The "W1ity of comnandll issue never ccxtpletely
disappeared, as evidenced by a disagreement which al."Ose in the
spring of 1943. It: this time Major-General Brooks, who had
44MacKt::nzie, "Aspects," pp. 28-29.
4sDziuban, MiJitary Relations, pp. 116-126.
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succeeded Brant as the United States NewfOLUldland Base
Coomander, convened a roard of officers to investigate and
report upon the possibility of \.U1ification of the AA defences
in St. John's. They were joined in their deliberation by RCAF
officers. In its report to Brooks the b:x:trd recoomended that
the RCAF take over and man the American Intelligence Center
and that a unified OOR, manned exclusively by Americans with
Canadian interests represented by a liaison officer only, be
established. In correspondence with the GOCinC, Major-General
Page rejected the proposal out of hand. In his view Annex II
to ABC-22 made "the defence of St. John's a Canadian
responsibility and I cannot allow the AA. defences of St.
John's to be put under American control, In any case the GOR
set up [which] they propose to use would be quite inadequate
for our needs. 1146 The GOCinC was in full agreement. He in
tum discussed the proposal with the Air Officer CCxrwanding
Eastern Air Ccmnand and since they were of a like mind the
proposal was rejected. 47
By this point, in 1943 the war was turning in favour of
the Allies and American efforts were increasingly focused on
other theatres of war. At the same time, canada proved
uown, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 809, 26 April 1943 .
...Ibid...., 3 May 1943,
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willing to assume tn:::lre and rrore of the responsibility for the
defence of Newfoundland. Relations between the local
corrmanders continued to irrprove and. there were no further
serious difficulties between the two forces. Nevertheless
until the end of the war, canadian and United States militaIY
organizations in Newfoundland, although charged with parallel
responsibilities, rerrained divided, and were dependent
cooperation solely in the event of an emergency.
The "unity of ccmnand" issue between canada and the
United States was still UIlS€:ttled when a similar problem
surfaced involving the differing interpretations of the
Visiting Forces (British Comronwealth) Act, brought to a head
when the Newfoundland Departrrent of Justice and Defence
questioned the GOC's authority to court martial a member of
the Newfoundland Militia charged with a service offence. Page
believed that a !TOre serious issue was involved, namely his
authori ty as COrnnander canadian/Newfoundland Forces in
Newfoundland and irrmediately sought clarification under the
Act. The problem resulted fran two different renderings of
the Visiting Forces Act in the Newfound] and C"..azette. The
first, in December 1940, described the Newfoundland Militia as
acting "in combination" with the canadian Forces; three rronths
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later, this was altered to "serving together. ,,'B TIre
distinction was significant: "in ccrnbination" suggested that
the two forces were under one conmandi "serving together,"
that they were under two separate conmands. The issue was
further cc:xrplicated by questions of the respective
jurisdictions of the Newfoundland Conmissioner and the
"appropriate Canadian Service Authority." Who had the
authority to decide how and to what extent Canadian and
Newfoundland forces would co-operate? Page thought it should
be the "appropriate canadian Service Authority" and persuaded
Emerson to agree on the grounds that it would hasten that
broader unity of cemnand between American and Canadian forces
in Newfoundland that the ccmni.ssioner sought. H In due course
page was designated the "appropriate Canadian service
Authorityll and with that move the Newfoundland Militia carre
under direct Canadian control. SlI In 1943 this authority was
extended to include the military forces of any part of the
British Corrrronwealth serving in Newfoundland. ~J
Once the Allies began to achieve greater success in the
"WO, NAC, RG24, volume 13, 812, 27 June 1942.
nlbid., 24 July 1942.
~'.I1lld., 14 September 1942.
s'lbid., 29 April 1942.
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European and Pacific Theatres American interests were directed
elsewhere and with that shift the earlier acrirrony over
corrrrand relationships diminished accordingly. In these
changed circumstances canada was easily able to assert its
role as the main player in the defence of the island. The
irony was that canada's concern in this process was to keep
American influence in NewfOWldland to an acceptable minimum.
That Great Britain's "oldest Colony" slipped irreversibly in
this process into the Canadian military and strategic orbit
was sanething that had been neither anticipated by Ottawa nor
intended.
162
THE FINllL PHASE
As the course of the war turned in the Allies' favour an
elemental change in canadian involverrent in the defence of
Newfoundland occurred. During the "dangerous" period after
the fall of Europe in 1940 the canadian Army provided the best
trained troops available in canada for the Newfoundland
garrison in order to forestall a possible large American
defence lUldertaking on the island. After the successful
Italian invasion and the build-up for a Normandy invasion
began in earnest in 1943, however, it became clear that the
island I s defence was no longer as important an issue as it had
been three years earlier. American hegem::my in Newfoundland
had been successfully averted and the island was securely
fixed within the Canadian defence orbit. 'llie arTl\lf felt it
could now safely replace the better trained, rrotivated and led
voltulteers of the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) with
draftees inducted under the National Resources Mobilization
Act (NRMA) in order to free the vohmteers for the rrore
arduous overseas duty. The successful D-Day landings in June
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1.944 forced a cc:nplete reassessment of the arrtT:f's defence task
in Newfoundland and resulted in a phased reduction in the
strength of W Force. Finally VB-Day in May 1945 marked the
beginning of the wholesale pullout of canadian troops from
Newfoundland. This corrplete withdrawal confirmed that
canada's relationship with its Cormlonwealth neighbour .....as
predicated more on wartirre exigencies than on future
considerations.
Until 1943 the units of WForce were part of the can.::.dian
Active Service Force and as such were liable for service
outside the Western Hemisphere. 'I11e majority ended up in the
European Theatre (the one notable exception being the Royal
Rifles of canada who were sent to Hong Kong) or were used as
reinforcement units. Occasionally drafts fran these units
were sent overseas. '£he Lincoln and weIland Regirrent, for
example, arrived in Newfoundland in september 1941 with a
corq;llement of 850 all ranka. By April 1943 the nunber had
shrunk to 600. 1 The PEIH found themselves in the same
predicament. As a result two ccxtpanies of the Dufferin and
'Geoffrey Hayes, IhfL...Liocs· A History "~.~lJe I,;oco]n and
WeIland Regiment at war, (Alma, O1tario: Maple: • /"~~ Route, 1986)
pp. 11-1.2.
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Haldimand Regiment had to be brought to Newfoundland, one for
at.taclInent to each unit. Units so affected fwrrl the practice
of 6UPP1ying' overseas drafts disconcerting. Many saw the
drafts as an indication t.hat the regirrent' s strength might be
so depleted t.hat it would lose its place in the order of
battle. And so, when a unit was required to furnish a draft
for overseas, rrost in the uni t volunteered, not because of
dissatisfaction with the unit but because perhaps it wa~
better to leave the unit before it was broken up. As unit
personnel numbers dwindled the increased danand on those
remaining also resulted in a corresponding drcp in llPrale.
Circumstances changed in 1943. 'Ib understand why it is
necessary to explain h:>w the canadian Army was then organized.
The Canadian Army consisted of three !TOre or less separate
cc::lffpC.(lents. On the outbreak. of war a large nUTber of units of
the Non-Perrranent Active Militia (NPAM) were rrobilized. These
units, together with those of the Permanent Force (PF)
augrrented.by volunteers direct from civilian life, constituted
the Canadian Active service Force (CASF) , whose l1lelTt:lers were
liable for service anywhere. The Reserve Arrrrf, made up for
the lTOst part of men who for various reasons such as age or
rredical reasons were unfit for overseas duty, acted as a hare
defence force. With the fall of Western Europe it became
obvious that greater numbers were required and so the
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government authorized c:orrpUlSOly military service under the
National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMAj , passed by
Parliament on 21 June 1940. For political reasons the act did
not extend to obligatory service outside Canada. Persormel
thus conscripted were limited to hare defence duties. After
Japan entered the war there was considerable popular demand
for general conscription.~ In April 1942, after a decisive
"Yes" vote in a national plebiscite on the issue, the
prohibition on sending persons called up under the NRMA out of
the country was rerroved. In September of the same year
Newfoundland was authorized as a place of duty for NRMA
personnel and NRMA soldiers were posted to specific units in
Newfoundland to free CA$F soldiers up for service overseas.
Beginning in 1943 no rrore CASF infantry units were posted to
Newfoundland and the CASF persormel of the existing artillery
and other units in Newfoundland were systematically replaced
by NRMA. soldiers. The first NRMA. infantry battalion posted to
Newfoundland, the Regiment de Joliette, arrived in January
::'!'he question of conscription was a highly contentious and
errotionally charged issue in Canada. It has been dealt with at
length in many Canadian histories of the period. See for instance
Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken prgni ses, Chapter 5, "Towards the
Plebiscite and Bill 80" pp. 133-184, W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton
Greenhous, Opt Qf the Shgdow§' canada in the Semnd World war
~~~~o~p. ~f~:~B~n~~~~r-b~~:: g~Zha ~st::r.llA"1Jij i~~
and Politjcal HjstOry (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) Chapter 5,
IlTotal War at Herne" pp. 104-125.
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1943 to relieve the Algonquin Regiment in Botwood. J Next came
the Regiment de Ste Hyancinthe which replaced the Lincoln and
Welland Regi.rrent in St. John's in April 1943. 4 These Wlits
were in turn relieved by the Regi.rre:nt de r-bntmagny in February
19445 and the Reginent de Q..t&lec in sept:ember 1944.'
In the sunTl"er of 1943 a change also occurred in the
c:armand of W Force. Major-General Elkins, who had been GOCinC
Atlantic Cc:ml'and since its inception, retired from the
canadian Army. Major-General Page, with his extensive
experience in Eastern canada and as GOC Newfoundland, was
selected as his replacetrent. 7 Page, who had been awarded the
o:npanion of the Order of the Bath (cal in the sovereign's
birthday list for 1943, took up his new duties in Halifax in
July.' His relief in St. John's was the fomer distinguished
M::Jntreal businessman and long-time citizen-soldier Major-
lWD, NAC, RG24, volume 15, 184, January 1943.
'WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 15, 191, April 1943.
~WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 15, 189, February 1944.
~WD, NAe, RG24 , Volume 15, 190, september 1944,
W, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 809, 9 June 1943.
"VID, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 812, 2 June 1943.
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General F.R. Phelan.' Arriving in Newfoundland in late June.
Phelan took ccmnand on 6 July 1943. 10 Just three nonths later.
NDIJ';;! announced that Phelan was to take up a new appointment as
Director General Reserve Army in Ottawau and narred as his
successor self-made millionaire and long-sez:vi.ng militia
officer Major-General P.E. Leclerc. u Leclerc arrived in St.
'In 1915 Major-General Phelan went overseas as a
~u~~~u~~~~ ~~~:a;{t~i~he; ~~i~n~fih::cll~I~
ceased, having attained. the rank of Major and been awarded the
nso and Me. Between the wars he served in the Canadian
Grenadier Guards, a Montreal-based militia Wlit, which he
&'~an£':i~~n~o;f' th;"er~:~~e~f ~cf{~~~~
At the outbreak of hostilities he was called up in a staff
~~~irre~; ~i~~r i?e4Jl~ ~=:r;~~u~6eAdj~tan~f
Bri9adier. Soortly after this he was };X>Sted to canadian
Mihtary Headquarters, London, En3land in the same
aA,Xlintrrent. In July 1941 he took carmand of the canadian
Rernfarce:rent units Overseas. the p:lSt he held prior to
receiving his prc:m:ltion to Major-General am. appointment as
General Officer eatm3.ndi.n:J W Force. Eyeo"irs Telegram. St.
John's, 5 July 1943, p.4.
lOWD, NAC, 0024, Volure 13, 810. 6 July 1943.
lllbid.... 1 OCtober 1943.
12m World War I Major-General Leclerc enlisted as a
sapper aOO later transferred to the Royal 22n::l. Regirrent. He
won the MilitaIy Medal (r-to1) during that conflict. Betwe'~n the
wars he served in the Regi.trent de Joliette, a QJeber.-based
militia unit. After cc:mnanding the regiment he was praroted
~~i~~J~:lAt~eg~~bre~~o~ldt~~rVihhe~~~t~
the Infantry n·aining centre at the Citadel, Quebec City. In
August 1940 he was praroted to Brigadier and proceeded
overseas in eatrnand of 5 Brigade in 2 Infantry Division. He
~&rc:t~~;o~~fe~abi~is~J', l;~Ch~~i~~~~ g~
held until his posting to Newfoundland as General Officer
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John's on 10 October and took ccmnand six days later. IJ
As the demands for overseas drafts increased in 1943
Atlantic Coomand decided to replace those infantry units
employed as ground defence at selected east coast airfields
with specially organized and equipped artillery W1its
designated Aerodrane Defence CaTpanies (AD Company). Because
of GP..neier's size and isolated location the RCAF want.ed to
maintain the infantry battalion. W Forc~ Headquarters voiced
similar concerns but to no avail. Atlantic Ccmnand ordered
that the infantry units were to be withdrawn. In August the
Pictou Highlanders, who had relieved the Prince Edward Island
Highlanders in February, returned to canada and were replaced
by 1 AD Carpany augmented by a rifle cCfl'Pany frcm the Botwood
defence battalion. In St. John's 2 AD company took up its
duties at Torbay, augmented by a rifle ccxnpany of the St.
John's defence battalion. TIlis arrangement was of short
duration, however, for in OCtober elements of Regiment de
Chateaugay, recently designated Air Defence Battalion (East
Coast) and specially trained and equipped for this duty,
arrived in Newfoundland. 6 Corrpany took responsibility for
ground defence at Gander and 5 carpany at Torbay. The AD
corrmanding W Force. St. John's~, 7 OCtober 1943.
p.3.
llWD, Woe, RG24, volume 13, BI0, 10 OCtober 1943.
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Ccnpanies were returned to canada and disbanded.
When the successful landings in Normandy were wade public
in June 1944, rrost canadian personnel greeted. the news with
enthusiasm. At least the end of the war a~red. to be in
signt. But there was also a drawback to the gcx:xi news.
casualty rates in the Italian Theatre had been higher than
expected and now with the opening of the North West Europe
'ttleatre the requirements for reinforcerrents multiplied. l4 NRMA
soldiers, who by now cooprised almost the entire strength of
WForce, were pressed to volW"lteer for overseas service. The
gravity of the situation was underlined by the fact that the
CDC. Major-General Leclerc. was directed by NDHQ to oversee
the recruiting drive personally. IS Leclerc had been briefed
on this possibility in April when he had travelled to ottawa
14~h recent research indicates that the L-einforcement
problem was an artificial one driven mt so mlch by a sOOrtage
~~~~~s~r:~~r~~~~or:n~oJ:~
and services had rrore rren than required. 'Ihere were tmre than
sufficient cfirsonnel in the reinforcement p:x>l rot the
fui~~~.hase~/~~~o~r=:~eI~ZcI~~~=~
12l:anisea. Chapter 6 "'!he Crisis of 1944" pp. 185-244. Douglas
and Greenhous, Sha.l::latm, Chapter 11. "'!he Hare Front," pp. 235-
268, M:Jrton. Canada and war, Chapter 6, "Limited War Overseas"
pp. 126-14~.
ascer~:fna~~ra~e~~ITre~u~~~l~~ ;~unfal~:Yu.;he_ a~~ho~hr~
recruitinsr carrpaign. However, a War Dia~ entry for 25th AA
~ai~Jn~~ri~U~~i~~~t~~ ~~\~:t~/~~;r~~~~t~~~
170
to receive the Ccmnander of the Order of the British Ehpire
(CBE) from the Governor General. 1G
In December 1944 Major-General Leclerc retired. His
replacement was the scion of the New Brunswick chocolate
empire and veteran militia officer, Major-General H. N.
GanongY Ganong arrived. in St. John's during the first week
of December and took cannand on the 16th.'~
12BM.OBILlZATION AND REPATRIATION
In late winter and spring the descent of Arctic pack ice
choked the northeast coast of the island, effectively
eliminating the threat from enemy shipping. During this
16WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 810, 12 April 1944.
Lieut~~t1I~5 th~aj~~h~dIan~aiti~~J:yav;~~~a.s ~~te~
Warld War I he retun1ed to his home in New Brunswick where he
served in the York Regiment of Militia and after amalgamation,
wi th the carleton and York Regiment. He was coomanding his
regiment when it was activated and took it overseas as part of
1 Division in 1939. In March 1941 he was prOlOClt'~d to
Brigadier and cOlll'flaI1d~d a brigade in 1 Division until July
1942 at which tirre he was praroted to Major-General. He
returned to canada to take cannand of 8 Division of Pacific
COmTIand and when that division was disbanded he took corrmand
~trlDiht~ionpo~~i~e ~~ i=~l~d ~;d cie~~r:lP06~~k~;
COrrrnanding W Force. (St. John's ~i.ns.-.1'el.e9rarn16 Dec 1944,
p.2.1
leWD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 811, 16 December 1944.
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period, the persormel of the coast batteries were normally
safely withdrawn frotn Botwood and Lewisporte during which time
the men could undergo other training .19 As well, by the auturm1
of 1944, the success of the D Day invasion allowed NDHQ to
reassess the coast artillery requirements in Newfoundland and
in OCtober 1944 it was decided to withdraw the coastal
artillery from the north east coast as soon as the winte:r
freeze began. As the ice began to form in Botwood harbour in
late November, Lieutenant-COlonel J.J. MacKenzie, comnander
Defended Port Botwood, began dismantlir:g ilis searchlights and
their engines. 20 On 24 January 1945 the order came to
dismantle the guns and ancillary equipment, a process which
began inmediately. 21 By the first week in Februal.Y all coast
artillery personnel had entrained for St. John's en route to
canada. Meanwhile in Lewisporte on 8 February the 107th
Battery War Diary recorded that "as of 1400 hrs 107th declared
officially out of action ...work begun on preparations to turn
in guns, lights, engines and arrrnunition. Small arms
armnmition withdrawn from troops. ,,22 Action to close the
battery down proceeded apace and on 13 February along with
19WD, NAC, 0024, Volume 14, 372, 5 April .,' :343.
~OWD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 14, 374, 27 November 1945.
2llhid...., 24 January 1945.
~2WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 377, 13 February 1945.
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their supporting infantry troops the 107th were en route to
St. John's, l~aving behind only two sappers from 16 Engineer
services and Works Company as caretakers. ~J
Thus as early as the autumn of 1944, as the threat to the
Atlant.ic coast, including NewfolU1dland, diminished. Canada
began to reduce its eastern defences accordingly. This
partial withdrawal of army troops frem the island at the
earliest opportlU1ity confinned that as the danger of military
action by the Axis in the Western Hemisphere faded canada I s
ccrrmi.tment to Newfoundland would similarly be reduced.
Maintaining troops in NewfotUldland once the war had ended was
obviously something canada had never seriously considered.
While the gunners of the 106th and 107th Batteries were
being repatriated the last unit to be posted to Newfoundland
was preparing for its rrove. The Edmonton Fusiliers, then
stationed. at carrp Niagara. departed by rail for Quebec City
where it boarded the S8 Lady ROOney EOl: St. John I s to relieve
the Regiment de Quebec. Arriving in St. John's in early Murch
1945, the battalion rroved into the Lester's Field Barracks. H
2JWD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 878, 14 February 1945.
24WD, NAC, R.)24 , Volume 15, 058, 7 March 1945.
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On 8 May 1945 St. John's received news that the Allies
had won a canplete victory in Europe with the unconditional
surrender of Germany. Civilian workers were given the day off
and all army units observed "Sunday Routine." However at W
Force Headquarters, "nonnal routine was maintained. ,,25
Festivities to mark the occasion were remarkably restrained,
so much so, that the Headquarters diarist recorded that "VE-
Day celebrations by W Force passed off in a quiet and orderly
fashion. '!he conduct of the troops brought credit to the
Canadian Army. ,,26 The war diary of 16 Engineer Works and
services Cropany had a similar entry: "there was not much
excitement on the army side of the track for it being VE-Day
but the airforce boys are sure going to town! 1127
On 9 May the Edroonton F'usiliers reverted from operational
to training status and were ordered to tum in all heavy
weapons, armnmition, engineer stores and emergency rations. 28
The following day, the artillery units, except for those
enployed in anti-subnarine duties, received the same order
with the addendum "only the requirements of routine duty will
~~WD, NAC, RG24, volume 13, S11, 8 May 1945.
2('..Ibid....
r,WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 14, 878, 8 May 1945.
1~WD, NAC, RG24, Voll..llTIe 15, 058, 9 Hay 1945.
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govern Ccmnanding Officers in granting leave or furlough. "~9
In the weeks that followed CO's were generous in the granting
of leave and for those soldiers remaining on duty, fatigues,
maintenance and sports became their Il'ain activities. The
officers, meanwhile, were kept busy with all the necessary
adrninistrative procedures required to prepare the personnel
and material of W Force for return to canada. At the same
time NDHQ decided that in view of the existing circLUnstances
the conmand of W Force should be reduced to a Brigadiet"' s
position. Brigadier L.C. Gocx:1eve, who as Chief of Staff
Atlantic Ccxm1and was no stranger to Newfoundland, was given
the job of overseeing the withdrawal of the Canadian arm'y' fron
Newfoundland .lO Arriving via Argentia at the end of May he
relieved Major-General Ganong on 1 June 1945. II
since only in exceptional circumstances would soldiers be
discharged outside Canada, a priority basis for the booking of
honeward bound transport was allocated. Personnel in
29WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 14, 493, 10 May 1945.
Offic::r~{at~~ns~~~ri~~ceair~~e~~i:~~~l~~i~f~a
appointments. After world War I he served administrative
appointments in Victoria, at the War Office in London, in
Toronto and in Ottawa. He was Director of Organization at NDHQ
early in the war and in 1940 was transferred to Halifax as
Colonel of the General Staff at Atlantic Coomand Headquarters.
(St. John's Evening Telegram, 2 June 1945, p.?)
HWD, NAC, RG:t4, Volume 13, 811, 1 June 1945.
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Newfoundland who volunteered for service in the Pacific
Theatre or for the occupation forces in Germany were given
first priority and awarded an imnediate thirty days leave upon
arrival in Canada. PersolU1el with 150 or more points were
granted second priority.n Upon arrival in canada they were
awarded. thirty days leave after which their discharge
documentation and medical would begin. Normal release
proceedings were expedited only for C'CXTpassionate reasons or
at the request of the Departrrent of Labour who needed service
personnel with special qualifications, for industry. only in
exceptional circumstances would the personnel of W Force be
repatriated other than by units.
On 25 May NDHQ ordered all AA personnel to return to
Canada by the most expeditious means,n Within a week all gw'1S
and and llary equiprent had been returned to the ordnance
J2The derrobilization of persolU1el was governed by a point
~&~~~~f s~e~~~~~ii~~ ~~~~d~ ~~~ ::~~e~~~~hr~f
and two points for each month or part thereof spend in Canada
(including Newfoundland). Married men, widowers or divorcees
with dependant children were awarded a bonus of twenty
~~ce~~icdSon6flX"~~;n~r~:~~rtmfri~ ~~~y~ed~gI~
~~~~~~a~A~i~rf:re~i~~to~i~;J~a~~l~~~~e~1iho~i
~a'~;~~~i~~~t~~I~~~h~E~l~~~sa~~et~~~
denobilized would have priority over all others. (WO, NA.C,
RG24 , Volurre 14, 878, 18 May 1945)
JJWD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 811, 25 May 1945.
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depot and at the sarre ti.rre units began "the stripping of
files, returning classified. material to Headquarters and
burn.ing of obsolete material. 1114 On 10 June all personnel of
25th AA. Regi.ment rroved to the Transit canp. 'Ibree days later
they boarded the lady Rodney for Bedford, Nova SCotia. I!> On
27 May W Force Headquarters had reccmnended to NOIfJ the
abandonment of all coast defence battery positions. J6 But it
took a month before sufficient transportation was available to
repatriate 103rd Coast Battery. Finally on 29 June the unit
diarist recorded "all bedding turned in and battery proceeding
to Transit Camp leaving Fort cape SpPar, Fort Amherst and Fort
Chain Rock as it rerrerbers it [sic) cold clamny, foggy and
miserable. NJ7 'l1le unit embarked on the~ for canada
on 2 July.lI
For the Engineers, because of the nature of their job,
the tenni.nation of hostilities meant that their workload
increased rather than decreased. As the operational units
departed for Canada and deroobilization the RCE continued the
14WD, NAC, RG24, Valure 14, 493, 5 June 1945.
lSlbid..., 13 June 1945.
l6WD, NAC, RG24 , Volume 13, 811, 27 May 1945.
llND, NAC, RG24, Volusre 14, 372, 29 June 1945.
J8.Ihid...., 2 July 1942.
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derranding task of dismantling the large number of now surplus
facilities. To expedite this task No. 16 Engineer Services
and works Company was designated custcdian for all army
assets, less ordnance, until disposal by the War Assets
Corporation .J!)
As personnel began to depart in large numbers, Canada
offered surplus accorrrrOOa.tion to the cannission of Govenw.ent
for Newfoundland servicemen returning fran overseas duty with
the British forces in order to expedite their release
procedures. Newfoundland authorities, however, refused the
offer, requesting instead office space. 40 The errpty barracks
were therefore used for a short time as a transit carrp for a
small number of repatriated canadian prisoners-of-war who had
been returned aboard RCN vessels. 41The Cortmission also inquired
of W Force Headquarters if it would be willing to repurchase
the military equipment sold to Newfoundland during the
hostilities. In reply the Ccmnission of Governrrent was told
such rratters should now be dealt with by the Newfoundland and
canadian governmemts through the Department of External
J~, NAC, RG24, volume 14, 878, 3 July 1945
IOWD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 813, 2 June 1945 .
•
1I
.Ibid...., 7 JW1e 1945.
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Affairs. ~2 Just over a rronth later WForce recOl'l'lllended to NOHQ
that the Bell Island coast artillery position be stripped of
all usable stores and equipnent less guns (but with their
breech blocks rerroved) and abandoned since the Newfoundland
Government had declined to maintain the position:1l
The announcement of VJ-Day was somewhat of an anticlimax
for W Force since so few Canadian army persoIU1el had been
engaged in the Pacific Theatre. To mark the occasion,
however, a parade and service of thanksgiving was held. ~.,
Finally, at the end of september, direction was received Ercxn
NDHQ for the withdrawal of the remainder of the Canadian Army
Garrison with the exception of administrative and IT'aintenance
personnel and those supporting the rerraining RCAF detachment. ·1';
TIle last elerrents of the last operational unit, the Edrronton
Fusiliers left Newfoundland 31 OCtober 1945 and with this
departure the Canadian Army presence in Newfoundland carre to
an end.
Thus we can see that the end of the war signaled Canada's
42lbi.d..., 29 June 1945.
4J.Ibid...., 1 August 1945.
4~.Ibi.d....., 15 August 1945.
~5lbi.d..., 29 September 1945.
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intentions concerning its military role in peacetimE!
Newfoundland. Sinply put there would be none. As long as
danger threatened canada was determined to play the role of
chief protector for its eastern neighbour. Even the arrival
on the scene of its powerful southern neighOOur did not deter
canada fran its resolve to be the principal player in
Newfoundland's defence. Once peace was achieved, however,
Canada saw no role in Newfoundland. Ottawa, therefore,
directed that the troops and their military equipnent be
repatriated quickly p:::>ssible and that the
infrastructure, so costly to build, be disposed of (at a
fraction of the original cost). This was hardly an indic3.tion
of ulterior designs. Rather it was an indication that having
"done the right thing" C:mada was willing to retire and let
history take its course.
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The irrportance of NewfolU1dland in any plan for the
defence of canada should have been mor.e generally recognized
than it had been by Canada's political leaders during the
turbulent 1930s. It tcok events in Europe, however, to arouse
the politicians to acknowledge what their milita~y advisors
had been telling the<n for years, namely, that canada'S east
coast defence was inextricably tied to the defence of the
island. NewfolU1dland was a North American problem for
although it heretofore had been dependent on Great Britain for
its defence, in the radically changed strategic situation of
1940, it was beyond the capacity of Great Britain to discharge
that responsibility. Once its irrportance to the Atlantic
coast's defence was fully recognized, Newfoundland became a
key element in canadian defence. For that reason, the
canadian cabinet was determined that canada would supplant
Great Britain in the defence of the island. This was
initially reflected in the tirrely dispatch of military and
airforce lUlits in the sumner of 1940 to secure Newfoundland's
vital airfields following which Canada expanded its control of
Newfoundland I s defences with the establishment of W Force in
the auturtU'l of the same year.
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At the same tirre, hO\llever, the United States also
recognized the ifll'Ortance of Newfoundlard to North American
defence. Altb::lugh the American republic was not yet
officially a belligerent - not before Pearl Ha.rl::or in Decerrber
1941 - they were very ooncenred by the distinct possibility of
a British collapse imrediately following the defeat of France
in 1940. Given the doubtful strategic situation in the rronths
that followed, the Arrericaus proposed and the canadians agreed.
to the formation of a Pennanent Joint Board on Defence to
coordinate the defence efforts of roth countries with respect
to ~rth Arrerica. Although not created expressly with
Newfoundland in mind, in its first year of existence nearly
one-half of the board I S reccmnendations dealt with the island
colony.
Increasing United States involverrent in the North
Atlantic brought Alrerican troc:ps to Newfoundland for the first
tirre in January 1941. By then, however, canada fully realized
that the defence of its Maritirre provinces depended in great
part on a secure Newfoundland firmly within the canadian
defence orbit. For this reason, canada decided that it could
not allow any other party to hdve control of the defence of
such an irrportant CCllTpOnent in its own defence scheme. Even
after the United States becarre a belligerent in December 1941,
and PJBD agreements notwithstanding, canada determined that it
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would be the pre-eminent partner in the defence of
NewfolU1dland. To forestall American daninance, Canada
rejected American overtures for "tmified ccmnand" in
NewfolU1dland unless corrrnand was vested in canadian officers -
a condition to which the Americans would not agree. Canada
opted instead for "mutual cooperation" and to shore up its
position, appointed service officers senior to their American
opp::lsite numbers. Thus, it became obvious that after the
initial "dangerous" period following the fall of Europe and
the establishment of the PJBD, Canadian defence poLlcy in
NewfolU1dland was driven rrore by concems ab:lut the United
States involvement in Newfoundland than an Axis threat.
Through joint planning, ca't1bined exercises and close
cooperation t.etween local corrmanders, success was achieved in
coordinating the military actions of the two countries in
NewfOlU1dland. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the
canadian and American anny organizations remained independent,
pledged solely to cooperation in the event of an emergency.
canada had had no clear idea of what a ccmni tlTent to
Newfoundland might involve when it first sent military
personnel to the island in 1940. As the war progressed and
canada asserted itself as Newfoundland I s principal defender,
increasing numbers of Canadian troops were stationed on
Newfoundland soil. The Newfoundland undertaking W,'3S a n{~w and
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challenging experience for the canadian A11ny, given that frOll
the outset it was operating independent of any higher allied
authority. This rreant that it had to establish its own nOOlls.
~. NewfOlU1dland troops came under Canadian call1Bnd and
Newfoundland became, in effect, a sub-cClll1Tl?J1d of the east
coast of canada. The senior Canadian AmlY Office~- functioned
as the Ccmnander NewfolU1dland Defences and exercised strategic
direction over all three services. W Force took res-
ponsibility for internal security, manned fixed defences and
provided rrobile reServes for counter-attack against an enemy
lodgement. Its role was crucial, especially in its ar~.illelY
contribution. rnatUling both AA and coast defence guns guarding
the major fX>rts and airfields. '!his was no small undertaking,
for it involved th\ ""sands of troops, large arrounts of materiel
and the construction of numerous facilities.
Thus the war had brought Canada and Newfoundland L"ngether
strategically and militarily, thereby adding to the already
well-established social. cultural and ccxmercial ties. It
must be errphasized that this new strategic and military
connection did not make confederation inevitable. Indeed,
canada's military withdrawal from Newfoundland was virtually
cenplete before the end of 1945. It may be. however, that it
made ConfedP.ratiLd more possible since canada now had a much
stronger appreciation of just how irrportant Newfoundland was
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to its own security.
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Brigadier P. Earnshaw, 080, Me
Major-General L.P. Page, CB, DSO
Major-General F .R. Phelan, OSO, Me, ve
Major-General P.E. Leclerc, CBE, l'JM, FD
Major-General H.N. Ganong, CBE, VD
Brigadier L. E. Goodeve, DSO
COAST ARTILLERY
"Q" Battery RCA
103 Coast eattery RCA
106 COast Battery RCA
107 Coast Battery RCA
ANrI-AIRCRAFJ' ARTI1.r.ERY
2S AA Regiment
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16 o.::td:er 1940 -
24 Decenber 1941
25~rl941­
5 July 1943
G July 1943 -
15 October 19'13
16 CCtOCcr 19013 -
15 December 1944
16 D2!caTt::er 1944-
31 May 1945
1 June 1945 -
captain R.R. wmd
Major D.V.
Rainnie
Major R.P. HOe.r
Major
C .•T, Mac[X)nald
M3.jo=- R. Sinclair
Lieutenant-
COlonel
C.V. Harris
Lieutenant-
COlonel
R.P. Capel
26 AA. Regiment (E)
26 AA. Regiment (F)
5TH Fortress canpany RCE
16 Engineer Services and Works Corrpany
Black Watch Royal Highlanders of Canada
Queen I S own Rifles of canada
Royal Rifles of canada
Victoria Rifles of Canada
Sherbrooke Fusiliers
Lincoln and Welland Regiment
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Lieutenant-
Colonel
1. B. MacCullum
Lieutenant-
Colonel
J.E. Plarrondon
Captain
R.P. Nicholson
captain
S.F. Willett
Major C.B. Bate
Lieutenant-
Colonel
K.G. Blackader,
Me, ED
Lieutenant-
Colonel
H.C.~ck,
ED
Lieutenant-
Colonel
W.J. Home, Me
Lieutenant-
Colonel
I.H. Eakin
Lieutenant-
Colonel
McA'Nulty
Lieutenant-
Colonel
C.A. Muir
Prince Edward Island Highlanders
Algonquin Regiment
pictou Highlanders
Regiment de Joliette
Regiment de Ste Hyancenthe
Regiment de Montrcagny
Regiment de Quebec
Regiment de Chateauguay
Edrronton Fusiliers
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Lieutenant-
Colonel
c. c. Thompson,
MC, YO
Lieutenant-
Colonel
J.B.Stewart,
E.G.
Lieutenant-
Colonel
J.A. J'daI:ns:Xl, M:::,
ED
Lieutenant-
Colonel G.V.
deBellefeville,
E.D.
Lieutenant-
celonel
R. Hanel
Lieutenant-
Colonel
J.N.E. Grenier,
E.D.
Lieutenant-
Colonel
L.P. Lebel, E.D.
Lieutenant-
Colonel
J. P. Croteau
Lieucenant-
Colonel
T.G. Brown, E.D.
OOQSE BAY DEFENDED AREA
canadian soldiers were also stationed on Newfoundland
territory in Labrador. The uncertain weather conditions at
Gander had long been a matter of concem and as well by 1941
it was obvious that the capacity of the airfield there was
being taxed to the limit. The day-to-day operations and the
increasing numbers of ferried aircraft made it clear that an
additional air facility was required on the east coast.
Labrador, it was decided, offered the best I,X>ssibility since
it would open a new ferry route via Greenland and Iceland and
extend the reach over the North Atlantic for land-based
aircraft enployed in the anti-V-boat role. In early August
1941, therefore. the canadian Government requested
Newfoundland's permission to conduct a survey for a suitable
location. By the end of August a site on a remarkable sand
plateau at Goose Bay forty miles from the coast but with
access to the ocean through Hamilton Inlet was selected.
Construction began inmediately and in one of canada I s rost
phenomenal wartime engineering fec:.ts all records for speed and
ingenuity were broken. By December, although the runways were
not yet paved, the airfield was in use and within a year it
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was fully operational. 1
'1l1e Gcose Bay Defended Area becarre an anny responsibility
and to rreet this task a new formation, G Force, was
established. It eatre: under the operational control of the
General Officer Camandi.ng-in-Chief Atlantic COnmand and was
supported administratively by the Military District No.6. In
June 1942 G Force coomanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J.N.
Medhurst, and consisting of the New Brunswick Rangers infantry
battalion, lOath Coast Defence Battery, 15th BAA Battery, 30th
LAA Battery with supporting and ancillary troops sailed fran
Halifax a1x>ard the SS lady Rodney for Labrador. 2
'1l1e New Brunswick Rang'ers provided security and local
defence. To provide protection against air attack the 15th
HAA. Battery, equiwed with 3 _7- in guns, guarded the ooter
peri.rreter while the 40mn Bofors guns of the 30th lAA. Battery
were grouped around the hangars and runways to provide close-
in protection. The lOath coast Battery was given the task of
guarding the sea approaches by denying the passage of the
narrows between Hamilton Inlet and lake Melville to enemy
fOOnt~~t~~l~ ~la~i~~y~~~,tso~piy~r ;~a~nf~s~n~Keih~~
other heavy goods were taKen in by ship. Air freight supplied
fresh foods and routine needs throughout the rest of the year.
2WD, NAC, Volume 13, 858, June-July 1942.
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subnarines and light surface craft. The well carrouflaged
surprise battery manned two 75rnn guns Slq:p)rted by t\«> 60-
inch searchlights.) Like the 106th arrl 107th C.D. Batteries
on the northeast coast of the island of Newfourxiland the lOath
withdrew fran its battery p:>sition during the freeze-up and
spent the winter in the relative canfort of the air base.
Because of the isolation and the rigorous living
conditions it was decided to rotate all the persormel of G
Force out of the Goose Bay Defended area after one year.
Consequently the following sUlTTT'er the New Brunswick Rangers
were replaced by an Airfield Defence eatpany of the Regirrent
de Chateauguay while the 15th BAA. and 30th LAA. Batteries were
replaced by the 1st and 6th HAA. and 25th LAA Batteries. The
lOath CD Battery remained in place but all unit personnel were
replaced. One unit was added, No. 10. OOR was established to
control the fire of the M batteries. Lieutenant-Colonel
Medhurst was replaced in a::mnand by Lieutenant-Colonel G. T.
Roach. 4
After the allied invasion of Europe in the surrmer of 1944
the enemy threat was assessed as minimal and a decision was
lNicholson, Gl.l.i::1n.el:a, pp. 467 and 4a9.
4WD, NAC, RG24, Volume 13, 858, July 1943.
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taken to withdraw all army operational \.Ulits before winter
freeze-up.
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